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ABSTRACT 
In a set of behavioral, eye tracking, and ERP experiments, this thesis 
explored when and how object-state representation is established, 
maintained, and retrieved in language comprehension. We firstly examined 
whether different object-state representations could be established under two 
contrasting linguistic contexts (e.g., no change – “choose the ice cream” vs. 
change – “drop the ice cream”). Our findings showed that when linguistic 
context was provided, the representation that matched the consequences of 
described events was verified faster than the one that mismatched the 
expected outcome. Then, we studied the time course of establishing object-
state representations with the visual world paradigm. Our results suggested 
that: a) the difference in looks towards the depicted versions of the 
situationally appropriate target object (an intact vs. a dropped ice cream) 
often manifested at the reference to the object but not prior to it; b) eye 
movements were primarily driven by semantic overlap between the visual 
display and the described object-state representation. Moreover, we found 
ERP evidence that was consistent with the need to keep track of, and 
retrieve object-state representations from episodic memory. We conclude 
that object-state representations were activated and retrieved during 
language processing. The work reported in this thesis highlights the need to 
take account of dynamics of event representation to capture the interplay 
between general semantic knowledge about objects and the episodic 
knowledge introduced by the sentential context in language comprehension. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
In this thesis, we shall explore how the language comprehension system keeps 
track of the changes that are entailed by the events described by the unfolding 
language. Specifically, we shall focus on the representation and selection of 
representations of object state, during (and following) descriptions of events in 
which objects experience changes of state. Such changes are often entailed by 
action verbs (e.g., break the window). Nonetheless, the consequence of such 
action is not necessarily determined by the lexical semantics of the verb alone, 
but by semantic knowledge associated with the objects acted upon (e.g. stomp 
on the penny vs. stomp the egg). Here, we shall explore how and when the 
comprehension system keeps track of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of event 
representations. 
In this chapter, theoretical background and foundational studies on the 
construction of mental representations in language comprehension are 
reviewed. We firstly review theories from philosophy, lexical semantics, and 
situation models to provide a theoretical foundation for event representation in 
language. Then, we discuss how events are linked and whether perceptual 
properties of objects are involved in event representations. Finally, we introduce 
the studies in the thesis and the structure of the following chapters.  
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1.2 Conceptualization of events in language 
In philosophy, there is little consensus on the ontology of events, but entities 
within a specific spatiotemporal framework are considered to be essential for 
identifying event structure. Immanuel Kant (1781/1961) proposed that our ability 
to conceive of and understand events comes from experience, but this is also 
structured in some basic primitive elements, such as space, time, and causality. 
Davidson (1980) further stated that spatial and temporal dimensions individuate 
events, while causality helps to determine how events relate to each other. 
Barwise and Perry (1981) distinguished between two types of events: states-of-
affairs and courses-of-events. A state-of-affairs is not dynamic and exists on a 
single spatiotemporal location, which is similar to a snapshot.  A course-of-
events, however, unfolds over time and space, which is linked by the uniformity 
of entities.  
Despite the differences in definition, we can see from the above 
philosophical views that events are often associated with time and space, which 
are known to provide a spatial and temporal framework for events that occur 
within that space (e.g. a room) and time (e.g. a day) (Wyer & Radvansky, 1999). 
These ideas form the foundation for theories of event structure and event 
representation.  
Following this line of theoretical framework, theories of mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983) and situation models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) propose 
that spatiotemporal and causal relations are also involved in language 
comprehension (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). An individual event representation 
is a building block of an integrated situation model. Readers keep track of the 
relations between events on different indexes, such as space, time, and 
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protagonists. A new integrated model will be constructed when an event index 
that links the current model and a future model needs to be updated (Zwaan, 
Radvasky, & Witten, 2002). In this way, we are able to interpret continuous 
description of events that may be conveyed in an order and manner that is 
different from our everyday experience. We are also able to understand events 
that are not necessarily restricted to objects and people within our proximity, but 
to refer to any event in the past, in the future, or even in an imaginary world 
which is not limited by our existence in the current space and time.  
By contrast, lexical semantics theories propose that lexical entries capture 
the underlying cognitive structure of events (Rappaport Hovav & Levin, 1998). 
Verbs contain not only phonological, orthographic, and semantic information, 
but also a conceptual structure of events that is projected to the syntactic 
structure of utterances (Goldberg, 1995; Jackendoff, 1990; Levin, 1993; Slobin. 
1991, 1996; Talmy, 1975). Learning verbs to describe events requires 
abstracting the action. Verbs like break and crack indicate a specific type of 
damage resulting from a forceful impact and have the same event structure. As 
the endpoint of such events is often lexicalized as part of verb meaning, the 
consequences of the action cannot be changed in subsequent linguistic context. 
In the following two subsections, empirical evidence of how events are 
represented in language comprehension from the lexical semantics and 
situation models perspectives is provided. Then, the potential role of objects in 
forming consistent memory and language comprehension is discussed. 
1.2.1 Events and verb semantics  
According to Vendler (1967), verbs are the means by which language describes 
events. There are four types of events, that are conceptualized in verbs and 
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verb phrases, including states (e.g., have, believe), activities (e.g., swim, run), 
accomplishments (e.g., paint a picture, deliver a parcel), and achievements 
(e.g., reach, find). Events that are described by state and activities verbs have 
no predicted end point. By contrast, events that are described by 
accomplishments and achievements describe a change of state that extends 
over a period of time. 
Moreover, verbs may also lexicalize the perspective of events differently 
and influence event perception. Papafragou, Hulbert, Trueswell (2008) asked 
participants to view motion events while preparing for verbal description or 
memorizing the events. They recruited native speakers of Greek who typically 
describe motion events with verbs about the path of events (e.g., approach) and 
native speakers of English who usually use verbs about the manner of events 
(e.g., slide). They found significant cross-language differences: Participants 
focused on the event components typically encoded in their native language in 
the verb description task but not in the memory task. The results indicate that 
speakers’ native language influences how events are perceived in the visual 
scene.  
Nevertheless, associating events with verb semantics does not always give 
rise to the appropriate event representation, because sometimes the outcome 
of events is not determined by a single verb in isolation but derived from the 
entire verb phrase, or even the entire utterance or discourse. For example, 
stomp on, may or may not indicate damage to the objects in (1).  
(1) a. Joe will stomp on the penny. – no change 
   b. Joe will stomp on the egg.    – change  
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The propositional representation of the ‘stomp on’ action for the two sentences 
would be the same, despite the nouns indicating two distinctive consequences. 
In this case, lexical semantics theories tell us little about how we integrate the 
meanings of words into an event representation for the utterance.  
In addition, lexical semantics theories assume that there is a one-to-one 
mapping between a word entry and its conceptual meaning, but in fact, 
properties of entities can be changed as language unfolds. For example, if you 
hear or read “The girl will stomp on the egg. And then, she will look down at the 
egg”, for the same noun phrase ‘the egg’ you will know its first reference 
(possibly an intact egg) is different in its physical state from the second 
reference (possibly a broken egg) due to the ‘stomp on’ action. Thus, a static 
representation of the event based on verb semantics alone cannot capture the 
dynamic change of ‘the egg’ form before to after the action. 
1.2.2 Events and situation models  
An alternative account of event conceptualization, however, suggests that 
language could be seen as a set of instructions to construct a mental 
representation of the described situation rather than the text itself. Mental 
Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) and Situation Models (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) 
assume that representations derived from language and perceptual-motor 
experiences share most of their properties. When we construct a situation 
model, we bring together our experiential knowledge with linguistic descriptions 
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). As a ‘penny’ and an ‘egg’ differ in their 
experienced physical properties (eggs are fragile but pennies are not), we 
predict different outcomes for the entities.  
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In narrative comprehension, described situations have shown to have 
effects on how readers remember events. For example, Bransford, Barclay, and 
Franks (1972) had participants listen to sentences such as (2a) and (2b) and 
then (2c) and (2d) for a recognition test.  
(2) a. Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them.  
     b. Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them. 
    c. Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it.  
d. Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it.  
Essentially, (2a) and (2c) describe the same situation in which three turtles 
resting on a log with a fish swimming beneath them (and the log). (2b) and (2d) 
describe different situations because the fish was under the turtles in (2b) and 
under the log in (2d). Results showed that participants who had heard (2a) 
frequently mistook (2c) as the answer, while people who had heard (2b) rarely 
confused it with (2d). These findings showed that we understand narratives by 
constructing representations of events described in the text rather than simply 
remembering the text itself.  
Situation models are considered as dynamic representations rather than 
static snapshots of events. A situation model is said to encode features of the 
current event across multiple dimensions, such as location (e.g., Glenberg, 
Meyer, & Lindem, 1987, Radvansky, 2005; Radvansky & Copeland, 2006; 
Radvansky & Copeland, 2010), time (Radvansky, Zwaan, Federico, & Franklin, 
1998; Speer & Zacks, 2005; Zwaan, 1996), goals, agents, and objects. As 
Zwaan, Radvasky, & Whitten (2002) pointed out, readers track the relations 
between events on at least five indexes: time, space, causality, intentionality, 
and protagonist. Therefore, they construct, update, and retrieve the situation 
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models based on these dimensions. When a change happens in any dimension, 
the current model will be updated to integrate the most recent information and 
deactivate irrelevant information.  
In line with situation models, Zacks, et al. (2007) proposed the Event 
Segmentation Models that changes in the environment would introduce a 
transient period of event model updating and resettling in working memory, 
known as an event boundary. Encountering this event boundary, such as 
temporal (e.g., before, an hour later) or location shifts (e.g., from one room to 
another) introduces a need to update one’s current situation modes, and this 
updating process is effortful. Sentences describing this boundary were thus 
read more slowly than other clauses in narrative comprehension (Speer, Zacks, 
& Reynolds, 2007), but objects that are associated with the event boundary 
becomes more prominent than nonbounary objects (Swallow, Zacks, & Abrams, 
2009). Previously encountered objects, however, were less accessible after 
crossing event boundaries. Retrieval interference, which occurs when there are 
multiple models in memory and only a single model is required to be retrieved, 
is attributed to this decreased accessibility (Radvansky, 2012). 
For example, Glenberg, Meyer, and Lindem (1987) showed that changes 
of the location influence the accessibility of entities in language comprehension. 
In this study, participants were asked to read a story and judge if an object (e.g., 
sweatshirt) had been mentioned earlier in the story. They found that participants 
had shorter response time when the target object was spatially associated with 
the agent (e.g., he put on his sweatshirt and went jogging) than dissociated 
(e.g., he took off his sweatshirt and went jogging). They argued that when a 
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target object was detached from an agent in a new location, it was deactivated 
from the situation model. 
Similarly, a temporal change encountered during reading is also shown 
to influence the accessibility of information prior to the time shift. Zwaan (1996) 
asked participants to read a sentence that either included a short time shift (e.g., 
Teresa walked onto the stage. A moment later, she collapsed.), or a long time 
shift (e.g., Teresa walked onto the stage. An hour later, she collapsed.). Results 
showed that information from the previously narrated event was less accessible 
when it was followed by “an hour later” than “a moment later”, suggesting a long 
narrative time shift created a large temporal distance between events. Similarly, 
Speer & Zacks (2005) asked participants to read narratives that contained 
continuous description of a single protagonist’s everyday activity. Either “a 
moment later…” or “an hour later” was used to indicate a change in narrative 
time. They found that when a temporal change is encountered during reading, it 
is perceived as event boundaries and readers are slower and less able to 
accurately retrieve prior information. 
There is limited evidence on whether this kind of shift of object states 
would influence language comprehension in a similar way as the spatial or 
temporal shifts, as most empirical evidence is based on spatial or temporal 
shifts alone (e.g., Glenberg, et al., 1987; Radvansky, 2009; Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006, 2012; Zwaan, 1996) or the combination of multiple dimensions 
(Zacks, Speer, and Reynolds, 2009). Nonetheless, events occur when objects 
change or interact (Miller & Johnson-Lair, 1976). Objects are also concrete and 
can be re-identified, but a given event can only be experienced once. For 
example, a window is not an event, but a window being broken is. Due to such 
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events, the window can be shifted to a new form of existence in time (e.g., 
break the window). In the next section, we review empirical studies that have 
shown that perceptual features of objects are activated in event representation. 
We propose that object properties are likely to be updated in current situation 
models as language unfolds.  
1.3 Perceptual properties of objects are activated in language 
comprehension  
Associated with each object are its perceptual properties, such as colour, size, 
orientation, and motion direction. In the real world, we rely on these features to 
determine an object’s identity or category if these features are diagnostic for the 
decisions (Lee and Chun, 2001; Palmeri and Tarr, 2008). Barsalou (1999) 
argued that even these features are schematic in the brain, and that perceptual 
simulations are involved in human cognitive processes, including language 
comprehension. In line with this idea, previous have shown that perceptual 
features can be activated by object names (Allopenna et al., 1998; Cooper, 
1974), achromatic line drawings of objects (Martin et al., 1995), semantically 
related words (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 2005; Huettig & Altmann, 2005, 2007; Yee 
& Sedivy, 2006), and linguistic context (Ferguson, Tresh, & Leblond, 2013; 
Stanfied &Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002; Zwaan, Madden, 
Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). 
Moreover, the activation of object representation is shown to be context 
dependent. Words are usually not encountered in isolation but in the context of 
other words. For example, the word “chair” has at least two distinct unrelated 
meanings, one referring to a piece of furniture for one person to sit on (e.g., “He 
sank back into his chair”) and the other to the position of being in charge of a 
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meeting or committee (e.g., “Address your questions to the chair, please”). A 
word like “fish” has multiple related meanings. It may refer to an animal that 
lives in the water (e.g., “I caught three huge fish this morning”) or the action of 
trying to catch the animal (e.g., “My grandpa really loves to fish”). 
Importantly, there are even subtler distinction of meanings. Stanfield and 
Zwaan (2001) provided evidence on the activation of an object’s different 
orientations depending on the linguistic context. In this study, they used the 
sentence-picture verification task. Participants were asked to read sentences 
like "He hammered the nail into the wall" (indicating a horizontal orientation) and 
"He hammered the nail into the floor" (indicating a vertical orientation) and to 
judge if a nail in the subsequently presented picture (either being horizontal or 
vertical) was mentioned in the sentence. They found that participants reacted 
faster to the probe picture when the orientation in the picture matched with the 
description than when they mismatched. 
Using the same task, Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley (2002) illustrated that 
the shape of the described objects could be activated in language 
comprehension. In this study, participants read sentences like "The eagle was 
in the nest" (implying an eagle with folded wings) or "The eagle was in the sky" 
(implying an eagle with outstretched wings) and verified whether the item 
depicted in a subsequent picture was mentioned in the sentences. Consistent 
with Stanfied and Zwaan (2001), participants were faster to respond to the 
matched picture than the mismatched one. 
Related, Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, and Aveyard (2004) showed that the 
direction of motion of objects could also be activated.  In this study, participants 
listened to recorded sentences that described the motion of an object toward or 
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away from the participants (e.g., The pitcher hurled the softball to you). Then, 
two pictures of the object (e.g., the ball) were presented with the second one 
smaller or bigger than the first one, indicating motion direction of the ball. 
Participants were required to judge whether the two objects were the same or 
not. Results showed that they responded faster when the depicted objects 
matched the implied motion direction of the recorded sentences.  
Perhaps, the activated perceptual properties were part of an integrated 
representation of the object. As Lee and Chun (2001) noted, a single feature of 
an object is not sufficient to characterize it. Instead, as each object is comprised 
of multiple features (e.g., a long, red, vertical line), an integrated aggregation of 
features is likely to be involved in object representation rather than individual 
features. Palmeri and Tarr (2008) further argued that we know more about 
objects than just their individual features like shape, colour, or size. We rely on 
these features to determine an object’s identity or category if these features are 
diagnostic for the decisions. 
However, these studies assume that the object would remain unchanged 
in its location and physical state. The fact that objects around us often change 
locations and properties has been largely neglected in the language 
comprehension literature. The study by Altmann and Kamide (2009) 
demonstrated that when an object is associated with multiple locations (before 
and after being moved), our attention can be directed to its future location 
despite its current location on a concurrently presented visual scene. The 
results suggest that an object can be associated with different locations in 
memory and these locations compete in subsequent language comprehension. 
Recently, Kukona, Altmann and Kamide (2014) provide further evidence on the 
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existence of multiple representations of the same object as it is described to 
move locations. When a location is not referred to in the linguistic context, we 
are able to retrieve it due to its association with the target object, which may 
form an important link in the temporal-spatial conceptual framework. These 
findings are consistent with abstract representations of objects in visual memory, 
with location-based perceptual representations of objects serving as episodic 
memory traces (Hoover & Richardson, 2008). 
Nonetheless, objects may have distinct representations at the same 
location when it is described to experience a substantial change of state. For 
example, when you hear “The teenager smashed the back window of his 
neighbour’s car”, you would understand window would be most likely in pieces 
after being smashed, but was intact before this event. Location information is 
not particularly helpful in this case, as the window may be either intact or broken 
in the same location. In a more complex scenario, you may buy a new vase 
from IKEA and take it home. You place it on the table. The next day, your cat 
accidently knocks it over and breaks the vase. In this scenario, the vase is 
associated with multiple locations and physical states across time. It also 
interacts with at least two different protagonists, you and your cat. When you tell 
this to a friend, how do they achieve successful understanding of this story?  
Recent work has demonstrated that the change of object state is likely to 
activate multiple states of the same object and these representations may 
compete during language comprehension. Using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) technique, Hindy, Altmann, Kalenik, and Thompson-Schill (2012) 
conduted two experiments with two sets of stimuli. In the first experiment, the 
degree of change was manipulated by using different verbs (e.g., The woman 
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will drop/choose the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream), but by 
using different nouns in the second experiment (e.g., The girl will stomp on the 
egg/penny. And then, she will look down at the egg/penny). In both experiments, 
they revealed that there was a correlation between the degree of change (that 
was entailed by the description of what happened to the object) and BOLD 
responses in the left ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (that is sensitive to word-
colour interference in the stroop task). This pattern suggests competitive effects 
between representations of the same object increase with the dissimilarity 
between object states before and after change. Understanding of the described 
scenario thus comes at a cost of resolving this competition between object 
representations. 
This is consistent with theories of event boundaries (Radvansky, 2012; 
Zacks, et al., 2007) that retrieval interference occurs when a single model is 
required to be retrieved after crossing event boundaries due to temporal shifts 
(e.g., but first/and then). Thus, to understand stories involving description of 
changes, we may need to overcome retrieval interference of competing 
situation models. Yet, due to the less than ideal temporal resolution of fMRI 
technique, it remains unknown at what point during language processing the 
interference arose and solved. For example, on reading “The woman dropped 
the ice cream. And then, she looked at the ice cream sadly”, when do we 
change the representation of the ice cream she was perhaps holding, to a 
representation of the ‘ice cream’ dropped onto the floor or other surface? When 
we subsequently read that ‘she looked at the ice cream’, do we at that point 
construct the appropriate representation of the ice cream (dropped onto a 
surface) or was that representation already constructed by the time we finished 
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reading the first sentence? In other words, when do we establish and perhaps 
shift between the one representation and the other? If we did not construct it 
then, how would we know at the end of the second sentence which is the 
correct “interpretation” of the ice cream that is intended by the writer? 
In an attempt to identify at what point in sentence comprehension this 
conflict may reveal, Kalenik (2012) asked participants to read these sentences 
in a self-paced reading task by using the same set of stimuli in Hindy et al. 
(2012). The hypothesis was that conflict resolution would be indicated by a 
slower reading times for a segment of the sentence. Results showed that 
reading times of the object name was longer when the object was described to 
experience a substantial change of state than no change. In Experiment 1, this 
difference was revealed at the second mention of the object (e.g., The woman 
will choose/drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream), but in 
Experiment 2 the difference was at the first mention of the object (e.g., The girl 
will stomp on the penny/egg. And then, she will look down at the penny/egg). 
The results have demonstrated that reading times of subsequent segment was 
likely to be influenced by the degree of change of the target subject, but there 
was no consistent evidence on when the influence was manifested. This 
discrepancy may come from the difference in experimental stimuli in the two 
experiments. Perhaps, using more temporal sensitive measures, such as eye 
tracking and evet related potentials (ERP) method would provide a clearer 
picture of the time course in language comprehension.  
In sum, existing literature on sentence comprehension suggests that 
perceptual properties of objects are activated in language processing. These 
properties may be linked to a particular location or physical state. When this 
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location or state changes, multiple representations of a target object can be 
activated. However, it is not clear at what point in language processing object 
representations are updated when temporal shifts are involved in subsequent 
language comprehension. In the next section, the current research is introduced, 
which attempts to explore the behavioural and neurophysiological evidence for 
keeping track of object-state representations in language comprehension as the 
target object experiences a change of physical properties brought about by 
external forces.   
1.4 Current research 
So far, there is limited evidence on whether object-state representations can be 
activated when an object is described as experiencing a change of state while 
the location remains the same. The time course of the activation of object-state 
representations and behavioural correlates of such sensitivity remains unknown. 
If there are indeed multiple representations of object-state, we shall find an 
object is associated with different states at different times relative to the 
narrated events, can be activated and switched between during online language 
comprehension, especially how temporal shifts (but first/and then) influence the 
retrieval of an object representation. 
Specifically, we ask three research questions. First, are we aware of the 
different states of the same object as the language describing a state-changing 
event unfolds? Second, what is the time course with which we keep track of the 
states of the object? That is, at what time during language comprehension do 
we know which state is intended to retrieve after encountering temporal shifts 
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(but first/and then). Third, what is the cognitive mechanism that enables us to 
keep track of object-state representation?  
The paradigms that we use in this research include the picture 
verification task (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), eye-tracking (Tanenhaus et al., 
1995; Altamnn & Kamide, 1999), and event-related potentials (Luck, 2005), 
which will be introduced in more details in the following chapters. With the 
picture verification task, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 explore whether are we are 
sensitive to the states of the described target object. With eye-tracking 
measures, Experiments 4 to 8 examine the time course of keeping track of 
object-state representations in real time language comprehension in the visual 
world. Moreover, Experiment 9 explores ERPs evidence of activating object-
state representations as the object was described to experience a change of 
state event. 
1.5 Outline of the thesis  
Chapter 2 explores whether object-state representations can be constructed in 
language comprehension. The picture verification paradigm is used to explore 
whether match/mismatch effect can be replicated when object features is 
manipulated by the degree of change. Chapter 3 examines the time course of 
constructing and updating object representations by using the visual world 
paradigm of eye-tracking. Chapter 4 focuses on the underlying reason for eye 
movements towards the appropriate object-state in language comprehension. 
Chapter 5 provides ERP evidence for keeping track of object-state 
representation during the comprehension process. Chapter 6 summarizes the 
findings and discusses methodological implications and theoretical contributions.   
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CHAPTER 2 
What does “the ice cream” look like? Conflicting 
object-state representations in language 
comprehension  
2.1 Overview 
The first three experiments reported in this thesis investigate whether detailed 
mental representations of objects can be activated in different linguistic contexts, 
and whether these established representations could be modified over the 
course of a sentence as new information is provided. For instance, we may 
activate a representation of what the ice cream would be like when we hear 
“The woman will drop the ice cream” (e.g., a dropped ice cream), but this 
representation may be modified if its original intact state was implied in the 
subsequent sentence “But first, she will look at the ice cream” (e.g., an upright 
ice cream).  
The idea that language comprehension involves activating detailed 
mental representations (see Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998 for a review) has been 
supported by empirical evidence. For example, Stanfield and Zwaan (2001) 
asked participants to read sentences like “The carpenter hammered the nail into 
the wall/floor” and verified whether a pictured nail was mentioned in the 
sentence. Critically, the nail in the picture either matched or mismatched the 
implied orientation. Although the nail’s orientation was irrelevant to the task, 
participants reacted faster to the pictured nail (e.g., a vertically oriented nail) 
that was compatible with its implied orientation (“The carpenter hammered the 
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nail into the floor”) than the picture showing a nail with an incompatible 
orientation (“The carpenter hammered the nail into the floor”). Using a similar 
task, subsequent studies found that semantic other perceptual properties of 
objects can also be activated, including shape (Zwaan et al., 2002), motion 
direction (Zwaan, et al., 2004), and visibility (Yaxley & Zwaan, 2006) of objects 
that were implied in the linguistic context. Response latency is a particularly 
important measure in these studies because response accuracy is usually high. 
Recently, Zwaan and Pecher (2012) replicated the above-mentioned lab-based 
results via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, showing shorter verification times for 
objects with perceptual properties that matched the linguistic description than 
mismatched. These studies demonstrated that language comprehension 
involves activation of contextually appropriate detailed mental representation of 
described objects.  
Nevertheless, target objects in Zwaan and colleagues’ studies (e.g., the 
nail) were often associated with a particular location (e.g., on the wall/floor) that 
encoded spatial properties of events (e.g., Morrow & Clark, 1989; Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2006, 2010). Thus, the target object may be activated in one location 
but may not be accessible in another location. For example, a study by 
Glenberg et al. (1987) ask participants read short stories with the target object 
either spatially associated (e.g., “after doing a few warm-up exercises, John put 
on his sweatshirt and went jogging”) or disassociated with the protagonist (“after 
doing a few warm-up exercises John took off his sweatshirt and went jogging”). 
Then they were asked to make a recognition response to the target word 
(“sweatshirt”). They found that it took longer for participants to respond to the 
target word after reading the spatially dissociated sentences, compared with the 
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spatially associated sentences. This shows that spatial location shifts influenced 
the accessibility of the target object.  
However, in a different scenario, the target object may stay at the same 
location, but it may be physically changed. For example, the nail may not be 
successfully pounded into the wall but bent half way. The sweatshirt may be 
torn by a tree branch when the protagonist is running across a forest. In other 
words, the same location would be possibly associated with different physical 
states of the target object. In this case, do we construct contextually appropriate 
representations for this object before and after being changed? Another issue 
that has not been explored in previous studies is whether these representations 
can be retrieved in subsequent sentences and whether backward and forward 
temporal shifts (but first/and then) influence the retrieval process differently. In 
the remainder of this chapter, and indeed this thesis, we explore these 
questions further.  
In this chapter, we aim to examine whether object representation can be 
activated, maintained, and retrieved when location information is not provided. 
Data were collected via Mechanical Turk with the sentence-picture verification 
paradigm that has been used by Zwaan and colleagues. On each trial, 
participants read a word (e.g., ice cream) or a sentence and then indicate 
whether a subsequent picture is mentioned in the text. By using pictures as 
probe, what the object name refers to is depicted visually and might be closer to 
the nature of our underlying representation of this object. In this way, any 
observed effects should not be attributed to the imageability of the object, but 
the construction of mental representations. The durations that it took 
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participants to read the text and respond to the picture were both measured. 
Accuracy rates of responding the probe pictures were also calculated. 
Typically, people are faster and more accurately to make judgments 
when the visually depicted picture is consistent with linguistically described 
information (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 
2004; Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley, 2002; Yaxley & Zwaan, 2006). Therefore, 
we predicted that participants would react faster to a probe picture when it 
matched the described state of the target object than it mismatched the state 
(e.g., shorter reaction times to a flatten ice cream when they read “drop the ice 
cream” than “choose the ice cream”).  
In all three experiments, experimental stimuli were adapted from 
sentences used in the Hindy et al. (2012) study and modified to accommodate 
the requirements of the picture-verification paradigm. We used the same 
participant recruitment and exclusion criteria and analyzed the data with the 
same trimming procedure as specified in Zwaan and Pecher (2012). First, we 
asked participants about their native language at the end of the experiment as 
part of a demographic questionnaire. We excluded the data from the small 
number of participants who were nonnative speakers of English. We also 
specified that participants should not have done other experiments from our lab 
before. If there were someone who had taken part in more than one experiment, 
we would exclude him or her from data analysis. Second, we eliminated the 
last-run participants of the longer list to create equal-length lists by following 
Zwaan & Pecher (2012) to ensure that each item’s mean is calculated over the 
same number of observations. Third, all RTs that were from incorrect answers 
were removed. Besides, RTs that were faster than 300 ms and slower than 
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3000 ms were excluded. Then, median response times (RTs) of picture probes 
were calculated across subjects and items. Average RTs were thus calculated 
based on these median scores. 
In Experiment 1, a set of objects (e.g., ice cream) were presented in 
words and were visually depicted in a subsequently presented probe picture. In 
each trial, participants read an object name and judged whether a probe picture 
showed the correct object. Each object was depicted in an intact or changed 
form, corresponding to the object which had undergone a ‘minimal/no’ or a 
‘substantial’ changes of state, respectively. The intact state (e.g., an upright ice 
cream) was showing what an object would naturally occur in, while the changed 
state (e.g., a dropped ice cream) appeared to be altered from the intact state by 
external forces. In this way, we investigated whether the intact state or the 
changed state was closer to the prototype of the object. 
Experiment 2 investigated whether the pattern observed in Experiment 1 
could be modulated by the linguistic context. The stimuli in Experiment 2 
consisted of single sentences that described either a substantial change of state 
(e.g., The woman has dropped the ice cream) or no change (e.g., The woman 
has chosen the ice cream). We expected to see different reaction times to the 
same picture depending on the sentences, such as faster reaction times to a 
dropped ice cream in ‘drop’ than ‘choose’ and vice versa, as indicated by the 
match/mismatch effect (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001). 
 Experiment 3 extended the stimuli to two sentences (e.g., The woman 
chose/dropped the ice cream. But first/And then, she looked at the ice cream). 
In this way, we aimed to examine which state (if multiple states have existed) 
was treated as the final representation of the target object after temporal shifts 
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(but first/and then). We also investigated whether accessibility of object 
representation would be influenced by the time gap between sentence reading 
and probe recognition. The picture probe was thus presented either after a short 
delay (250 ms) or a long delay (1250 ms). We expected to see match/mismatch 
effect that has been demonstrated in previous studies by Zwaan and colleages 
(e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001), e.g., shorter response times were predicted 
when participants responded to a dropped ice cream in “drop, and then” than 
“choose, and then”. Besides, following Hindy et al. (2012) we expected to see 
the degree of change that the object underwent influencing the constructed 
object-state representation(s). Specifically, we predicted that a substantial 
change of an object would lead to competition between the conflicting object 
states (‘before’ and ‘after’ states). Thus, we predicted that there would be longer 
reaction times to the probe picture when the first-sentence contained the “drop” 
than the “choose”. Nonetheless, the retrieval of object representation may be 
subject to the time that is available for constructing situation models before 
probe recognition.  
2.2 Experiment 1  
Experiment 1 intended to investigate the activation an object’s representation 
after participants had read an object name (e.g., ice cream), which was 
measured by means of reaction times to a picture probe. At first blush, object 
state was not relevant as long as both pictured versions of the object could be 
correctly identified as what the object name referred to. Rosch (1975) 
suggested, however, good exemplars of a category could be identified faster 
than poor exemplars, because they closely match a prototype of this category. 
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A dropped ice cream may be less typical of ice creams than are the ones that 
we eat (and which are intact, either in a cone or a tub), in which case perhaps 
the unusual image of a dropped ice cream may contribute to the time it takes to 
process a sentence that refers to one. Thus, in Experiment 1 object names (e.g., 
ice cream) were presented without giving any context so as to get the typicality 
of the intact state and changed state as an object’s representation. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants. 118 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
system (54 female, mean age 36, range 19-64 years old). They received $1.5 
for their participation in the experiment, which lasted approximately 20 min1. 
There was one nonnative speaker of English in the sample. With the exclusion 
of this participant, the sample included 117 native speakers of English.  
Materials. 32 stimuli were selected from the original 120 sets from Experiment 1 
in Hindy et al (2012). Each stimulus from this set was consisted of two 
sentences (e.g., The woman will choose/drop the ice cream. But first/And then, 
she will look at the ice cream). For Experiment 1, only nouns in the selected 
stimuli were kept for the current experiment (e.g., ice cream). A picture that 
depicted either an intact state or a changed state of the named object was 
presented after each experimental item. As all experimental items required “yes” 
responses, 32 foil items that required “no” answers were added. All words 
referred to concrete objects such as “ice cream”, “acorn”, etc. All pictured 
objects were scaled to approximately three inches. The pictures were taken 
from clipart.com and were edited with Adobe Illustrator for optimal similarity in 
perceptual features, as shown in Figure 2.1.  
                                                 
1 The median hourly rate on Mechanical Turk is $1.38 (Horton & Chilton, 2010).  
24 
 
Design. A within-subjects design was used. Two lists of stimuli were created to 
counterbalance items and conditions. Each participant saw either an intact or 
changed version of the same target object after reading the object name.  
Procedure. The stimuli were presented online using the Qualtrics Research 
Suite. Participants first completed a practice session with 4 warm-up trials. Then, 
32 experimental trials and 32 foil trials were presented in a random sequence. 
Each trial started with a left justified and vertically centered fixation cross for 
1000 ms, immediately followed by a written word, centered at the same location 
as the fixation cross. Participants pressed the Space bar when they had 
understood the word. After the key press, a fixation cross appeared for 500 ms, 
immediately followed by a picture. Participants were asked to judge if the item 
depicted in the picture had been mentioned in the text that was presented 
before. They responded by pressing the c-key for “no” responses and the m-key 
for “yes” responses. The next trial started 500 ms after the response. After 
completing all trials, participants answered questions about their age, gender, 
and native languages.  
  
(a)                                              (b) 
Figure 2.1 Experiment 1: Example pictures showing the intact state (left) and the 
changed state (right) of an ice cream. In each trial, an object name was mentioned 
and then followed by a picture like a or b. Participants were required to verify if the 
item depicted in the picture was the one that the object name referred to. 
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2.2.2 Results 
Four participants had accuracy scores <80%, which was three times less than 
the standard deviation from the mean response accuracy (M=96.63%, 
SD=1.27). Data from these participants were removed. Besides, to equate the 
number of participants per list by following Zwaan & Pecher (2012) to ensure 
that each item’s mean is calculated over the same number of observations, the 
last-run three participants were removed so that each list had the same number 
of participants. Thus, data analysis involved 110 participants, with 55 persons 
per list. Mean verification accuracy rates and latencies are shown in Figure 2.2. 
A paired-sample t-test showed that participants responded more accurately to 
the pictures depicting the intact state than the change state (significant by 
subjects but not by items), t1(109) = 8.22, p < .001, t2(31) = 1.51, p = .140. They 
also responded faster to the intact state than the changed state (significant both 
by subjects and by items), t1(109) = - 5.75, p < .001, t2(31) = - 2.59, p = .015. 
Therefore, Experiment 1 showed that verification times for the intact state was 
shorter than the changed state. This result suggests that the intact state of 
object may be the default or typical object-state representation in mind when no 
contextual information was provided.  
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Figure 2.2 Experiment 1: Mean accuracy rates (left) and response times (right) of correct 
responses in the picture verification task of Experiment 1. 
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2.3 Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 investigated whether constructing object-state representation 
could be modulated by linguistic contexts. Is the representation of the ice cream 
in its intact (pre-dropped) state more, or less, accessible depending on whether 
one reads, “The woman has dropped the ice cream” or “The woman has chosen 
the ice cream”? In both cases, we presume that the initial state of the ice cream 
is intact supported by the evidence from Experiment 1 – so we are therefore 
asking whether mentioning a change of state event (in the “drop” case) makes 
the intact initial state (hereafter referred to as “intact state”) less accessible but 
the changed end state (hereafter referred to as “changed state”) more 
accessible. In this experiment, participants read sentences such as “The 
woman has dropped the ice cream”, which describes a change of state that 
happened to an ice cream, or “The woman has chosen the ice cream”, which 
describes a minimal or no change of state that occurred on it2. We measured 
how long it took participants to finish reading each of the two versions of 
sentences (change vs. no change). We also measured how accurate and how 
long it took participants to respond to the two versions of the picture probes 
(intact state vs. changed state).  
Following Kalenik’s (2012) result (see Section 2.1), we predicted that it 
would take longer for participants to read the sentence involving a change of 
state (e.g., The woman has dropped the ice cream. And then/But first, she 
looked at the ice cream) than no change (e.g., The woman has chosen the ice 
cream. And then/But first, she looked at the ice cream). Besides, by following 
                                                 
2 These sentences were rated in a separate study to determine the degree of change that the object was 
deemed to have undergone, showing significantly higher degree of change in the ‘drop’ condition than 
the ‘choose’ condition. t(119) = 27.63, p < .001 (120 sets of stimuli, Hindy et al, 2012) 
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Zwaan and colleagues, we predicted that the intact state of the ice cream would 
be more accessible (higher accuracy rates, faster verification times) when no 
change was described, but the changed state would be more accessible when a 
change of state event was described. 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants. 211 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
system (104 female, mean age 34, range 18-69 years old). They received $1.50 
for their participation in the experiment, which lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
There were 8 nonnative speakers of English in our sample. With the exclusion 
of these participants, our sample included 203 native speakers of English.  
Materials. Experimental stimuli consisted of 32 pairs of sentences and 
corresponding picture probes. The pictures were the same in Experiment 1, 
showing the target object either in its intact state or changed state, as illustrated 
in Figure 2.1. Example sentence stimuli are shown in 1a and 1b3. 
1a) The woman has chosen the ice cream.  
1b) The woman has dropped the ice cream.   
The sentences described an action involving either no change (e.g., choose) or 
a change of state (e.g., drop) on the target object (e.g., ice cream). All 
experimental items required “yes” responses. 32 foil sentences were added. 
These trials were similar to the experimental trials in length, but were followed 
by an unrelated picture, thus requiring “no” responses.  
                                                 
3 We also ran an experiment with the sentence stimuli in the future tense (e.g., the woman will 
choose/drop the ice cream). The results were consistent with Experiment 2. See Experiment A1 in 
Appendix III. 
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Design. A factorial design was used with 2 (Event type: No Change vs. Change) 
by 2 (Picture type: Intact vs. Changed). Four lists were created, including 32 
sentence-picture experimental pairs in each version. Items and conditions were 
counterbalanced across lists. Each participant saw only one of the lists.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. The sentence 
was presented left-aligned to the screen.  
2.3.2 Results  
4 participants seemed to confuse the response keys as they had between 0% 
and 3% correct responses. Another 5 participants had accuracy scores <70%, 
which was three times less than the standard deviation from the mean response 
accuracy; data from these participants were also removed. The removal of 
these 9 participants yielded unequal numbers of participants across lists. To 
equate the number of participants per list, the last-run participants of three lists 
were removed so that each list had the same number of participants as the 
shortest list (N=44). This means that the data analysis involved 176 participants.  
Mean reading times of sentences, accuracy rates, and verification times 
for picture probes (intact state, changed state) in both event types (change, no 
change) were calculated across participants, as shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Experiment 2: Mean reading times, accuracy rates and response latencies 
that were calculated based on median scores across subjects in Experiment 2  
Type of events No Change  Change 
Reading time (ms) 2351 2297 
Type of pictures Intact state Changed state Intact state  Changed state 
Accuracy rate (%) 97 88 94 97 
Response latency (ms)  952 1153 991 1065 
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A paired-sample t-test showed that there was no difference in reading 
times between the two versions of sentences, t1(175) = .56, p = .756, t2(31) = 
1.94, p = .062. For picture verification times a two-way repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed no main effect of event, F1(1, 175) = 1.93, p = .167, ηp2 = .01, 
F2(1, 31) = 2.09, p = .159, ηp2 = .06, but a significant main effect of picture (the 
intact state being verified faster than the changed state), F1(1, 175) = 71.52 , p 
< .001, ηp2 = .29, F2(1, 31) = 4.51 , p = .042, ηp2 = .13, replicating the finding in 
Experiment 1. Importantly, the interaction between event and picture was also 
significant, F1(1, 175) = 14.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .07, F2(1, 31) = 11.56, p = .002, 
ηp2 = .27, indicating the influence of linguistic context on the construction of 
object-state representations. Paired-sample t-tests confirmed that the intact 
state was verified faster, t1(175) = 2.12, p < .001, t2(31) = 2.64, p = .013, and 
more accurately under the context of no change than change, t1(175) = 3.65, p 
< .001, t2(31) = 2.43, p = .021. By contrast, the changed state was verified 
faster, t1(175) = 3.01, p = .003, t2(31) = 2.60, p = .014, and more accurately 
under the context of change than no change, t1(175) = 10.38, p < .001, t2(31) = 
2.48, p = .019. 
In sum, in Experiment 2 there was no difference between reading times 
of sentences depending on the type of events. For picture verification, overall 
participants reacted faster to the intact state than the changed state. However, 
verifications were also influenced by the described changes. Compared with no 
change (e.g., choose), sentences involving a change of state (e.g., drop) lead to 
shorter verification times to the dropped ice cream but longer times to the intact 
ice cream, and vice versa. This indicates that the changed state was more 
accessible when changes were described to happen on the object than no 
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change. These findings are consistent with previous findings by Zwaan and his 
colleagues (e.g., Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan & Pecher, 2012) that 
contextually appropriate perceptual information about described objects were 
activated in language comprehension. In particular, the description of a change 
of state event activated perceptual features of the target object in its changed 
state, showing a facilitation effect of events on the accessibility of object state. 
However, it remains unclear in Experiment 2 whether the differential 
accessibility of object states would be maintained in subsequent language 
comprehension – e.g. if the object were to be referred to again in a subsequent 
sentence. To address these issues, more data were collected via Mechanical 
Turk, as reported in the following section. In this experiment, it aimed to 
investigate whether object-state representation could be maintained in 
subsequent sentences. It also examined whether the time gap between 
sentence reading and picture probe presentation would influence the pattern of 
picture verification times. 
2.4 Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 intended to further investigate the extent to which the accessibility 
of an object representation is modulated in linguistic context and whether the 
amount of time that is available for comprehending the text prior to verification 
influences response latencies. As suggested by Hindy et al. (2012) and Kalenik 
(2012), conflict of object representations may be introduced into language 
comprehension when the object was described to experience a substantial 
change. To investigate investigate whether subsequent language 
comprehension is influenced by the degree of change, a second sentence was 
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added. Besides, two types of temporal shifts of events were added as event 
boundaries. Thus, the stimuli included two sentences. The first sentences were 
the same as the ones used in Experiment 2, describing an event involving either 
no change or a change of state on a target object (e.g., The woman 
chose/dropped the ice cream). The second sentences referred to the object 
again and started with either a backward temporal shift (e.g., But first, she 
looked at the ice cream) or a forward temporal shift (e.g., And then, she looked 
at the ice cream).  
Moreover, picture probe was presented either after a short delay (250 ms) 
or a long delay (1250 ms) so as to examine whether the time available for 
comprehension would influence retrieval of object representations. This 
manipulation was motivated by findings from the negation literature of sentence 
comprehension. Kaup and Zwaan (2003) examined the accessibility of a colour 
term (e.g., pink) that was either presented in an affirmative situation (e.g., Sam 
was wished that Laura was not wearing her pink dress) or a negative situation 
(e.g., Sam was relieved that Laura was not wearing her pink dress). Importantly, 
as shown in aforementioned examples the critical clause was the same for both 
situations despite the difference in sentence meanings due to the main verbs 
(“wished” vs. “relieved”). Participants were asked to indicate whether a probe 
word (e.g., “pink”) was mentioned or not in the sentences. When there was a 
short delay (500 ms) between sentence reading and probe recognition, no 
difference of response latencies between these two situations were found, 
suggesting “pink” was not accessible in both situations. However, after a long 
delay (1500 ms), difference in response times of the two situations were found 
and “pink” was more accessible in the affirmative situation than the negative 
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situation, suggesting the influence of described situations rather than the text 
itself. 
Subsequently, with a sentence-picture verification paradigm, Lüdtke, 
Friedrich, De Filipis, & Kaup (2008) asked participants to read affirmative or 
negative sentences followed by a matching or mismatching pictures while 
response latencies and event-related potentials were measured during reading 
and picture verification. When the delay was short (250 ms) verification 
latencies and ERPs evoked by the picture showed a priming effect regardless of 
the linguistic context as being affirmative or negative. In contrast, only when the 
delay was long (1500 ms), they observed main effects of linguistic context in 
addition to the priming effect, suggesting longer processing time was required to 
process more complex structure, such as negation so as to establish the 
situation models.  
. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Upon 
finishing reading the sentences, a probe picture was presented and participants 
were asked to judge if the depicted object was mentioned in the sentences that 
they had just read. However, unlike in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the 
probe picture was presented to participants either 250 ms or 1250 ms after they 
finished reading the sentences. We predicted that: a) there would be 
match/mismatch effects between linguistic contexts and picture probes. 
Linguistic contexts, including degree of change and temporal shifts would 
influence the construction of object representations; b) the delay between 
sentence reading and picture presentation would influence verification times. In 
the short delay (250 ms), there would be no main effect of linguistic contexts 
due to the limited time to process the sentence meaning. Whereas in the long 
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delay (1250 ms), object-state representation would be modulated by language 
contexts as specified in a).  
2.4.1 Method 
Participants. 404 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
system (219 female, mean age 35, range 18-69 years old). They received $2.00 
for their participation in the experiment, which lasted about 40 min. There were 
nine nonnative speakers of English and one participant who had taken part in 
Experiment 2. With the exclusion of these 10 participants, our sample included 
394 native speakers of English.  
 
Materials. Experimental stimuli consisted of 32 sets of linguistic stimuli adapted 
from Experiment 2 by adding a second sentence for each stimulus. The first 
sentence described a target object (e.g. ice cream) undergoing either no 
change (e.g., choose) or change of state (e.g., drop) and the second sentence 
referred to the objects again. Half of the stimuli began with a backward temporal 
shift (but first) and the other half with a forward temporal shift (and then). The 
pictures were the same as in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, which either 
depicted a target object in its intact state or the changed state. Because all 
experimental items required a “yes” response, 32 foil items were added. The foil 
trials and the experimental trials were identical in sentence structure and the 
number of words in each sentence. Yet, the foil sentences were followed by an 
unrelated picture, and thus required a “no” response. The time delay between 
sentence reading and picture presentation was manipulated. The picture was 
shown to participants either 250 ms or 1250 ms after reading the second 
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sentence. As for foil trials, half of them had a delay of probe pictures for 500 ms 
and the other half for 1750 ms.  
Design. A mixed design was used in this experiment. With-subject factors 
included Event (No Change vs. Change), Temporal shift (But first vs. And then), 
and Picture (Intact state vs. Changed state). Half of the stimuli in the “but first” 
condition were followed by a picture probes in 250 ms, in one list but the same 
stimuli were presented in the “and then” condition in another list and followed by 
a picture probe 1250 ms later. Thus, within 8 lists, the time delay was treated as 
a between subject factor. In each list, there were 32 sentence-picture 
experimental pairs and 32 foil pairs.  
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiments 1 and 2. The 
stimuli were presented online using the Qualtrics Research Suite. A trial started 
with a left justified and vertically centered fixation cross for 1000 ms, 
immediately followed by the first sentence (e.g. The woman chose the ice 
cream). Participants pressed the Space bar when they had understood the 
sentence. Following the key press, the second sentence appeared on the 
screen (e.g., But first, she looked at the ice cream). They pressed the Space 
bar again when they finish reading the second sentence and a fixations-cross 
appeared on the screen for either 250ms or 1250 ms before the probe pictured 
was presented. The foil trials were presented by following the same procedure, 
but the time delay between sentence reading and picture verification was either 
500 ms or 1750 ms. Upon seeing the picture probe, participants verified 
whether the object depicted in the picture was mentioned in the sentences they 
had just read by pressing the c-key for “no” responses and the m-key for “yes” 
responses. Their answers and verification times were recorded. The next trial 
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started 500 ms after the response.  
2.4.2 Results  
7 participants appeared to confuse the response keys and reversed their 
“yes/no” response mappings, as they had between 0% and 4% correct 
responses. Another 23 participants had accuracy scores <70%, which was 
three times less than the standard deviation from the mean response accuracy. 
Data from these participants were removed. The removal of them yielded 
unequal numbers of participants across lists. To balance the lists, 20 
participants from 7 lists who were the last participants were removed to match 
the lists with the one containing the least number of participants (N=43). Thus, 
the data analysis of Experiment 3 involved 344 participants.  
 2.4.2.1 Sentence reading times 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 shows average reading times for the first and second sentences. For 
the first sentence (S1), there was no difference between reading times, 
t1(343)=.80, p = .567, t2(31)=.51, p = .613. For the second sentence (S2), 
repeated measures ANOVAs showed that there was no main effect of Event on 
reading times, F1(1, 343) = 1.27, p = .261, ηp2 = .004, F2(1, 31) = 2.22, p = .146, 
ηp2 = .01 but a main effect of Temporal shift by subjects (longer reading times 
Table 2.2 Experiment 3: Mean reading times that were calculated based on 
median scores across subjects in Experiments 3   
Type of events No Change  Change 
S1 (ms) 1081 1092 
Temporal shifts But first And then But first And then 
S2 (ms) 1387 1277 1394 1300 
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for sentences with “but first” than “and then”), F1(1, 343) =42.04, p<.001, ηp2 
= .11, but not by items, F2(1, 31) = 1.84, p = .185, ηp2 = .01. No interaction 
between Temporal shift and Event was found, F1(1, 343) =.28, p = .594, ηp2 
= .001, F2(1, 31) = 0.45, p = .833, ηp2 = .001. Thus, unlike in Kalenik (2012), no 
difference is reading time between the two event types was revealed. This 
discrepancy may come from the difference in stimuli presentation. In our 
experiment, participants read in a sentence-by-sentence way, but phrase-by-
phrase in Kalenik (2012). 
2.4.2.2 Picture verification times 
Mean accuracy rates and response times for the picture verification task are 
shown in Table 2.3 and 2.4.  
Table 2.3 Experiment 3: Mean accuracy rates and response latencies that were 
calculated based on median scores across subjects in Experiments 3 (250 ms) 
 
Statistical analyses were conducted separately for the short time gap (250 ms) 
and (1500 ms) separately. When there was a 250 ms delay between sentence 
reading and picture verification, a repeated-measures three-way ANOVA with 
Event, Picture, and Temporal shift as within-subjects factors showed that there 
was a main effect of the type of Picture on verification times (shorter response 
Temporal 
shifts 
But first And then 
Type of 
events 
No Change Change No Change Change 
Type of 
pictures 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Accuracy 
rate (%) 
97 96 97 96 97 95 94 98 
Response 
time (ms) 
950 977 940 989 880 1068 929 1047 
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times for the intact state than the changed state), F1(1, 85) = 8.46, p = .005, ηp2 
= .09, F2(1, 15) = 11.16, p = .004, ηp2 = .43, but there were no main effects of 
Temporal shift, F1(1, 85) = .17, p = .683, ηp2 = .002, F2(1, 15) = .04, p = .842, ηp2 
= .003, nor Event, F1(1, 85) = .37, p = .546, ηp2 = .004, F2(1, 15) = .41, p = .534, 
ηp2 = .03. No interactions between the three factors were found, F1(1, 85) = 
1.15, p = .286, ηp2 = .01, F2(1, 15) = .71, p = .413, ηp2= .05. These results 
suggest that when the time delay was short (250 ms) participants reacted faster 
to the picture depicting an intact state than a changed state regardless of the 
degree of change and temporal shifts. This pattern has been seen in 
Experiment 1 when the intact state was treated as the default object-state 
representation. Thus, when there was a short delay, participant did not 
incorporate the meaning of sentences in comprehension but probably focused 
on the object name and hence activated the typical representation of the object. 
 
By contrast, when there was a 1250 ms delay between sentence reading 
and picture verification, repeated-measures three-way ANOVAs with Event, 
Picture, and Temporal shift as within-subjects factors showed that there were no 
Table 2.4 Experiment 3: Mean accuracy rates and response latencies that were 
calculated based on median scores across subjects in Experiments 3 (1250 ms) 
Temporal 
shifts 
But first And then 
Type of 
events 
No Change Change No Change Change 
Type of 
pictures 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Intact 
state 
Changed 
state 
Accuracy 
rate (%) 
99 94 97 97 97 97 94 98 
Response 
time (ms) 
926 956 964 979 865 1065 898 969 
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main effects of Temporal shift, F1(1, 85) = .01, p = .929, ηp2 = .00,  F2(1, 15) 
= .22, p = .648, ηp2 = .01, or Event, F1(1, 85) = .26, p = .612, ηp2 = .003, F2(1, 
15) = 1.94, p = .184, ηp2 = .11, but there was a marginal main effect of Picture 
(shorter response times for the intact state than the changed state), F1(1, 85) = 
3.14, p = .080, ηp2 = .04, F2(1, 15) = 7.50, p = .015, ηp2 = .33. Besides, there 
was a significant interaction between Temporal shift and Event by subjects, but 
not by items, F1(1, 85) = 6.58, p = .012, ηp2 = .07, F2(1, 15) = 1.33, p = .268, η
p
2 = .08. Besides, there was a significant three-way interaction between Picture, 
Temporal shift, and Event by subjects, F1(1, 85) = 5.68, p = .019, ηp2 = .06, but 
not by items analysis, F2(1, 15) = 2.94, p = .107, ηp2 = .16. Mean verification 
times and accuracy rates of picture probe after a long time delay (1250 ms) 
were shown in Table 2.4. Paired t-tests showed that verification times for the 
changed state in the context of “drop, and then” were significantly faster than 
“choose, and then” by subjects, t1(1,85) = 2.53, p = .010, but not by items, 
t2(1,85) = 1.96, p = .069, suggesting the changed state induced by the action in 
the first sentence was likely to be maintained in the second sentence. No 
difference of probe recognition was found for the “but first” condition. 
In sum, Experiment 3 was conducted to investigate whether the 
accessibility of object-state representation could be retrieved and maintained in 
subsequent linguistic context and whether verification was influenced by the 
amount of time that is available for comprehending prior to picture presentation. 
Reading times for read sentences containing “but first” were longer than “and 
then”. The results may reflect that greater retrieval interference and cognitive 
effort was required to process sentences violating the temporal order of events 
in real life (Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas, 1998). The lack of match/mismatch effect 
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in the “but first” sentences suggested that longer time gap than 1250 ms may be 
needed to update situation models. By contrast, there was a match/mismatch 
effect for “and then” sentences but only when there was a long delay (1250 ms). 
When there was a short delay between sentence reading and probe recognition, 
participants were susceptible to typicality effect, showing a preference for the 
intact state to the changed state regardless of the type of linguistic contexts. 
This finding is consistent with Lüdtke et al. (2008) that a short delay between 
reading comprehension and picture presentation only allows for a word-picture 
priming effect. Instead, a longer delay is required to complete constructing 
situation models and retrieve object-state representation, particularly for more 
complex linguistic structure.  
2.5 General discussion  
With the picture-sentence verification paradigm, three experiments have 
investigated whether the accessibility of object state could be modulated by 
linguistic context. Results have shown that when only object names were 
presented, the intact state was more accessible than the changed state 
(Experiment 1). The difference between the accessibility suggests that the intact 
state may be a more typical object-state representation than the changed state. 
However, accessibility was also shown to be influenced by linguistic context 
(Experiment 2). When contextual information was available, the changed state 
became more accessible if the object was described to undergo a change of 
state event. Besides, we found that object-state representation could be 
maintained across a subsequent sentence, although the somewhat limited 
evidence for this is related to available comprehension time between the 
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sentence and probe (Experiment 3). After a short delay between sentence 
reading and picture verification, there was no change in accessibility as a 
function of state-change until sufficient time had elapsed for a marginal change 
after a longer delay, showing shorter latencies for the intact state than the 
changed state. After a long delay, however, participants tended to respond 
faster to the changed state that was required to be maintain the representation 
after a change of state events, suggesting the accessibility was also influence 
by the content of the described situation in sentences. 
 Our findings are not consistent with the amodal proposition account for 
which the perceptual features of objects should not be relevant for the 
accessibility of object-state representation. However, semantic mapping 
between the verbs (e.g., choose vs. drop) and nouns seems to be able to 
account for the results. As shown by Altmann and Kamide (1999), verbs can be 
used to restrict the choice of appropriate objects in the visual scene. For 
example, when participants heard “The boy will eat …”, they were more likely to 
look at something edible in the scene (e.g., cake) even before the object was 
mentioned. Perhaps, the verbs in the stimuli helped participants to identify the 
appropriate state of the object. For example, “choose” is usually associated with 
an intact object, while “drop” is often associated with a “dropped” object or an 
object that could be dropped. When a “flattened/dropped” ice cream was 
presented to participants, they might associate it with the “dropping” action, but 
not necessarily the ‘choosing’. In this case, the findings in Experiment 2 may 
simply indicate that there was closer link between the ‘dropping’ event and a 
dropped ice cream compared with the “choosing” event. However, as shown in 
Experiment 3, the delay between sentence reading and picture presentation 
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was crucial for the facilitation effects between a change of state event and a 
pictured changed state to appear. This indicates that the findings in Experiment 
2 are possibly not just the result of the mapping between verb meaning and a 
depicted state. Instead, understanding what was described in the sentences is 
important for constructing an appropriate object-state representation under the 
linguistic contexts. 
Our findings are in line with the situation model theories, which state that 
language comprehension involves activating situated object features (Stanfield 
& Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan, Stanfield, & Yaxley, 2002, Yaxley & Zwaan, 2006). 
Experiment 1 showed that the intact state would be the default object 
representation. Experiment 2 replicated and extended the finding of Zwaan and 
colleagues that the match/mismatch effects could appear when object change 
was described. Experiment 3 further showed that after crossing a temporal shift 
situation models were updated when there was enough time to understand the 
content of the linguistic description. However, as the picture verification 
happened after participants finished reading the sentences, it was not clear how 
mental representation was constructed, maintained, and retrieved during online 
language comprehension. Besides, it is not clear at what point during language 
processing participants have decided on the “”appropriate” object 
representation. Perhaps, pragmatics context may have facilitated inference of 
consequences of actions (Niuewland & Kuperberg, 2008; Tian, Breheny, & 
Ferguson, 2010). Due to difference in semantic properties of the verbs (choose 
vs. drop) and temporal shifts (but first vs. and then) there are different 
expectations of the consequences. By the time before the noun phrase is 
mentioned, we may have already started to infer the results.  
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In the next three chapters, I will report findings of experiments using eye-
tracking and event-related potentials paradigms, which allowed us to explore 
when linguistic input would influence the accessibility of objects’ state during 
online language comprehension. Given the statistically weak results which 
moderate confidence in the generalizability of the interpretation, these other 
studies may also shed light on when and how object-state representation is 
established during language comprehension. 
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, findings from three experiments with the picture-sentence 
verification paradigm were reported. The intact state was shown to be a typical 
object-state representation compared with the changed state. However, when 
contextual information was provided, object-state representation was influenced 
by the content of described situations, showing match/mismatch effect between 
linguistic context and object state. Besides, object-state representation was also 
shown to be affected by the amount of time allowing for language 
comprehension. When the described event has not yet been integrated into 
sentence interpretation, verification decisions appear to be modulated only by 
the typicality of object-state representation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Tracking object-state representation during language 
comprehension: Evidence from eye movements  
3.1 Overview  
With the picture-sentence verification paradigm, the three experiments in 
Chapter 2 have demonstrated that an intact state of an object is likely to be a 
typical object representation, but mental representation can also be context-
dependent. Verification latencies tended to be shorter for a picture depicting an 
intact state than a changed state of the object, suggesting the intact state is a 
more typical representation of the object than the changed state. Importantly, 
information from linguistic contexts appeared to modulate object-state 
representation. For example, verification latencies for the changed state (e.g., a 
dropped ice cream) tended to be shorter when the object was described to have 
experienced a substantial change (e.g., drop the ice cream) than no change 
(e.g., choose the ice cream). Nevertheless, sufficient amount of time seemed to 
be needed so as to integrate the meaning of a described change into the 
discourse; otherwise verification latencies were shorter for the intact state than 
the changed state. Therefore, it seems that when an object is described as 
undergoing changes from one state to another, we may establish multiple 
mental representations for the object. For instance, on hearing “The woman will 
drop the ice cream”, we may activate its changed state after being dropped, but 
we may keep its intact state on hearing “The woman will choose the ice cream”. 
44 
 
However, since probe pictures were presented after sentence reading, it 
is not clear from Chapter 2 whether object-state representation can be 
constructed as part of the language comprehension process.  
The goal of the two experiments reported in this chapter was to examine 
the pattern and time course of keeping track of object-state representation 
during language comprehension. An eye-tracking method, known as the visual 
world paradigm was used for data collection due to its sensitivity to online 
sentence processing. It has been shown that incoming spoken language cues 
are able to drive eye movements around a current static scene (Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003) or on a blank screen 
(Altmann, 2004). Eye movements can be directed to where information is 
introduced (Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Hoover & Richardson, 2008), to an item 
that is anticipated to be mentioned (Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Boland, 1995; 
Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood, 2003; Knoeferle, Crocker, Scheepers, & 
Pickering, 2005), or to semantically-related items (e.g., Huettig & Altmann, 
2005, 2011; Yee & Sedivy, 2006). 
A typical experimental trial with the visual world paradigm involves asking 
participants to listen to recorded auditory stimuli while looking at visual displays 
that either include real objects (e.g., Tanenhaus et al., 1995) or clipart items 
(e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999) as their eye movements are recorded. 
Participants may also be instructed to perform a simple task (e.g. "pick up the 
candy") (e.g., Allopenna, et al., 1998; Tanenhaus, et al., 1995) or just "look and 
listen" (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 2007). Experiments reported in this chapter and 
the next chapter adopted the “look and listen” version of the visual world 
paradigm. One advantage of using the "look and listen" task is to avoid 
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interference of task demands. When participants are asked to complete a task, 
they may fixate the target objects because they are asked to touch or move 
them rather than as part of a natural process in language comprehension. 
Besides, the “look and listen” task does not require participants to utilize 
conscious response strategies that may affect how language is processed. 
Therefore, the “look and listen” task examines online language processing 
without interrupting it and provides a continuous implicit record of cognitive 
processes as language unfolds over time. 
In this chapter and in all other following eye-tracking experiments, two 
measures of eye movements were reported: fixations and saccades  
(Henderson & Ferreira, 2004). Fixations refer to the situation when gaze 
position is held relatively still on a single location, while saccades refer to the 
situation when the eyes are moving fast from one fixation location to another. 
Thus, fixations reflect the extent to which an object holds attention and does so 
in the face of competing demands on attention, but saccades are a measure of 
shifts in attention (see Altmann & Kamide, 2007 for further discussion). Both 
measures are particularly important for the purpose of this thesis. Fixations 
were used to describe static patterns in the data and reflect the existing internal 
representations of the target items. In addition to fixations, detailed statistical 
analyses on proportions of saccadic eye-movements were also reported, which 
reflected the dynamic shift of attention from one fixation point to another, as 
language unfolded. 
Raw measurements of our eye-tracking data are time points of fixations 
on a region of interests (ROI). Since onset and offset of critical words in auditory 
stimuli were marked, we were able to figure out whether a fixation appeared at 
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a given time point. Thus, for each trial of linguistic stimuli and a given time 
window we also knew whether there was a fixation on a particular ROI. 
Fixations were thus calculated by sampling at specific, linguistically-motivated 
points in time, the proportion of trials in which participants were looking at the 
ROI at that moment in time. To compare across ROIs, we calculated the 
percentage of fixations on each region. For by-subjects analysis, we calculated 
the percentage of fixations for each participant by dividing the total number of 
trials with a fixation and the number of trials per condition. Similarly, for by-item 
analysis, the percentage fixations on a ROI were calculated by dividing the 
number of participants with a fixation and the total number of participants in 
each condition. Besides, we calculated the number of trials on which at least 
one saccade was launched at the region of interest within a particular time 
window. Thus, we were able to know the number of saccades on each ROIs 
within a certain time window as specified in the linguistic stimuli. Percentages of 
saccades have also been calculated both by subjects and by items just as 
percentages of fixations.  In this way, we achieved the dynamic mapping of the 
unfolding language and percentage of eye movements on the visual display. 
Thus, we were able to compare whether two regions of interest differ in their 
likelihood of attracting eye movements during each of a set of critical time 
windows.  
In Experiment 4, eye movements towards two versions of the target 
object were compared (See Figure 3.1). while linguistic stimuli “The woman will 
choose/drop the ice cream. But first/And then, she will look at the ice cream” 
unfolded.  In the first sentence, the verbs were different between two conditions. 
In the Change condition, the verb indicated a substantial change of state (e.g., 
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“drop”), while in the No Change condition the verb described a minimal change 
or even no change of state (e.g., “choose”). The second sentence referred to 
the target object again and began with either a backward temporal shift (but 
first) or a forward temporal shift (and then). These stimuli were selected and 
modified based on three criteria: the intact state and changed state of the target 
object can be visually presented; the Change condition was rated to indicate a 
greater change of state happening on the object than the No Change condition. 
No difference was found between imageablility and ambiguity between Change 
and No Change condition.  
We hypothesized that participants would look at a particular version of 
the target object in the visual scene depending on the linguistic context. Based 
on findings from Chapter 2 and in line with the literature, we predicted that the 
item that matched the intended object-state representation would attract more 
eye movements than when they mismatched. For example, participants might 
prefer to look at the changed state (e.g., the dropped ice cream) when the 
Figure 3.1 Experiment 4:  Example of an experimental visual stimulus used in 
Experiment 4. The target object (e.g., the ice cream) was depicted in the intact 
state and the depicted state. Two unrelated distractors were also included. The 
corresponding auditory stimuli were “The woman will choose/drop the ice cream. 
But first/ And then, she will look at the ice cream”. 
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object was described to experience a substantial change of state (the condition 
in which the woman was described as dropping the ice cream). By contrast, 
when only minimal or no change of state was mentioned (i.e. the “choose” 
condition), the changed state was not relevant to the event, and thus in this 
case participants might look less at it. 
Experiment 5 intended to replicate the findings of Experiment 4. Auditory 
stimuli in Experiment 5 had a similar structure as in Experiment 4, with the first 
sentence describing either a substantial or a minimal change of state on an 
object and the second sentence referring to the object again. For example, “The 
girl will stomp on the egg/penny. But first/And then, she will look down at the 
egg/penny”. Unlike Experiment 4, the degree of change in Experiment 5 was 
manipulated by using two different target objects that experienced the same 
action. Whereas one object (e.g., the egg) would experience a substantial 
change of state if “stomped on”, the other object (e.g., the penny) would not. We 
expected to see a similar pattern and time course of eye movements in 
Experiment 5 as in Experiment 4: participants would prefer to look at a 
particular depicted version of the object depending on the language context.  
In sum, the two experiments reported in this chapter aimed to explore 
when a particular object-state representation was established in real-time 
language processing. Two conflicting object states were presented on the visual 
scene together with two distractors. Eye movements around the visual scene 
were expected to be modulated by described events. 
3.2 Experiment 4 
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Experiment 4 aimed to investigate the time course of constructing object-state 
representations. The target object was described as undergoing an event 
involving either a change of state or no change on the object. With the “look and 
listen” version of the visual world paradigm, participants were presented 
recorded sentences via loud speakers while their eye movements around a 
visual scene were recorded. In this way, we were able to map participants’ eye 
movements onto real-time language processing. We predicted that there would 
be differences in participants’ eye movements depending on the language 
context. Specifically, we would see more looks towards a particular object state 
when it was indicated as the appropriate object-state representation. For 
example, there might be more looks at the dropped ice cream in “drop” than 
“choose”. 
3.2.1 Method 
Participants. 64 students (42 female, mean age 21, range 18-25 years old) from 
the University of York participated in this study. They received either half an 
hour course credit or two pounds for their contribution. All participants were 
native speakers of British English and had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Materials. The auditory stimuli were created based on the stimuli used in 
Experiment 3. The first sentence of each stimulus indicated either a change of 
state or no change (choose vs. drop) on the object, while the second sentence 
involved either a backward temporal shift (but first) or a forward temporal shift 
(and then) when the object was mentioned again. In addition to the 32 sets of 
sentence stimuli in Experiment 3, four sets of new stimuli were added. The 
stimuli were all in the future tense, as shown in the examples below:  
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a) The woman will choose the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
b) The woman will choose the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. 
c) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
d) The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. 
 
There were 36 foil items in total, which had the same sentence structure as the 
experimental stimuli. Half of the foil items mentioned a backward temporal shift 
(“but first”) while the other half a forward temporal shift (“and then”). Different 
from experimental stimuli, foil sentences did not always refer to the same object 
in the first and the second sentences. One third of the foil items described a 
distractor on the scene in the first sentence, but referred to an object that was 
not depicted in the second sentence. One third referred to a depicted distractor 
in the second sentence, but a non-depicted object in the first sentence. Besides, 
one third mentioned both depicted distractors in the first and second sentences 
respectively. All experimental and foil sentences were recorded by a male 
native speaker of British English at the sampling rate of 44,100 Hz and 16-bit 
sound resolution in a sound proof booth. Identical words in auditory stimuli 
within the same set were spliced and re-used.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Experiment 4: Example of a foil visual stimulus used in 
Experiment 4. The corresponding auditory stimulus was “The boy will 
open the book. And then, he will pick up the pen” 
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36 experimental pictures (e.g., Figure 3.1) and 36 foil pictures (e.g., Figure 3.2) 
were created using commercially available Clipart. In each experimental picture, 
there were two states of the same object, including an intact state (e.g., the 
upright ice cream), a changed state (e.g., the inverted/dropped ice cream) and 
two distractors (e.g., the milk carton and the magazine). The locations of the 
four depicted items were rotated and counterbalanced across experimental 
stimuli.  
Procedure. The experiment was conducted on an Eyelink II Head-mounted eye-
tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right eye, but viewing was binocular. 
Participants previewed the visual display for a second before hearing a 
description about the objects in the scene. They were instructed to look at the 
visual display freely while listening to the sentences. Visual stimuli were 
presented at 800 x 600 pixels resolution at the centre of a computer screen that 
was about 60 cm in front of each participant, while audio files were played via 
two loudspeakers placed at each side of a computer screen during the 
experiment. Prior to every six trials, a nine-point calibration procedure and later 
a validation procedure was performed. Between each trial, a single black dot 
was shown in the centre of the screen and was used to correct calibration drift. 
Participants were told when they finished half of the experiment and were 
encouraged to take a short break, if they would like, before carrying on. Each 
trial lasted about 9 seconds and the total length of the experiment was about 25 
minutes. 
3.2.2 Results 
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Data were analyzed with the following procedure: First, four interest areas were 
marked on the visual scene, including the intact state, the change state, and 
two distractors, as shown in Figure 3.3.  
As the eye-tracker recorded x-y co-ordinates of participants’ eye movements, 
this output was mapped onto the marked areas. As critical words and phrases in 
each sentence were marked from word onsets to offsets in the speech files, 
such as “choose/drop”, “the”, “ice cream”, looks to the different interest areas 
were thus synchronized with the auditory stimuli. In this way, we calculated both 
fixations on and saccades towards a particular visual region as language 
unfolded4.  
Subject and item means of eye movements were entered into separate 
statistical analyses. The data entered into the statistical analysis in this 
experiment and all the following eye-tracking experiments in this thesis were 
arcsine-transformed proportions5. The presentation of the result in the following 
                                                 
4 See Table a2.1 in Appendix II for percentage of trials with saccades and fixations on the 
depicted items on the visual display when a critical word/phrase was. 
5 Identical ANOVAs were also conducted on original proportions. Arcsine transformation was 
done to adjust the proportion between 0 to 1. Unless noted, statistically significant effects were 
consistent between the transformed and untransformed data. 
 
               
 
     Distractor 1            Intact  
 
            
 
 
    Changed             Distractor 2 
Figure 3.3 Experiment 4: Example of interest areas on 
visual stimuli in Experiment 4. 
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section is divided into two parts. First, a general description of participants’ 
overall fixation patterns is provided, which gives an indication of eye 
movements as language unfolded. Second, to get a more detailed description of 
data, particularly how eye movements changed over time, statistical analyses of 
eye movements during time windows of critical words and phrases were 
reported, including the verb in the first sentence (e.g., “choose/drop”), the first 
reference to the target object (e.g., “the ice cream”), temporal shifts (but 
first/and then), the verb in the second sentence (e.g., “look at”), and the second 
reference to the target object (e.g., “the ice cream”). 
3.2.2.1 Fixations  
Figure 3.4 illustrates eye movements over time by showing the mean proportion 
of fixations on the depicted items on the visual scene during the presentation of 
auditory stimuli. It presents an overview of eye-movements to all items on the 
visual scene.  
Overall, there were more fixations on the two depicted states of the 
target object than distractors throughout the experiment. In the first sentence, at 
the onset of the verb there were more looks to the dropped ice cream than the 
upright ice cream regardless of the verbs. Then, there were steadily increasing 
looks towards the upright ice cream when the verb indicated a minimal change 
of state (e.g., “choose”), but the dropped ice cream when the verb indicated a 
substantial change of state (e.g., “drop”). This pattern became more obvious at 
the end of the first sentence when they had heard “the woman will choose/drop 
the ice cream”, suggesting the influence of the described events on eye 
movements towards the depicted states on the visual scene. 
In the second sentence, at the onset of the second sentence eye 
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movements pattern of the first sentence was maintained. There seems to be 
more fixations on the upright ice cream than the dropped ice cream when no 
change was described in the first sentence (Figure 3.4a), but more fixations on 
the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream when a change on the object 
was mentioned (Figure 3.4b). This pattern continued to the onset of the verb 
with an interaction between the described change and the depicted object state. 
However, eye movements in the “drop, but first” condition started to change 
after the verb onset, with increasing looks towards the upright ice cream, but 
decreasing looks towards the dropped ice cream. As shown in Figure 3.4b, at 
the offset of the second sentence, there were more fixations on the upright ice 
cream than the dropped ice cream, while patterns for other conditions remained 
more or less unchanged.  
To summarize, proportions of fixations revealed that the linguistic context 
seemed to influence participants’ eye movements on the visual scene. For 
instance, in the first sentence when a change of state event was described, they 
tended to look at the dropped ice cream, but when a backward temporal shift 
was mentioned, they tended to look at the upright ice cream. In the second 
sentence, the established object-state representation was kept unchanged untill 
the linguistic context indicated that a different object-state representation should 
be retrieved.  
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Figure 3.4a Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with fixations on the two versions of the target object (INTACT, CHANGED) and distractors on the visual display 
when no change (e.g., “choose”) was mentioned in the first sentence. The x-axis shows the average time windows of critical phrases and words in the utterance. 
The y-axis shows mean proportion of trials with fixations that were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point on a trial-by-trial basis 
across subjects. The straight lines indicate fixations on the two versions of the target object in the “but first” condition, while the dotted line represent fixations in 
the “and then” condition. As the temporal shift (BUT FIRST/AND THEN) was mentioned in the second sentence, fixations during the first sentence were averaged 
between “but first” and “and then” conditions. The dashed line reveals averaged inspections of the distractors. 
The woman will   choose   the ice-cream.      (GAP)          But first / And then,       she will   grin at    the  ice-cream. 
“CHOOSE” 
Time (ms) 
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Figure 3.4b Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with fixations on the two versions of the target object (INTACT, CHANGED) and distractors on the visual display 
when a change of state (e.g., “drop”) was mentioned in the first sentence. The x-axis shows the average time windows of critical phrases and words in the 
utterance. The y-axis shows mean proportion of trials with fixations that were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point on a trial-by-trial 
basis across subjects. The straight lines indicate fixations on the two versions of the target object in the “but first” condition, while the dotted line represent 
fixations in the “and then” condition. As the temporal shift (BUT FIRST/AND THEN) was mentioned in the second sentence, fixations during the first sentence 
were averaged between “but first” and “and then” conditions. The dashed line reveals averaged inspections of the distractors.
Time (ms)        
“DROP” 
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3.2.2.2 Saccades  
“The woman will choose/drop the ice cream” 
(i) During “choose/drop”: A two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
that there was no main effect of the depicted state (intact, changed), 
F1(1, 63) = .71, p = .402, ηp2 = .01, F2(1,35) = .21, p = .653, ηp2 = .01, nor 
main effect of the degree of change (choose, drop), F1(1,63) = .14, p 
= .139, ηp2 = .02, F2(1,35) = 2.74, p = .107, ηp2 = .07. No interaction was 
found between the depicted state and the degree of change by subjects, 
F1(1,63) = 1.66, p = .200, ηp2 = .01, but a significant interaction was 
found by items, F2(1,35) = 8.80, p = .005, ηp2 = .20. Planned 
comparisons revealed that there were more saccades towards the 
dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream during “drop” than 
“choose”, t1(63) = 2.08, p = .040, t2(35) = 3.09, p = .004, showing 
increasing eye movements towards the dropped ice cream if a change of 
state event was mentioned. There were more looks to the upright ice 
cream after “choose” than after “drop” by subjects, t1(63) = 4.51, p 
< .001, but not with by item analysis, t2(35) = .06, p = .956. Hence, there 
tended to be increasing looks towards the dropped ice cream when a 
change was described in the auditory stimuli. 
(ii) During “the ice cream”: Figure 3.5 shows mean proportions of saccades 
towards the two depicted object states that were averaged for each 
condition. A two-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was 
no main effect of the degree of change on saccades towards the 
depicted state, F1(1,63) = 3.49, p = .064, ηp2 = .03, F2(1,35) = .001, p 
= .981, ηp2 = .00, but there was a significant main effect of the depicted 
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state by subjects but not by items (more saccades towards the dropped 
ice cream than the upright one), F1(1,63) = 4.78, p = .030, ηp2 = .04, 
F2(1,35) = .08, p = .783, ηp2 = .002. A significant interaction between the 
degree of change and the depicted state was found both by subjects and 
by items, F1(1,63) = 20.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, F2(1,35) = 14.50, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .29. Planned comparisons confirmed that participants looked more 
at the upright ice cream in the “choose” condition (M= .71, SD = .19) than 
the “drop” condition (M = .60, SD = .20, t1(63) = 4.51, p < .001, t2(35) = 
3.45, p = .001, but they looked more at the dropped ice cream in the 
“drop” condition (M= .72, SD = .18) than in the “choose” condition (M 
= .67, SD = .21, t1(63) = 2.16, p = .043, t2(35) = 2.09, p = .044).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with saccades launched towards 
the intact state and the changed state between the onset and offset of the noun 
phrase (e.g. “the ice cream”) (Mean duration = 603 ms) in the first sentence. 
The labels on the x-axis refer to the two described events in the first sentence, 
with “choose” representing the condition of No Change and “drop” the condition 
of Change of state. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of trials 
with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
** 
** 
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In sum, data from the first sentence showed that eye movements 
towards the depicted object states tended to be influenced by what was 
indicated as the appropriate object-state representation in the linguistic 
context in real time as language unfolded (e.g., a changed state for a 
change of state event but not for no change). This finding was reflected 
in the fixation data. It was also consistent with Experiment 2, where 
shorter picture verification times were found for pictures depicting an 
object state that matched the linguistic description than that mismatched.  
“But first/And then, she will look at the ice cream” 
(iii) During “But first/And then”: A three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant main effect of the temporal shift (but 
first vs. and then) on saccades towards the depicted object state, with 
more saccades launched in the “but first” than in the “and then” condition 
(See Figure 3.6), F1(1, 63) = 11.44, p = .001, ηp2 = .15, F2(1, 35) = 10.37, 
p = .003, ηp2 = .23. There was no main effect of the degree of change 
(choose vs. drop), F1(1, 63) = 1.61, p = .210, ηp2 = .03, F2(1, 35) = .16, 
p= .689, ηp2 = .01, nor the depicted state (intact vs. changed), F1(1, 63) = 
3.71, p= .059, ηp2 = .06, F2(1, 35) = .01, p = .982, ηp2 = .00. No 
interactions were found. Nonetheless, to evluate whether there would an 
immediate influence of time shifts on eye movements, follow-up paired-
sample t-tests compared saccades between the two versions of the 
target object. If there was such influence, the upright ice cream was 
expected to attract more saccades than the dropped one when “but first” 
was mentioned. Contrary to this prediction, results showed that the 
pattern for the “but first” condition was largely similar to what has been 
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seen when the target noun phrase was mentioned in the first sentence, 
with more saccades towards the changed one than the upright one (see 
Figure 3.6). 
 
(iv) During “look at”: To further examine whether eye movements could be 
adjusted prior to the target noun phrase, saccadic eye movements during 
the verb region were analysed. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that there was no significant main effect of the temporal shift (but 
first vs. and then) on saccades towards the depicted object state, F1(1, 
63) = .01, p = .928, ηp2 = .00, F2(1, 35) = 1.26, p = .270, ηp2 = .04, nor 
main effect of the degree of change (choose vs. drop), F1(1, 63) = 1.00, p 
= .322, ηp2 = .02, F2(1, 35) = .56, p= .461, ηp2 = .02, but there was a main 
effect of the depicted state (intact vs. changed) by subjects (more looks 
to the dropped ice cream than the upright one), F1(1, 63) = 7.20, p= .009, 
*   * 
 
       * 
* 
Figure 3.6 Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the intact state and the 
changed state between the onset and offset of temporal shifts (e.g., “but first/and then”) in 
the second sentence (M = 619 ms). The labels on the x-axis refer to temporal shifts at the 
beginning of the second sentence. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of 
trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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ηp2 = .10, but not by items, F2(1, 35) = .01, p = .996, ηp2 = .00. 
Nonetheless, a significant interaction between the temporal shift and the 
state was found, F1(1, 63) = 4.35, p= .041, ηp2 = .07, F2(1, 35) = 4.93, p 
= .033, ηp2 = .12. Planned comparisons have shown that there were 
more saccades toward the dropped ice creams by subjects but not by 
items, t1(63) = 2.63, p = .011, t2(35) = 1.52, p = .138, suggesting there 
tended to be increasing saccades towards the changed state in “and 
then” despite exisiting fixations.  
 
(v) During “the ice cream”: Figure 3.8 illustrates mean proportions of 
saccades towards the two depicted object states that were averaged for 
each condition across subjects. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant main effect of the depicted state with 
more saccades towards the intact state than the changed state overall, 
* 
* 
Figure 3.7 Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the intact state and the 
changed state between the onset and offset of verbs (e.g., “look at”) (M = 507 ms) in the 
second sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to temporal shifts at the beginning of the 
second sentence. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of trials with saccades 
that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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F1(1, 63) = 11.23, p = .001, ηp2 = .15, F2(1, 35) = 12.67, p = .001, ηp2 
= .27. There was no significant main effect of the temporal shift (but first 
vs. and then), F1(1, 63) = 3.38, p = .071, ηp2 = .05, F2(1, 35) = 1.83, p 
= .185, ηp2 = .05, nor the degree of change (choose vs. drop), F1(1, 63) 
=1.47, p = .230, ηp2 = .02, F2(1, 35) = 2.21, p = .147, ηp2 = .06. 
Nevertheless, there was a significant interaction between the temporal 
shift and the depicted state, F1(1, 63) = 4.78, p = .032, ηp2 =07, F2(1, 35) 
= 7.76, p = .009, ηp2 = .18. A significant three way interaction was also 
found, F1(1, 63) = 9.47, p = .003, ηp2 = .13, F2(1, 35) = 8.48, p = .006, ηp2 
= .20.  
Figure 3.8 Experiment 4: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the intact state and the 
changed state between the onset and offset of the noun phrase (e.g, “the ice cream”) (M = 
565 ms) in the second sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to temporal shifts at the 
beginning of the second sentence. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of 
trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
  ***** 
*** 
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To confirm the source of the interaction described above, we conducted 
follow-up pairwise comparisons. No differences in saccades after the 
“choose” sentences. In “drop”, however, there were more looks towards 
the upright ice cream after “but first” than after “and then”, t1(63) = 2.31, p 
= .024, t2(35) = 2.88, p = .007, while there were conversely fewer looks to 
the dropped ice cream after “but first” than after “and then”, t1(63) = 2.55, 
p = .013, t2(35) = 1.94, p = .061, suggesting increasing looks to the 
upright ice cream were driven by the degree of change (“drop”) and a 
backward temporal shift (“but first”).  
In sum, data from the second sentence illustrate that participants 
tended to retrieve an object-state representation that fitted in the current 
linguistic description. When a substantial change was described to 
happen on the object in the first sentence, there were increasing looks 
towards the intact state but decreasing of looks at the changed state, 
probably due to retrieval of an intact object-state representation as 
required. No such difference was found in eye movements when no 
change was described. Importantly, in the second sentence this effect 
was not manifested until the object name was explicitly mentioned. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 4, participants’ eye movements were recorded while they listened 
to auditory sentences about a target object (e.g., an ice cream) and viewed a 
visual scene that illustrated an upright ice cream and a dropped ice cream along 
with two distractors. We have obtained eye movement patterns that were 
manifested during the unfolding of the sentences. Results showed that eye 
movements were influenced by the difference between the two depicted 
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versions of the ice cream and moderated by linguistic description. Initially, there 
were more fixations on the dropped ice cream than the intact ice cream even 
before verbs were mentioned. Later, at the first reference to the target object, 
participants tended to look at the upright ice cream when no change was 
described, but the dropped one when a change of state was mentioned. This 
pattern was consistent with findings from the sentence-picture verification 
paradigm that also showed an interaction between object state and degree of 
change on picture verification response latencies.   
At the second reference to the target object, participants tended to look 
at a particular object state depending on whether a backward temporal shift (but 
first) or a forward temporal shift (and then) was indicated. In the “but first” 
condition, there were increasing looks at the upright ice cream but decreasing 
looks at the dropped ice cream when a change of state was described in the 
first sentence. By comparison, in the “and then” condition, there tended to be 
more looks at the dropped ice cream when a change of state than no change 
was described in the first sentence. Interestingly, it was during the second 
reference to the target object when participants moved their eyes to a relevant 
object state but not immediately after the temporal shift was mentioned (“but 
first/and then”). Thus, although participants’ eye movements on the static visual 
scene were influenced by temporal shifts, such difference of eye movements 
towards the appropriate version of the target object was manifested at the final 
reference to it, but not before. 
The question is whether the lack of anticipatory eye movements towards a 
particular object state in Experiment 4 is resulted from a lack of appropriate 
contextual constraint. On the one hand, it is possible that the verbs in the first 
65 
 
sentence could not constrain what kind of objects would follow because there 
were four different objects depicted on the scene. Similarly, in the second 
sentence, participants could favour (and switch to) the upright ice cream as 
soon as they heard “but first”, since they were clearly required to shift back in 
time and the current object-state representation would not be relevant. What 
would be referred to next could only be drawn from the remaining three items 
unless the dropped ice cream was not ‘bound’ to the same identity as the ice 
cream that was dropped (i.e. it was just another object, unrelated to the one in 
the story, in which case the referential set would remain at four, and would not 
reduce down to three). Perhaps, the lack of anticipatory eye movements 
towards a specific object state came from: (a) limited processing time and 
cognitive resources available in online language comprehension, since 
establishing object-state representation required enough amount of time 
allowing for integrating sentence meaning, as shown in Experiment 3; (b) 
nothing mentioned to pull attention away from the “ice cream” that they’ve 
already been looking at, or (c) they are not anticipating with any great certainty 
that the “ice cream” will be mentioned again because the verbs in the second 
sentence (e.g., “look at” is non-selecting the “ice cream”, but there might be 
earlier looks to the intact ice cream in “the woman will drop the ice cream but 
first she will lick…”). 
Taken together, with the visual world paradigm, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that eye movements on the visual scene were primarily drawn to 
the two conflicting states of a target object. The effect was mostly manifested at 
the explicit reference to the object itself and modulated by the degree of change 
and temporal shifts that were described in auditory stimuli. 
66 
 
3.3 Experiment 5  
Experiment 5 aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 4. The 
paradigm was identical to Experiment 4. Different from Experiment 4, the 
auditory stimuli in Experiment 5 indicated the degree of change in the first 
sentence by using two contrasting objects (stomp on the penny vs. stomp on 
the egg) instead of two different actions (choose the ice cream vs. drop the ice 
cream). Thus, participants would not be able to get complete information of the 
described event until a particular object was mentioned. In this way, the degree 
of change was manipulated by the affordance of the objects, but not the actions 
alone. 
3.3.1 Method 
Participants. 64 students (38 female, mean age 22, range 18-26 years old) from 
the University of York participated in this study. They received either half an 
hour course credit or two pounds for their contribution. All participants were 
native speakers of British English and had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
None of the participants were in any of the previous experiments. 
Materials. There are 36 sets of auditory stimuli. The first sentence indicated 
either a change of state or no change by using the same verb with two different 
nouns (stomp on the egg vs. stomp on the penny), while the second sentence 
involved either a backward temporal shift (but first) or forward shift (and then). 
The stimuli were all in future tense, as shown in the examples below:  
 
a) The girl will stomp on the penny. But first, she will look down at the penny. 
b) The girl will stomp on the penny. And then, she will look down at the penny. 
c) The girl will stomp on the egg. But first, she will look down at the egg. 
67 
 
d) The girl will stomp on the egg. And then, she will look down at the egg. 
 
 The foil stimuli were the same as the ones used in Experiment 4. All sentences 
were recorded by a male native speaker of British English at the sample rate of 
44,100 Hz and 16-bit sound resolution in a sound proof booth. Identical words in 
the recorded stimuli of each set were spliced and re-used to exclude effects of 
any subtle difference in auditory cues, such as intonation.   
36 pairs of quadrant experimental pictures and were created by 
commercially available Clipart packages, as shown in Figure 3.9a and Figure 
3.9b. In each pair of quadrant pictures, the target objects were placed in the 
same locations. For the no change condition (“stomp on the penny”), two 
identical version of the object were presented together with two distractors (the 
oven and gloves). For the change condition (“stomp on the egg”), the intact 
state and the changed state of the object were depicted along with two 
distractors. The foil pictures were the same as the ones used in Experiment 4.  
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 4.  
  
Figure. 3.9a Experiment 5: Example of an 
experimental visual stimulus. The 
corresponding auditory stimuli were “The 
girl will stomp on the penny. But first/And 
then, she will look down at the penny”. 
Figure 3.9b Experiment 5: Example of an 
experimental visual stimulus. The 
corresponding auditory stimuli were “The girl 
will stomp on the egg. But first/And then, she 
will look down at the egg”. 
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3.3.2 Results 
Interest areas on the visual scene were marked with quadrants around depicted 
objects. Participants’ eye movements on each region were synchronized to the 
onset and offset of critical words and phrases in the auditory stimuli, including 
“stomp on”, “the”, penny/egg”, "but first/and then", "look down at", "the", and 
"penny/egg". The presentation of the result is divided into two sections. First, 
overall fixation patterns are described, which gives a general indication of eye 
movements as language unfolded. Second, analyses within time windows are 
provided by examining the percentage of trials with saccades towards the two 
versions of each target object (egg vs. penny) over time in time windows of the 
verb in the first sentence (stomp), the first reference to the target object (the 
penny/egg), temporal shifts (but first/and then), and the final reference to the 
target object (the penny/egg)6.  
3.3.2.1 Fixations 
Figure 3.10a and Figure 3.10b give a detailed illustration of eye movements 
over time by showing the mean proportion of fixations on the two versions of 
each target object on the visual scene during the presentation of trials. Although 
the two versions of the “PENNY” are the same, they are marked as “Intact” and 
“Changed” by following the locations of the “EGG” (i.e. the “changed” penny 
takes the same location as the “changed” egg, and vice versa).  
 
                                                 
6 See Table a2.2 in Appendix II for mean saccades and fixations during the critical time windows 
on the visual display as the utterance unfolded. 
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Figure 3.10a Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with fixations on the visual display as the auditory stimuli unfolded. This graph shows conditions in which the 
target object underwent no change of state (e.g., STOMP ON THE PENNY). Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the onset critical words and 
phrases, as indicated in the x-axis. The y-axis shows mean proportions of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis and averaged across subjects. 
The straight lines are fixations on the two different version of the target object when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned at the beginning of the second sentence, while 
the dotted lines showing fixations when “AND THEN” was mentioned. Although both versions of the “PENNY” are the identical, they are marked as “CHANGED” 
and “INTACT” to match the locations of the two versions of the “EGG”. The dashed line shows averaged percentage of fixations on the two distractors. 
             The girl will       stomp on     the penny.   (GAP)  But first/And then, she will look down at the penny. 
“PENNY” 
Time (ms) 
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Figure 3.10b Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with fixations on the visual display as the auditory stimuli unfolded. This graph shows conditions in which the 
target underwent a substantial change in state (e.g., “STOMP ON THE EGG”). Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the onset critical words 
and phrases, as indicated in the x-axis. The y-axis shows mean proportions of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis and averaged across 
subjects. The straight lines are fixations on the two different version of the target object when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned at the beginning of the second 
sentence, while the dotted lines showing fixations when “AND THEN” was mentioned. The two versions of the target object are different with one being an intact 
state and the other a changed state. The dashed line shows averaged percentage of fixations on the two distractors.
The girl will    stomp on  the egg.            (GAP) But first/And then, she will look down at the egg. 
Time (ms) 
 
“EGG” 
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Data from the first sentence suggested that there were obvious changes of 
fixations on the two identical versions of the unchanged object (e.g., penny) 
throughout the whole utterance. By contrast, participants predominantly looked 
at the broken egg compared to the intact egg before the verb “stomp on” was 
mentioned. This pattern remained the same until the final reference to the target 
object in the second sentence (e.g., the egg). Similar to Experiment 4, there 
was no immediate influence of temporal shifts on eye movements. However, 
when the noun phrase of mentioned again at the end of the second sentence, 
there were decreasing fixations on the broken egg but increasing eye 
movements on the intact egg for “but first, egg”, but no obvious changes of  
fixations on the two  versions of the egg for “and then, egg”.  
Therefore, the pattern of fixations in Experiment 5 seemed to be largely 
similar to Experiment 4. The following statistical analysis of saccadic eye 
movements during the same critical time windows as in Experiment 5 further 
revealed the changes of eye movements as language unfolded. 
3.3.2.2 Saccades 
“The girl will stomp on the penny/egg” 
(i) During “stomp on”: A two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed that 
there was a main effect of object type (penny vs. egg) (just missing 
significance by items) with more saccades towards the eggs than the 
pennies (see Figure 3.11), F1(1,63) = 6.54, p = .012, ηp2 = .05, F2(1,35) = 
3.97, p = .054, ηp2 = .10, but no main effect of object state despite more 
initial fixations on the broken egg than the intact egg, F1(1,63) = 2.87, p 
= .093, ηp2 = .02, F2(1,35) = 2.61, p = .115, ηp2 = .069, nor significant 
interaction, F1(1,63) = 1.65, p = .202, ηp2 = .01, F2(1,35) = 1.75, p = .194, 
72 
 
ηp2 = .05. This pattern suggested that eye movements were largely 
driven by the visual features of depecited items, and not yet influenced 
by the linguistic context.   
(ii) During “the penny/egg”: There was a main effect of object type on 
saccades (more looks towards the eggs than the pennies), F1(1,63) = 
8.46, p = .004, ηp2 = .12, F2(1,35) = 11.13, p = .002, ηp2 = .24, a main 
effect of the object state (more looks towards the changed state than the 
intact state), F1(1,63) = 8.53, p = .004, ηp2 = .12, F2(1,35) = 4.02, p 
= .004, ηp2 = .10, and a significant interaction, F1(1,63) = 6.09, p = .015, 
ηp2 = .10, F2(1,35) = 13.44, p = .001, ηp2 = .28, suggesting eye 
movements were influenced by both object type and the depicted object 
state. This pattern was similar to that seen in Experiment 4. 
 
Figure 3.11 Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the target 
regions between the onset and offset of the verb (e.g., “stomp on”) (M=607 ms) in 
the first sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to the two target objects with 
“penny” representing the condition of No Change and “egg” the condition of Change 
of state. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of trials with saccades 
that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Pairwise comparisons suggested that despite no difference in looks 
towards the two versions of “penny” (as expected, of course), t1(63) = 0.3, 
p = .976, t2(35) = 0.3, p = .976, but a significant difference between the 
two versions of “egg”, with more looks to the changed state (M = .64, SD 
= .18) than the intact state (M = .55, SD = .21, t1(63) = 3.87, p < .001, 
t2(35) = 0.3, p = .976), as shown in Figure 3.12. Although this pattern 
suggested that despite existing fixations on the broken egg, there were 
more saccades towards it than the intact one. 
In sum, data from the first sentence demonstrated that when the 
target object was not expected to change its state (e.g., “stomp on the 
penny”), there was no difference in looks towards it’s the two depicted 
versions. By contrast, when the object (presumably) was described to 
*** 
Figure 3.12 Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the target 
regions between the onset and offset of the reference to the target object (M = 562 
ms) in the first sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to the two described events 
in the first sentence, with “penny” representing the condition of No Change and 
“egg” the condition of Change of state. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed 
proportions of trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged 
across subjects. 
 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
    ** 
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change (e.g., “stomp on the egg”), the changed state tended to draw 
more eye movements than the intact state despite existing fixations. 
 “But first/And then, she will look down at the penny/egg” 
(iii) During “but first/and then”:  A three-way repeated measures ANOVA and 
suggest that there was a significant main effect of the temporal shift (but 
first vs. and then) with more saccades on hearing “and then” than “but 
first”, F1(1, 63) = 4.62, p = .035, ηp2 = .07, F2(1, 35) = 4.70, p = .037, ηp2 
= .12, and a main effect of object type (penny vs. egg) with more 
saccades towards the pennies than the eggs (See Figure 3.13) , F1(1, 
63) = 5.11, p = .027, ηp2 = .08, F2(1, 35) = 6.05, p= .019, ηp2 = .15, but 
there was no main effect of object state (intact vs. changed), F1(1, 63) 
= .57, p= .45, ηp2= .01, F2(1, 35) = .54, p = .47, ηp2 = .02. No significant 
interactions were found. No such difference was found for “penny”. The 
above data suggested that the increase of eye movements on the visual 
scene was largely driven by “and then”, but not by “but first”. 
Nonetheless, the contrasting versions of the “egg” was not differently 
influenced, suggesting no immediate impact of the description of 
temporal shifts on individual representation of the target object.  
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(iv) During “look down at”: To examine whether the influence of linguistic 
context would be revealed during the verb region, stastical analysis of 
saccades was conducted in this time window. A three-way repeated 
measures ANOVA showed that there was no significant main effects of 
the temporal shift (but first vs. and then), object type (penny vs. egg), and 
object state (intact vs. changed). However, there was a significant 
interaction between the depicted state and object type, F1(1, 63) = 4.55, 
p= .037, ηp2= .07, F2(1, 35) = = 6.90, p= .013, ηp2= .17. As predicted, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that the intact version of the “egg” was 
preferred compared to its broken version when a backward temporal shift 
was mentioned (“but first”), t1(63) = 2.80, p = .007, t2(35) = 2.32, p = .027 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Figure 3.13 Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the target 
regions between the onset and offset of the reference to the target object during the 
temporal shifts (M = 732 ms). The labels on the x-axis refer to the temporal shifts. 
The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of trials with saccades that were 
calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
* 
* 
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(See Figure 3.14). No such difference was found for the “and then” 
condition probably due to exisiting more fixations on the broken one than 
the intact one. This result suggested that by the time the verb in the 
second sentence was mentioned, participants were able to anticipate the 
intact state of the “egg” was the appropriate object state in the context. 
Thus, compared with Experiment 4, Experiment 5 showed an ealier 
demonstration of the retrieval of the intact state in the verb region prior to 
the noun region.   
(v) During “the penny/egg”: Figure 3.15 shows mean percentage of trials 
with saccades towards depicted versions of the “egg”. A three-way 
repeated measures ANOVA showed that there was no significant main 
effect of the temporal shift (but first vs. and then), F1(1, 63) = .18, p 
Figure 3.14 Experiment 5: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the target regions 
between the onset and offset of the verb (e.g., look down at) (M = 586 ms) in the second 
sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to the temporal shifts. The y-axis shows arcsine 
transformed proportions of trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and 
averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* 
 
** 
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= .674, ηp2 = .003, F2(1, 35) = .01, p = .912, ηp2 = .00, object type (penny 
vs. egg), F1(1, 63) = .17, p = .681, ηp2 = .003, F2(1, 35) = .02, p= .880, ηp2 
= .001, nor main effect of object state (intact vs. changed), F1(1, 63) 
= .01, p= .945, ηp2= .00, F2(1, 35) = .09, p = .772, ηp2 = .002. However, 
there was a significant three-way interaction, F1(1, 63) = 8.89, p= .004, 
ηp2= .12, F2(1, 35) = 7.64, p = .009, ηp2 = .179.  
Pairwise t-tests found that there were higher percentages of trials with 
saccades towards the intact state of the “egg” than its changed state 
when the second sentence began with “but first”, t1(63) = 2., p = .042, 
t2(35) = 2.76, p = .009). Besides, there were more looks towards the 
intact “egg” in “but first” than “and then”, t1(63) = 2.50, p = .015, t2(35) = 
Figure 3.15 Experiment 5: Percentage of saccades towards the depicted 
versions of the object between the onset and offset of the noun phrase (e.g., 
“the penny/egg”) (M = 630 ms) in the second sentence. The labels on the x-axis 
refer to the two depicted states, while y-axis shows estimated arcsine 
transformed proportions of trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial 
and averaged across subjects. 
 
* 
** 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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2.59, p = .014). No such difference was found for the “penny”. This result 
suggests that despite increased saccades towards the intact egg, 
participants were able to further increase looks it compared to the broken 
version. This pattern replicated the findings of Experiment 4.  
In sum, data from the second sentence showed that participants 
were able to retrieve the state of the target object as described in the 
language context when object name was mentioned at the end of the 
second sentence and at the verb region prior to it.   
3.3.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 5, the degree of change was manipulated by using the same verb 
with two different nouns (e.g., stomp on the penny/egg). For each set of 
auditory stimuli, separate visual scenes were used for the two target objects. 
Two identical versions were depicted for the object that was not expected to 
change its state (e.g., stomp on the penny), while two different versions (intact 
vs. changed) were depicted for the object that was expected to change its state 
with the same action (e.g., stomp on the egg).  
All eye movement patterns in Experiment 4 were replicated in 
Experiment 5. No difference was found between eye movements towards the 
two identical versions of “the penny”, though they switched from one version of 
to the other in the “but first” condition. By contrast, despite an initial bias 
towards the broken egg than the intact egg, eye movements were modulated by 
the linguistic context. After the verb onset in first sentence (e.g., “stomp on”), 
there were increasing inspections to the broken egg than the intact egg. At the 
end of the second sentence, looks towards the intact version increased but 
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looks towards the changed version decreased in the “but first’ condition. No 
such changes were found in the “and then” condition. Nonetheless, compared 
with Experiment 4, the shift of object representation was revealed earlier at the 
verb region in Experiment 5, which may be resulted from the difference in 
linguistic structures as the properites of object were important for understanding 
change in Experiment 5 but not necessarily in Experiment 4. 
3.4 General discussion 
With the “look and listen” eye-tracking paradigm, Experiments 4 and 
Experiment 5 aimed to investigate the time course of tracking object-state 
representation in language comprehension. The target object was depicted in 
two versions along with two distractors. We have obtained reliable evidence of 
the influence of linguistic context on eye movements towards the depicted 
versions of the object. Participants’ eye movements revealed that there was an 
initial bias towards the changed version of the target object, but this bias was 
reversed when no change was described to happen on the object. Besides, in 
the second sentence, the earliest moment eye movements switched from the 
unwanted changed state to the intact state was at the noun region. In principle, 
they could favour (and switch to) the appropriate state as soon as they heard 
the temporal shifts, since they were clearly required to shift back/forward in time 
when the current object-state representation may not be relevant. The fact that 
looks towards the appropriate state happened at a later linguistic region was 
probably due to the processing time that is required to construct situation 
models, as illustrated in Experiment 3.  
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What was driving participants’ eye movements towards the depicted 
versions of the object during the utterance? Could eye movements towards a 
particular object state reflect phonological overlap (Allopenna, Magnuson, & 
Tanenhaus, 1998) between the described object-state representation and the 
depicted object state? I might look at an ice cream because I hear the word “ice 
cream” and this directs my attention to anything to which that label can apply, or 
I might look at an ice cream because I have activated a conceptual 
representation and it is this (conceptual) activation that directs my attention to 
an ice cream (one that most closely matches my conceptual representation). 
Data from Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 suggested that phonological overlap 
was not likely to be the case: If it were phonological overlap that drove the eye 
movements, there should be no differences in looks towards the two depicted 
states of the ice cream. After all, both of pictures had the same object name. 
Alternatively, we might assume that participants were treating the two 
depicted versions as the same object, the intact version being the initial state 
and the changed version the end state. The two object states represented how 
the target object would look like before and after a change of state occurred. 
Increasing looks at the intact state as required by the backward temporal shift 
further showed that appropriate object states could be established in language 
comprehension. On the other hand, participants may have treated these two 
versions as two separate objects with the same linguistic label. For example, if 
there are two bottles of juice with exactly the same appearance in front you, one 
bottle empty and the other one full, you would not assume that the empty bottle 
of juice is the “future” existence of the full one, but you would assume instead 
that it is a separate bottle.  
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Therefore, it might have been the semantic overlap between the depicted 
object state and the mentally constructed object-state representation that drove 
eye movements to one object or another. That is, the object-state 
representation may not necessarily be ‘bound’ to the identity of the depicted 
version, but it may share core semantic features with the depicted item in the 
visual scene. For example, they have the same linguistic label and thus both 
can be referred to with the same object name; second, they are in the same 
state as indicated in the linguistic context. This semantic feature mapping effect 
was first reported by Cooper (1974), who found that participants were more 
likely to fixate items that were semantically related with the spoken word (e.g., 
more looks towards a snake or a lion for “Africa” than unrelated control words). 
Thus, aside from the time it took to integrate the linguistic description, there 
might be other cognitive processes (e.g., semantic feature mapping) involving in 
this process, which might have delayed early looks towards the appropriate 
object state.  
Taken together, Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 have shown that visual 
and auditory input can be rapidly integrated with representation of object state, 
but it is not clear what drove participants’ different eye movements towards the 
two depicted versions of object – whether they treated the two depicted 
versions as conflicting states of the same object or mapped semantic features 
of the described object-state representation onto the depicted object state in the 
visual scene. In the next Chapter, this issue will be further examined. Answering 
this question may be useful to provide an account of the level of mental 
representation activation in online language comprehension. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, Experiment 4 and 5 revealed that object-state representation could 
be established during language comprehension. Eye movement measures 
revealed rapid mapping between object-state representation and object state in 
the immediate visual scene. Nevertheless, this effect tended to manifested 
when object name was explicitly mentioned, but not before. Further studies will 
be presented in the following chapter to examine what drove participants’ eye 
movements around the visual scene – the binding of the two conflicting states 
as the before and after versions of the same object, or semantic overlap 
between object-state representation and the depicted state?  
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CHAPTER 4 
Tracking object-state representation during language 
comprehension: More evidence from eye movements   
4.1 Overview  
In Chapter 3, two experiments with the visual world paradigm investigated the 
linguistically-mediated influence of described events on eye movements 
towards two conflicting depicted versions (intact vs. changed) of a target object 
(e.g., ice cream). Initially, participants preferred the changed version (e.g., a 
dropped ice cream) to the intact version (e.g., an upright ice cream), but they 
adjusted their eye movements towards an appropriate version of the target 
object that matched the linguistic context as language unfolded. In the first 
sentence, they switched from the changed version to the intact version when no 
change was described as happening to the object (e.g., “The woman will 
choose the ice cream”). In the second sentence, eye movements were again 
directed to the relevant versions of the ice cream based on the linguistic 
description. For example, after “drop, but first” was mentioned, they started to 
look away from the dropped ice cream but towards the upright ice cream, 
suggesting the retrieval of the intact version as the appropriate object-state 
representation. However, looks towards the intact version did not exceed the 
changed version until the object name (e.g., “ice cream”) was mentioned at the 
end of the sentence, which may be due to updating of situation models. 
 What drove participants’ eye movements switching from one ice cream to 
the other in the second sentence? On the one hand, we might assume that the 
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two conflicting versions were bound to the same identity of the target object, 
with the upright ice cream reflecting the initial state and the dropped ice cream 
reflecting the end state. Although these two versions could not co-exist in real 
life, participants were able to track the appropriate one based on the linguistic 
description. When “the ice cream” was mentioned, they just looked at the one 
that matched the described state.  
On the other hand, participants may have treated these two versions as 
two separate tokens of the target object. Semantic features of spoken words 
have shown to be able to direct eye movements towards objects in the visual 
scene (Huettig & Altmann, 2005, 2007; Huettig & McQueen, 2007; Huettig, 
Quinlan, McDonald, & Altmann, 2006; Yee & Sedivy, 2006). Huettig and 
Altmann (2005) found that when “piano” was heard, participants were more 
likely to fixate on a picture of a trumpet than unrelated objects due to overlap of 
semantic features between “piano” and “trumpet” (i.e. as musical instrument). 
Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill (2011) further demonstrated that objects 
sharing semantic knowledge, including perceptual (shape) and abstract 
(function) features can be co-activated. Thus, perhaps participants mapped the 
semantic features of the described object-state representation in the episodic 
memory onto the depicted versions of the target object on the visual display. 
Participants’ eye movements were then directed to the one that overlapped 
most with the object’s representation in mind. If this is the case, the depicted 
versions of the target object were not necessarily bound to the same object 
identity. Instead, the two versions could be totally different-looking tokens of the 
same type of object, with looks to each version driven solely by the degree of 
overlap between that version and whatever features were being ‘held in mind’. 
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The three experiments in this chapter were designed to see whether 
findings from Experiment 4 and 5 were due to participants’ treating the two 
displayed versions as depicting the same object, or whether eye-movements 
reflected semantic overlap between the depicted object and the current mental 
representation of the object – one that was not necessarily ‘bound’ to the same 
token of the target object.  
Specifically, Experiment 6 intended to investigate whether eye 
movements could be driven by semantic overlap alone when the two depicted 
versions of the target object cannot be bound to the same object identity. As 
shown in Figure 4.1, two tokens of the target object (“the ice cream”) were 
depicted on the visual display. One was in the intact state (e.g., an upright ice 
cream) and the other one in the changed state (e.g., a dropped ice cream), but 
the two versions could not be treated as conflicting states of the same object 
identity due to differences in perceptual features. 
The auditory stimuli in Experiment 6 were the same as in Experiment 4, for 
example, “The woman will choose/drop the ice cream. But first/And then, she 
will look at the ice cream”. We predicted that if eye movements were driven by 
Figure 4.1 Experiment 6: An example visual scene in Experiment 6. On each 
display, there were four items, including two target two object with the same 
linguistic label but in conflicting states and two unrelated distractors. 
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semantic overlap alone, we would see the same pattern of eye movements in 
Experiment 6 as in Experiment 4. 
In Experiment 7, visual stimuli from Experiments 4 and 6 were combined 
into a single design (See Figure 4.2).  
The auditory stimuli in Experiment 7 were modified based on Experiment 6 to 
introduce either “the ice cream” or “another ice cream”, such as “The woman 
will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the/another ice cream”. We 
expect to replicate findings of Experiment 4 and Experiment 6 when “the ice 
cream” was mentioned.  When “another ice cream” was mentioned, however, 
participants were expected to establish a new object-state representation that 
does not necessarily inherit the episodic characteristics of the first ice cream 
that has been dropped. If this is the case, there would be no difference in looks 
towards the two upright ice creams between (4.2a) and (4.2b). However, if in 
Experiment 4, binding of the two representations of the ice cream (upright and 
a. similar                                                      b. different 
Figure 4.2 Experiment 7: Example visual display in Experiment 7. On (4.2a), two similar-
looking versions of the target object were presented together with two distractors. The 
intact version was intended to resemble the initial state of the object before it undergoes a 
change of state event, e.g., drop, while the changed version as the end state after change. 
On (4.2b), however, two different-look versions of the target objet were presented. Despite 
they were in different states, they were not supposed to be treated as conflicting states of 
the same item as perceptual differences cannot be attributed to a change of state action. 
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dropped) did in fact occur, there would be more looks towards the upright ice 
cream in (4.2b) than (4.2a). 
Consideration of the outcomes of Experiment 7, and their possible 
explanations, led to a final study in this series: Experiment 8. Three versions of 
ice creams were presented on the visual display. In this way, this final study 
distinguishes between alternative interpretations of the prior experiments, and 
leads to the conclusion that semantic overlap, and not binding, drives eye 
movements in this paradigm.  
Taken together, with three experiments, this chapter would like to provide 
a comprehensive examination of the mechanisms that drove eye movements on 
the visual scene as object-state representation was established during 
language comprehension. 
Figure 4.3 Experiment 8: Example visual display in Experiment 8. The objects including 
a dropped ice cream (c), an upright ice cream that is more similar to the dropped one 
(a), an upright ice cream that is less similar to the dropped one (b), and three 
distractors. The letters are shown here for exposition only and were not part of the 
visual display. 
a b 
c 
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4.2 Experiment 6 
In Experiment 6, we investigated whether eye movements around the visual 
scene could be driven solely by semantic overlap between the activated 
concept and the objects depicted on the visual scene. Unlike previous 
experiments in Chapter 3, the target object (e.g., ice cream) was depicted as 
two distinct tokens (i.e. two different looking ice creams. See Figure 4.1). Thus, 
it was not possible for participants to treat them as two conflicting states of the 
same token of the ice cream and to bind each to the same object identity.  
If participants were binding the two depicted versions as the same object 
identity in Experiment 4, this was not possible in Experiment 6 due to the 
perceptual differences between them, as they were two different tokens of the 
ice cream. In this case, we should not see increasing looks (or as many looks) 
towards the upright ice cream when a backward temporal shift (“but first”) was 
mentioned. However, if eye movements were solely driven by semantic overlap 
between the depicted version and the described object-state representation of 
the ice cream, we should see the same pattern of eye movements in 
Experiment 6 as in Experiment 4. 
4.2.1 Method 
Participants. 64 students (40 female, mean age 21, range 18-24 years old)  
from the University of York participated in this study. They received either half 
an hour course credit or three pounds for their contribution. All participants were 
native speakers of British English and had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
None of the participants in this study had taken part in previous experiments. 
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Stimuli. The visual stimuli were modified based on those in Experiment 4. 
Instead of having two “similar-looking” versions of the target object, two 
“different-looking” versions were depicted in the visual scene, as shown in 
Figure 4.1 above. The auditory stimuli were identical to those used in 
Experiment 4, as shown in the examples below:  
a) The woman will choose the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
b) The woman will choose the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. 
c) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
d) The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. 
Procedure. Experiment 6 followed the same procedure as Experiment 4 and 
Experiment 5. The onset of the auditory stimulus occurred 1000 ms after 
participants previewed the scene. Eye movements were monitored throughout 
the experiment using an EyeLink II head-mounted eye-tracker, which sampled 
at 250 Hz. Viewing was binocular but only the right eye was tracked. Each trial 
lasted 9 seconds and the total length of the experiment was about 30 minutes.  
4.2.2 Results 
Data were analyzed by the following steps as in Experiment 4 and 5. Both 
fixations and saccades around the same critical time windows as Experiment 4 
were reported.  
4.2.2.1 Fixations 
Figure 4.4a and Figure 4.4b illustrate percentage of trials with fixations on the 
depicted ice creams, which were synchronized to the auditory stimuli.  Similar to 
Experiment 4, the two versions of the target object received more fixations than 
distractors.  
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Figure 4.4a Experiment 6: Percentage of trials with fixations on the target regions during the presentation of the auditory stimuli. This graph shows conditions in 
which the target object underwent no change of state (e.g., CHOOSE). Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the 
onset of critical words and phrases, as shown on the x-axis. Y-axis shows mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. The straight 
lines indicate fixations on the two target items when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned in the second sentence, while the dotted lines show fixations when “AND 
THEN” was mentioned. Since the temporal shift was mentioned in the second sentence, the fixations of “but first” and “and then” were averaged in the first 
sentence for the purpose of the graph. Fixations on the two distractors were averaged and indicated by the dashed line. 
Time (ms) 
“CHOOSE”
” 
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Figure 4.4b Experiment 6: Percentage of trials with fixations on the target regions during the presentation of the auditory stimuli. This graph shows conditions in 
which the target underwent a substantial change in state (e.g., “DROP”). Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the 
onset of critical words and phrases, as shown on the x-axis. Y-axis shows mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. The straight 
lines indicate fixations on the two target items when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned in the second sentence, while the dotted lines show fixations when no change 
of “AND THEN” was mentioned. Since the temporal shift was mentioned in the second sentence, the fixations of “but first” and “and then” were averaged in the 
first sentence for the purpose of the graph. Fixations on the two distractors were averaged and indicated by the dashed line. 
Time (ms) 
“DROP” 
92 
 
At the onset of the verb in the first sentence, there were more fixations on 
the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream regardless of the verbs. At the 
offset of the verb when they had heard “the woman will choose/drop…”, there 
were  more fixations on the dropped ice cream for “drop”, but no difference of 
the upright ones for “choose”. Nonetless, at the offset of “the ice cream” when 
they had heard “the woman will choose/drop the ice cream”, fixations on the two 
depicted versions of the ice cream were influenced by the described actions in 
different ways, with more fixations on the dropped ice cream in “drop” than 
“choose”, but the upright ice cream in “choose” than “drop”.  
In the second sentence, shortly after the onset of “but first/and then”, 
fixations on both versions of the target object decreased. However, at the onset 
of “the ice cream”, fixations on the upright ice cream rapidly increased when 
“but first” was mentioned but not when “and then”. Nonetheless, at the offset of 
the noun phrase in the second sentence, there were no difference in fixations 
on the upright one and the dropped one in “drop, but first”, which is different 
from Experiment 4 where there were more fixations on the upright one than the 
dropped one. 
Therefore, in Experiment 6 proportions of fixations were similar to 
Experiment 4 in the first sentence with more fixations on the dropped ice cream 
than the upright one, but not in the second sentence, where not necessarily 
more fixations on the upright ice cream than the dropped one.  
4.2.2. 2 Saccades  
 “The woman will choose/drop the ice cream” 
(i) During “choose/drop”: A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed 
that there was no main effect of the verb on percentage of saccades 
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towards the depicted ice creams, F1(1,63) = .34, p = .561, ηp2 = .01, 
F2(1,35) = 1.01, p = .321, ηp2 = .028, the depicted version, F1(1,63) = 
1.54, p =.217, ηp2 = .01, F2(1,35) = .01, p = .954, ηp2 = .00, or interaction 
between them, F1(1,63) = .81, p = .371, ηp2 = .01, F2(1,35) = 1.49, p 
= .231, ηp2 = .04. Hence, saccades seemed to be not influenced by the 
verbs when they were just mentioned. 
(ii) During “the ice cream”: There was no main effect of the verb (choose vs. 
drop), F1(1,63) = .30, p = .583, ηp2 = .01, F2(1,35) = .12, p = .729, ηp2 
= .01, but there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice creams 
(more looks overall to the dropped version than the upright version. See 
Figure 4.5), F1(1,63) = 15.44, p < .001, ηp2 = .11, F2(1,35) = 4.88, p 
= .034, ηp2 = .12, and an interaction between them by subjects, F1(1,63) 
= 5.91, p = .016, ηp2 = .04, but not by items, F2(1,35) = 3.62, p = .065, ηp2 
= .09.  
To compare the results with Experiment 4, pairwise comparisons 
revealed that there was no difference in the percentage of saccades 
towards the upright ice cream depending on the verb (“choose” vs. 
“drop”). However, participants tended to look towards the dropped ice 
cream in “drop” (M = .73, SD = .19) more than in “choose” (M = .67, SD 
= .22, t1(63) = 2.16, p = .033, t2(35) = 1.63, p = .112), as shown in Figure 
4.5. Hence, saccades were influenced both by the described actions and 
the depicted object states with more saccades towards the dropped ice 
cream when “drop” was mentioned, but more towards the upright ice 
cream when “choose” was mentioned, replicating the findings of 
Experiment 4. 
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In sum, data from the first sentence showed that eye movements 
around the visual scene tended to be influenced both by what was 
described as the appropriate object-state representation in the linguistic 
context and by the depicted versions of the target object. This effect 
manifested at the end of the first sentence when the noun phrase (e.g., 
“the ice cream”) was mentioned.  
“But first/And then, she will look at the ice cream” 
(iii) During “but first/and then”: Figure 4.6 illustrates mean proportions of 
saccades towards the two depicted versions of the target object that 
Figure 4.5 Experiment 6: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the two 
depicted versions of the target object (“the ice cream”) between the onset and offset 
of noun phrase (M = 603 ms) in the first sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to 
the two described events in the first sentence, with “choose” representing the 
condition of No Change and “drop” the condition of Change of state. The y-axis 
shows percentage of trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and 
averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* 
*** 
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were averaged across subjects for each condition. A three-way 
repeated ANOVA showed that there was no significant main effect of 
the temporal shift (but first vs. and then), F1(1, 63) = .68, p = .412, 
ηp2 = .01, F2(1, 35) = 3.37, p = .075, ηp2 = .09, the verbs (choose vs. 
drop), F1(1, 63) = .00, p = .999, ηp2 = .00, F2(1, 35) = .04, p =.853, 
ηp2 = .00, nor the depicted ice creams, F1(1, 63) = 2.76, p = .102, ηp2 
= .04 (not significant by subjects), F2(1, 35) = 5.14, p = .030, ηp2 
= .13 (significant by items), but there was a significant interaction 
between the verbs and ice creams, F1(1, 63) = 15.73, p < .001, ηp2 
= .20, F2(1, 35) = 11.71, p = .002, ηp2 = .25. 
To confirm the source of the interaction, planned comparison 
showed that participants preferred to look more at the upright ice 
cream after “the woman will choose the ice cream, but first …” than 
after “the woman will drop the ice cream, but first...”. The reverse 
pattern was found for saccades towards the dropped ice cream with 
higher probability of eye movements in “drop, but first” than “choose, 
but first”. This pattern was similar to eye movements in the first 
sentence. The above results showed that eye movements were not 
influenced by the temporal shift, even though “but first/and then” has 
just been mentioned. 
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(iv) During “look at”: A three-way repeated ANOVA showed that there 
were no main effects or interactions. Thus, there were no differences 
of saccades towards the depicted versions of the target object 
depending on the linguistic context and object type.  
(v) During “the ice cream”: Figure 4.7 shows mean saccades towards 
the two versions of the ice creams during this time window. A three-
way repeated ANOVA showed that there was a significant main 
effect of the temporal shift (but first vs. and then) (more saccades 
overall in “but first” than “and then”), F1(1, 63) = 7.52, p = .008, ηp2 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
** 
Figure 4.6 Experiment 6: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the two 
versions of the target object on the visual scene between the onset and offset of 
“but first/and then” (M = 619 ms) in the second sentence. The labels on the x-axis 
refer to the two conditions of temporal shifts in the second sentence, with “but first” 
indicating a backward shift and “and then” a forward shift. The y-axis shows arcsine 
transformed proportions of trials with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and 
averaged across subjects. 
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= .12, F2(1, 35) = 5.79, p = .021, ηp2 = .14, and depicted ice creams 
by subjects, F1(1, 63) = 6.17, p = .016, ηp2 = .09, but not by items, 
F2(1, 35) = 2.63, p = .114, ηp2 = .07, but there was no main effect of 
the verbs, F1(1, 63) = .01, p = .924, ηp2 = .00, F2(1, 35) = .01, p 
= .913, ηp2 = .00. No interactions were found.  
In sum, data from the second sentence revealed that participants 
were influenced by the described degree of change and the depicted 
versions of the target objects when a temporal shift was mentioned, 
showing a preference to the dropped ice cream for “drop, but first”, 
but the upright ice cream for “choose, but first”. This finding was not 
consistent with Experiment 4, in which the influence of the temporal 
  * 
  * 
Figure 4.7 Experiment 6: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the target 
regions between the onset and offset of “the ice cream” (M = 565 ms) in the second 
sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to the two conditions of temporal shifts in 
the second sentence, with “but first” indicating a backward shift and “and then” a 
forward shift. The y-axis shows arcsine transformed proportions of trials with 
saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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shift manifested immediately after the temporal shit was mentioned. 
However, similar to Experiment 4, at the final reference to the target 
object, there was an increase of eye movements towards the upright 
ice cream with more saccades towards it in “drop, but first” than 
“drop, and then”. No such difference was found for the dropped ice 
cream. 
4.2.3 Discussion 
In Experiment 6, participants listened to a description of a target object and 
looked at a visual display that illustrated two different versions of the object 
along with two distractors. One version of the object was in an intact state, while 
the other version was in a changed state. Unlike Experiment 4, in which the two 
versions might be associated with two conflicting states of the “same” object 
identity (see Figure 3.1), in Experiment 6 the two versions were depicted as two 
“different’ tokens of the target object that cannot be bound into the same object 
identity (see Figure 4.1). By manipulating the identity of the target object on the 
visual display, we intended to investigate whether semantic overlap alone can 
drive eye movements on the visual scene towards the appropriate versions of 
the object.  
We predicted that if participants were binding the two versions into the 
same object identity, we would see fewer eye movements towards the intact 
version when participants were, in effect, requested to move backward in time, 
because it did not correspond to the initial state of, in the example, the dropped 
ice cream (recall that the two ice creams were manifestly different tokens of an 
ice cream). Yet, if eye movements were driven by semantic overlap between 
described object-state representation and depicted object, the identity of the two 
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depicted versions would not be relevant. In this case, the pattern of eye 
movements in Experiment 6 would be similar to Experiment 4.  
Eye movements during the first sentence showed that participants were 
aware of the consequences of the described events and tended to look at the 
changed version of the target object after a change of state was described. This 
effect manifested when the object name was mentioned, but not before. 
However, unlike in Experiment 4, there was no reliable interaction between verb 
type (choose vs. drop) and object type. In the second sentence, the influence of 
the temporal shift did not manifest immediately when “but first/and then” was 
heard. Instead, the pattern of eye movements were following the same trend as 
in the first sentence. Nevertheless, consistent with Experiment 4, at the final 
reference to the target object there tended to be more looks towards the upright 
ice cream in “drop, but first” than “drop, and then”. Thus, compared with 
Experiment 4, eye movements towards the intact version were delayed and 
reduced in Experiment 6.  
These findings were not consistent with the prediction of the identity 
binding account that participants treated the upright ice cream and the dropped 
ice cream as two conflicting states of the same object identity in Experiment 4. 
According to this account, participants were binding the upright ice cream and 
the dropped one as the same object identity in Experiment 4.  If this is the case, 
we were not expecting to see increasing eye movements towards the upright 
ice cream in Experiment 6 since the two versions of ice creams were different 
tokens can could be not bound to the same token of the target object. However, 
the results were not consistent with the semantic overlap account either, since 
the patterns were different from Experiment 4, even though there were 
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increasing looks towards the upright ice cream. Perhaps, eye-movements 
around the visual scene were likely guided both by ascribing the same identity 
to the two versions of the object and by semantic overlap between the 
linguistically described object-state representation and a depicted version.  
4.3 Experiment 7  
Experiment 7 intended to further explore what drove the eye movements 
towards the depicted versions of the target object, being the binding of two 
depicted versions as the same object or semantic overlap between the object-
state representation in mind and the depicted versions. All linguistic stimuli in 
Experiment 7 described a change of state in the first sentence and started the 
second sentences with “but first”. However, the final noun phrase in the second 
sentence differed, as either “the” object or “another” was mentioned (e.g., the 
woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the/another ice cream). 
Compared with “the ice cream”, “another ice cream” shares certain 
characteristics with the ice cream in the first sentence (i.e. it must be of the 
same type), but it is not expected to inherit its episodic characteristics and 
consequences (due to it having to be a different token). Instead, on hearing 
“another ice cream”, a new token of ice cream that had not been encoded in the 
current model of language processing was expected to be introduced into the 
event representation. Based on findings in previous chapters, an intact token 
would be inferred in the second sentence. 
On the visual display, we manipulated the perceptual features of the target 
object. One visual scene was the same as in Experiment 4 (see Figure 
3.1/Figure 4.2a) and the other was the same as in Experiment 6 (see Figure 
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4.1/Figure 4.2b). For each trial, participants saw either two “similar” versions of 
the target object that could be associated with its initial state and end state 
(Figure 4.2a) or two “different” versions that could not be treated as conflicting 
states of the same object but two separate tokens of the object (Figure 4.2b).  
 
If eye movements are driven by participants’ treating the two depicted ice 
creams in (4.2a) as representing the same actual (i.e. token) ice cream, we 
would expect to see more looks towards the upright ice cream in (4.2a) than 
(4.2b) when “the ice cream” is mentioned since the one in (4.2b) could not be 
treated as the corresponding dropped version. When “another” is mentioned, 
however, there should be fewer eye movements towards the upright ice cream 
in (4.2a) compared with the one in (4.2b). The upright ice cream in (4.2a) would 
be interpreted as the same token as the dropped ice cream, which means it 
would be a poor candidate for “another ice cream”.  
Figure 4.2 Experiment 7: Example visual display in Experiment 7. On (4.2a), two similar-
looking versions of the target object were presented together with two distractors. The 
intact version was intended to resemble the initial state of the object before it undergoes a 
change of state event, e.g., drop, while the changed version the end state after change. 
On (4.2b), however, two different-look versions of the target objet were presented. Despite 
they were in different states, they were not supposed to be treated as conflicting states of 
the same item as perceptual differences cannot be attributed to a change of state action. 
a. similar                                                      b.  different 
102 
 
By comparison, if eye movements are driven by semantic overlap, when 
“the” is mentioned there should also be more eye movements towards the 
upright ice cream in (4.2a) than (4.2b), because the one in (4.2a) was not only 
upright (i.e. not dropped) but also shared more perceptual features with the 
dropped ice cream than the one in (4.2b) in episodic memory. When “another” 
was referred to, however, there would be no differences in eye movements 
towards the upright versions between (4.2a) and (4.2b), because both versions 
are intact, and thus fit the newly-established representation of a (presumably 
intact, but different) ice cream. To summarize, when “the ice cream” was 
mentioned, we would expect to replicate findings in experiment 4 and 
Experiment 6, with more looks at the upright ice cream than the dropped one for 
both visual displays. However, when “another ice cream” was mentioned, there 
would be differences in eye movements between (4.2a) and (4.2b) according to 
the binding account, but not according to the semantic overlap account. 
4.3.1 Method 
Participants. 64 students (41 female, mean age 21, range 18-26 years old)  
from the University of York participated in this study. They received either half 
and hour course credit or two pounds for their contribution. All participants were 
native speakers of British English and had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
None of the participants in this study had taken part in previous experiments.  
Materials. 36 sets of auditory stimuli were included as experimental trials. In 
each set of stimuli, either “the” or “another” was mentioned in the noun phrase 
at the end of the second sentence. For example,  
4a) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
4b) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at another ice cream. 
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There were 36 sets of foil sentences that followed the same sentence structure 
as the experimental trials. Half of them included “the” in the final noun phrase, 
while the other half included “another”. All experimental and foil sentences were 
recorded by a male native speaker of British English at the sampling rate of 
44,100 Hz and 16-bit sound resolution in a sound proof booth. Identical words in 
the recorded stimuli of each set were spliced and re-used to exclude effects of 
any subtle difference in auditory cues, such as intonation. Each stimulus was 
presented together with one of the two versions of visual display, as shown in 
Figure 4.2a and 4.2b.  
Procedure. The procedure was the same as previous eye-tracking experiments 
in this thesis. The total length of the experiment was about 35 minutes. 
4.3.2 Results 
Following the same data analysis procedure as in previous experiments, 
fixations and saccades arond the time windows of the verb in the first sentence 
(“drop”), the first reference to the target object (“the ice cream”), temporal shifts 
(“but first”), the verb (“look at”),  and the noun (“ice cream”) were reported. 
4.3.2.1 Fixations 
Figure 4.8a and Figure 4.8b illustrate the percentage of trials with fixations on 
the depicted versions of the target object, which were synchronized to the 
auditory stimuli7.  At the onset of the verb in the first sentence, the dropped ice 
cream received more fixations than the upright ice cream in both pictures, 
                                                 
7 The duration of “another” is longer than “the”. For the purpose of the fixation graph, we have 
used the average duration of “another ice cream” and “the ice cream” to synchronize eye 
movements. However, for statistical analysis, we excluded the determiner and only took the 
average duration of the noun (“ice cream”), which has been cross-spliced across the linguistic 
conditions. 
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replicating previous experiments. This pattern did not change during the 
remaining section of the first sentence (See Figure 4.8a & 4.8b). At the offset of 
the “ice cream”, there were more fixations on the dropped ice cream but fewer 
on the upright ice cream in (4.2a) than (4.2b) (See Figure 4.8a & 4.8b). 
In the second sentence, shortly after the onset of “but first”, fixations on 
both of the depicted versions decreased, but the pattern of eye movements 
remained the same until at the final reference to “the ice cream” when eye 
movements switched to the upright ice creams. When “another ice cream” was 
mentioned, there were more fixations on the upright version but fewer on the 
dropped version compared with “the ice cream”. 
In sum, data of fixations revealed that there were more eye movements on 
the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream in the first sentence, 
replicating previous experiments. In the second sentence, eye movements 
switched to the upright ice creams when “the/another ice cream” was 
mentioned.  
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Figure 4.8a Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with fixations on the target regions during the presentation of the auditory stimuli. Two versions of 
the target object were depicted, which could be associated with the INTACT state and the CHANGED state of the SAME object. Fixations were 
calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the onset of critical words and phrases, as shown on the x-axis. Y-axis shows 
mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. The straight lines indicate fixations on the two target items when 
“ANOTHER” was mentioned in the second sentence, while the dotted lines show fixations when “THE” was mentioned. Fixations on the two 
distractors were averaged and indicated by the dashed line. 
 Time (ms) 
“Similar” 
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Figure 4.8b Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with fixations on the target regions during the presentation of the auditory stimuli. Two versions of 
the target object were depicted, which could not be possibly associated with the INTACT state and the CHANGED state of the same object, but two 
DIFFERENT objects sharing the same linguistic label. Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the 
onset of critical words and phrases, as shown on the x-axis. Y-axis shows mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. 
The straight lines indicate fixations on the two target items when “ANOTHER” was mentioned in the second sentence, while the dotted lines show 
fixations when “THE” was mentioned. Fixations on the two distractors were averaged and indicated by the dashed line. 
 
 Time (ms) 
“Different” 
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4.3.2.2 Saccades 
 “The woman will drop the ice cream” 
(i) During “drop”: There were increasing looks towards the dropped ice 
cream. A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed that there was a 
main effect of the depicted ice creams (more looks at the dropped ice 
cream than the upright one), F1(1,63) = 19.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, 
F2(1,35) = 10.07, p = .003, ηp2 = .22, but there was no main effect of the 
type of visual displays, F1(1,63) = .00, p = .989, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) = .37, 
p = .549, ηp2 = .01, or no interaction, F1(1,63) = .84, p = .364, ηp2 = .01, 
F2(1,35) = .70, p = .409, ηp2 = .02.  
 
Figure 4.9 Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the depicted 
versions of the target object between the onset and offset of the verb (e.g., “drop”) 
(M = 425 ms) in the first sentence. The labels on the x-axis refer to the two types of 
visual display. “Similar” indicates the upright ice cream and the dropped ice cream 
may be possibility treated as the intact state and the changed state of the ice 
cream, while “different” means the two ice creams could not be treated as the 
same object identify but two different tokens. The y-axis shows percentage of trials 
with saccades that were calculated trial-by-trial and averaged across subjects. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* 
*** 
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This result is consistent with the fixation data that there were more looks 
to the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream regardless the visual 
displays, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
(ii) During “the ice cream”: Looks towards the dropped ice cream continued 
to increase. A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed that there 
was a significant main effect of the depicted ice creams (more saccades 
towards the dropped one than the upright one, see Figure 4.10), F1(1,63) 
= 61.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, F2(1,35) = 23.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, a main 
effect of the type of visual display by subjects (more looks at the display 
with two different-looking ice creams than two similar ones), F1(1,63) = 
6.05, p = .017, ηp2 = .09, but not by items, F2(1,35) = 3.26, p = .080, ηp2 
= .09. A significant interaction was found, F1(1,63) = 4.34, p = .041, ηp2 
= .06, F2(1,35) = 4.78, p = .036, ηp2 = .12. As shown in Figure 4.10, there 
was no difference in saccades towards the dropped ice cream between 
the two visual displays, but there were more saccades towards the 
upright ice cream when the two versions of the target object were less 
similar, t1(63) = 3.56, p =.001, t2(35) = 2.99, p = .005. Thus, these 
findings were consistent with Experiment 4 and Experiment 6. 
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In sum, in the first sentence, there were more saccades towards the 
dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream in both visual displays, 
replicating the findings in Experiment 4 and Experiment 6. Nevertheless, 
when comparing across the visual displays, there were more saccades 
towards the upright ice cream when the two depicted versions of the ice 
creams had less identical perceptual features.  
  
Figure 4.10 Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the depicted 
versions of the target object between the onset and offset of the noun phrase (e.g., 
“the ice cream”) (M = 667 ms) in the first sentence.  
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
*** 
** 
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“But first, she will look at the/another ice cream” 
(iii) During “but first”: A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed that 
there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice creams (more 
saccades towards the dropped one than the upright one, see Figure 
4.11), F1(1,63) = 5.53, p = .022, ηp2 = .08, F2(1,35) = 7.91, p = .008, ηp2 
= .18, no main effect of the type of visual displays, F1(1,63) = 2.86, p 
= .096, ηp2 = .04, F2(1,35) = 1.89, p = .178, ηp2 = .05, or interaction, 
F1(1,63) = .08, p = .782, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) = .01, p = .973, ηp2 = .00.  
(iv) During “look at”: Figure 4.12 showed the mean percentage of trials with 
saccades towards the two versions of the ice creams on each display 
during this time window. A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed 
that there was a marginal main effect of the depicted ice creams (more 
saccades towards the upright one than the dropped one, see Figure 
Figure 4.11 Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the depicted 
versions of the target object between the onset and offset of “but first” (M = 685 ms) 
in the second sentence.  
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* 
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4.11), F1(1,63) = 3.33, p = .073, ηp2 = .05, F2(1,35) = 6.39, p = .016, ηp2 
= .15, but no main effect of the type of visual display, F1(1,63) = .34, p 
= .563, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) = .27, p = .609, ηp2 = .01, nor interaction, 
F1(1,63) = 2.58, p = .113, ηp2 = .04, F2(1,35) = 1.48, p = .232, ηp2 = .04.   
(v) During “ice cream”: Due to the difference of duration between “the” and 
“another”, only the time window for “ice cream” was included for 
statistical analysis of saccades. A three-way repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice 
creams (more saccades towards the upright one than the dropped one, 
see Figure 4.13), F1(1,63) = 67.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .52, F2(1,35) = 62.72, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .64, but no reliable main effect of the determiner (the vs. 
another), F1(1,63) = 3.17, p = .080, ηp2 = .05, F2(1,35) = 2.81, p = .103, 
ηp2 = .07, nor main effect of the type of the visual displays, F1(1,63) = .12, 
Figure 4.12 Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the 
depicted versions of the target object between the onset and offset of “look at” 
(M = 491 ms) in the second sentence.  
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* 
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p = .735, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) = .15, p = .697, ηp2= .01. No interactions 
were found.  
 
In sum, in the second sentence saccades switched from the dropped ice 
cream to the upright ice cream on the visual displays for both “the ice 
cream” and “another ice cream”.   
4.3.3 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 7 showed that participants’ eye movements 
towards the visual displays were influenced by the linguistic context. Consistent 
with previous eye-tracking experiments in this thesis, there were more fixations 
on the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream at the beginning of the first 
Figure 4.13 Experiment 7: Percentage of trials with saccades 
towards the depicted versions of the target object between the 
onset and offset of the final noun (“ice cream”) (M = 512 ms) in the 
second sentence.  
 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
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sentence. Looks towards the dropped ice cream continued to increase when a 
change of state action (“drop”) was described to happen on the ice cream. In 
the second sentence, after “but first” was mentioned, participants started to look 
away from the dropped ice cream and towards the upright ice cream. When “the 
ice cream” was referred to at the end of the second sentence, there were more 
saccades towards the upright ice cream than the dropped ice cream on both 
visual displays.  
Similarly, when “another ice cream” was mentioned, there were also more 
saccades towards the dropped ice cream than the upright one regardless of the 
visual displays. Thus, it seems that participants were not treating the upright 
and dropped ice creams as conflicting states of the same ice cream and did not 
bind them to the same object identity (4.2a). Otherwise, it would be difficult for 
them to switch to the upright ice cream when “another” was mentioned. Instead, 
eye movements seemed to be predominantly guided by semantic overlap as 
there were increasing saccades towards the upright ice cream on both visual 
displays regardless of the determiners (“the”/”another”). Nonetheless, a 
difference in saccades towards the upright ice cream and the dropped ice 
cream emerged when the verb (“look at”) was mentioned in the second 
sentence for (4.2a) but not in (4.2b). Thus, although the results were not 
consistent with the prediction of the binding account, participants did seem able 
to switch to the upright ice cream earlier when the depicted versions were more 
similar to each other.  
These findings suggest that semantic mapping is also important for 
discourse comprehension, which is consistent with studies on individual words 
(Huettig & Altmann, 2005; Yee & Sedivy, 2001, 2006). To conclude, Experiment 
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7 suggested that eye movements on the visual scene were driven by semantic 
overlap between the depicted version of the object and the described object-
state representation. 
One limitation of Experiment 7, however, is that only a single intact version 
of the target object was depicted in the visual display. Thus, participants had no 
alternative but to opt for that particular upright ice cream when they heard 
“another”. Experiment 8 addresses this. 
4.4 Experiment 8  
In Experiment 6 and Experiment 7, we have demonstrated that sematic overlap 
between linguistic and visual information is likely to drive eye movements 
towards a specific version of the target object on the visual display. For 
example, when a change of state was described (e.g., “the woman will drop the 
ice cream”), there were more eye movements towards a dropped ice cream 
than an upright one. However, this pattern of eye movements reversed in the 
subsequent discourse when “the/another ice cream” was mentioned, as 
participants were directed to travel back in time (“but first”) and retrieve the 
intact version, i.e. an upright ice cream. However, when they heard “another ice 
cream”, they most likely had an upright ice cream in mind, which may or may 
not have the same perceptual features as the one in the visual display. As there 
was only one upright ice cream on the visual display, participants had no 
alternative but to look at that ice cream when looking for “another ice cream”. 
Hence, in Experiment 8, we depicted two intact ice creams along with one 
dropped ice cream (matching one of the intact ones). Distractors were also 
included (See Figure 4.3). The same auditory stimuli in Experiment 7 were 
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used. The “and then” condition was added so as to compare how the influence 
of temporal shifts on eye movements(e.g., The woman will drop the ice cream. 
But first/And then, she will look at the/another ice cream). 
Therefore, with this manipulation in Experiment 8, we were able to directly 
compare eye movements towards three different versions on the visual display 
as the language unfolded. This was particularly useful for identifying which 
version of the two upright ice creams could be considered as “another ice 
cream”. On the one hand, we may assume no difference between (a) and (b), 
since both versions were intact and may match the default object-state 
representation of “another ice cream”. On the other hand, we may predict that 
(a) would be preferred to (b) for “another ice cream”, since new information is 
integrated into the current situation model in which (c) is the current object-state 
representation. Also, (a) shared more “episodic characteristics” of (c) than (b) 
did. Thus, perhaps it is easier to modify (c) into (a) than (b). As for “the ice 
cream”, we may expect more eye movements towards (a) than (b) regardless of 
whether there was an influence of the current situation model since (b) had 
fewer overlapping semantic features with (c) compared with (a). 
4.4.1 Method 
Participants. Thirty-eight students8   (22 female, mean age 20, range 18-23 
years old)  from the University of York participated in this study, receiving 1-hour 
course credit or a payment of three pounds for their contribution. All participants 
were native speakers of British English and had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. None of the participants in this study had taken part in previous 
                                                 
8 There were fewer participants in Experiment 8 (N=38) than other experiments (N=64). Due to 
time constraints it was not possible to run the intended number of participants. The conclusions, 
given the data, should accordingly be treated with a degree of caution. 
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experiments.  
Stimuli. Six items were depicted on each visual display, as shown in Figure 4.3. 
The auditory stimuli were shown in following examples:  
(a) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at the ice cream. 
(b) The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will look at another ice cream. 
(c) The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. 
(d) The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at another ice cream.   
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 7, except that the 
calibration was based on 13 points rather than 9 points. The experiment was 
run on an Eyelink II remote eye-tracker, which sampled at 250 Hz from the right 
eye. The total length of the experiment was about 45 minutes. 
4.4.2 Results 
Data were analyzed by the following steps as in previous experiments. Both 
fixations and saccades on the visual display were reported by using the same 
critical time windows as in previous experiments.  
4.4.2.1 Fixations 
Figure 4.14a and Figure 4.14b illustrate proportion of fixations on items on the 
visual display. At the onset of the verb in the first sentence, there were more 
fixations on the dropped ice cream than the upright ice creams, replicating 
previous experiments. This difference became greater as the first sentence 
unfolded: At the offset of the verb when participants had just heard “The woman 
will drop … ”. 
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Figure 4.14a Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with fixations on items on the visual display when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned in the second 
sentence. Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the onset of critical words and phrases, as shown 
on the x-axis. Y-axis shows mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. The straight blue lines indicate fixations on 
INTACT_SAME (a) and CHANGED (c), while the dashed orange lines reveal fixations on INTACT_DIFF(ERENT) (b). The dotted grey lines the 
averaged fixations on unrelated distractors. 
a                             b 
 
 
 
c                              
“But first” 
 Time (ms) 
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Figure 4.14b Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with fixations on items on the visual display when “BUT FIRST” was mentioned in the second 
sentence. Fixations were calculated every 25 ms sequentially from the synchronization point at the onset of critical words and phrases, as shown 
on the x-axis. Y-axis shows mean proportion of fixations that were calculated on a trial-by-trial basis. The straight blue lines indicate fixations on 
INTACT_SAME (a) and CHANGED (c), while the dashed orange lines reveal fixations on INTACT_DIFF(ERENT) (b). The dotted grey lines the 
averaged fixations on unrelated distractors.  
“And then” 
a                             b 
 
 
 
c                              
 Time (ms) 
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In the second sentence, despite decreasing fixations on the dropped ice 
cream after “but first” was mentioned, fixations on the upright ice creams did not 
exceed the dropped one until “the/another ice cream” was mentioned, 
suggesting a late influence of the linguistic context.  Specically, when “but first” 
was mentioned (see Figure 4.14a), there was no difference in fixations on (a) 
INTACT_SAME between “the ice cream” and “another ice cream” at the offset 
of “ice cream”, but more fixations on (b) INTACT_DIFFERENT for “another ice 
cream” than “the ice cream”. This pattern indicated that (a) was considered as 
an appropriate candidate of object representation for both “the” and “another” 
ice creams for “but first” condition. However, (b) INTACT_DIFFERENT was 
treated as a more appropriate representation for “another” than “the” ice cream. 
By contrast, when “and then” was mentioned (see Figure 4.14b), there was no 
difference in fixations on (a) INTACT_SAME and (b) INTACT_DIFFERENT. 
Thus, this result indicated that both (a) INTACT_SAME and (b) 
INTACT_DIFFERENT appropriate object-state representation for “another ice 
cream” and “the ice cream” for “and then” condition. Interestialy, overall there 
were more fixations on both (a) INTACT_SAME and (b) INTACT_DIFFERENT 
in “another ice cream” than “the ice cream”. 
In sum, fixations on the depicted ice creams suggested that participants 
predominantly looked at the dropped ice cream rather than at the upright ones 
in the first sentence. This finding is consistent with previous eye-tracking 
experiments reported in this thesis. In the second sentence, when “but first, the” 
was mentioned, there were increasing looks towards both upright ice creams, 
but the upright one that was more similar to the dropped one attracted more 
fixations than the less similar one for “the ice cream”. The opposite pattern was 
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found for “but first, another”, with more fixations on the different-looking ice 
cream than the same-looking one. As for “and then, the/another”, both upright 
ice creams were considered as more appropriate for “another ice cream” than 
for “the ice cream”, because the former requires any intact ice cream, while the 
latter requires continued attention to the dropped ice cream.  
4.4.2.2 Saccades 
“The woman will drop the ice cream” 
(i) During “drop”: A repeated measures one-way ANOVA showed that 
there was no main effect of the depicted ice creams, F1(2,36) = 1.25, 
p = .290, ηp2 = .02, F2(2,34) = 2.23, p = .124, ηp2 = .12, suggesting no 
difference of saccades towards the ice creams.   
(ii) During ‘the ice cream”: A repeated measures one-way ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice 
creams on saccades, F1(2,36) = 45.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, F2(2,34) = 
15.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. Pairwise comparisons suggested that there 
were more saccades towards the dropped ice cream than the upright 
ice creams, with t1(37) = 7.19, p < .001, t2 (35) = 4.25 , p <.001 ,  
t1(37) = 9.30, p < .001, t2 (35) = 5.54, p <.001, respectively (see 
Figure 4.15).  
In sum, in the first sentence, there were more saccades towards 
the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream. This pattern 
replicated preivous findings in Experiment 4-7. 
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“But first/And then, she will look at the/another ice cream” 
(iii)  During “but first’/and then”: A repeated measures two-way ANOVA 
showed that there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice 
creams (more saccades towards the dropped one than the upright 
ones. See Figure 4.16), F1(2,36) = 33.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .65, F2(2,34) 
= 23.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .58, but there was no significant main effect of 
the temporal shifts, F1(1,37) = .002, p = .961, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) 
= .05, p = .823, ηp2 = .001, nor interaction, F1(2,36) = .04, p = .961, 
ηp2 = .002, F2(2,34) = .56, p = .576, ηp2 = .03. Thus, the pattern of eye 
movements was similar to the first sentence, suggesting no 
immediate influence of the temporal shifts on eye movements. This 
result was also consistent with previous findings in Experiment 4-7. 
Figure 4.15 Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the items 
on the visual display when the target object was mentioned (e.g., “the ice cream”) 
(M = 667 ms) in the first sentence. “Changed” refers to the dropped ice cream; 
“Intact_Same” refers to the upright ice cream that is more similar to the dropped 
one, while “Intact_Different” refers the other upright ice cream that is less similar to 
the dropped one. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
*** 
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(iv) During “look at”: A repeated measures two-way ANOVA showed that 
there was a significant main effect of the depicted ice creams (more 
saccades towards the dropped one than the upright ones), F1(2,36) = 
5.87, p = .004, ηp2 = .14, F2(2,34) = 19.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .48, but 
there was no significant main effect of the temporal shifts, F1(1,37) 
= .28, p = .598, ηp2 = .004, F2(1,35) = .14, p = .756, ηp2 = .01, nor 
interaction, F1(2,36) = .47, p = .626, ηp2 = .01, F2(2,34) = .50, p 
= .720, ηp2 = .04, suggesting the pattern did not change from the last 
time window (“but first/and then”), thus no anticipatory eye 
movements towards the appropriate version of the ice cream.  
(v) During “ice cream”: This is the most important time window in 
Figure 4.16 Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the items 
on the visual display during temporal shifts (“but first/and then”) (M = 487 ms) 
in the second sentence. “Changed” refers to the dropped ice cream; 
“Intact_Same” refers to the upright ice cream that is more similar to the dropped 
one, while “Intact_Different” refers the other upright ice cream that is less similar 
to the dropped one. 
 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** Changed 
Intact_Same 
Intact_Different 
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Experiment 8. Figure 4.17a and Figure 4.17b illustrate the proportion 
of trials with saccades towards the ice creams. Since we have cross-
spliced the same words in each set of the stimuli, the duration of the 
final noun was identical across conditions. A repeated measures 
three-way ANOVA showed that there was a significant main effect of 
the depicted ice creams (more saccades overall towards the same-
looking upright ice cream than the different-looking one), F1(2,36) = 
55.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .83, F2(2,34) = 50.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .82, but 
there was no main effect of the determiners, F1(1,37) = .58, p = .452, 
ηp2 = .02, F2(1,35) = .84, p = .367, ηp2 = .02, or temporal shifts, 
F1(1,37) = .12, p = .740, ηp2 = .00, F2(1,35) = .00, p = .985, ηp2 = .00. 
A significant interaction between the depicted ice creams and the 
determiners was found, F1(2,36) = 8.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .41, F2(2,34) 
= 10.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .48. 
Planned comparisions were conducted by separting the 
conditions based on the determiners (“the” vs. “another”). As shown in 
Figure 4.17a below, when the linguistic context was “but first, the”, 
there were most saccades towards the same-looking upright ice 
cream than the different-looking one. Nonetheless, as shown in 
Figure 4.17b, when “but first, another” was mentioned, there were 
more saccades towards the same-looking upright ice cream than the 
different-looking one. These results suggest that when participants 
needed to retrieve an intact object-state representation as indicated 
by “but first”, they tended to associate it with the same-looking upright 
ice cream during both “the/another ice cream”.  
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By comparison, when “and then” was mentioned, there were also 
more saccades towards the same-looking upright ice cream than the 
different-looking for one during “the ice cream”. However, there was 
*** 
Figure 4.17a Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the items 
on the visual display during the noun (“ice cream”) (M = 513 ms) after “the” was 
mentioned in the second sentence.  
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
* **   
“THE” 
Figure 4.17b Experiment 8: Percentage of trials with saccades towards the 
items on the visual display during the noun (“ice cream”) (M = 513 ms) after 
“another” was mentioned in the second sentence. “Changed” refers to the 
dropped ice cream; “Intact_Same” refers to the upright ice cream that is more 
similar to the dropped one, while “Intact_Different” refers the other upright ice 
cream that is less similar to the dropped one. 
“ANOTHER” 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
** 
*** 
** 
* 
Changed 
Intact_Same 
Intact_Different 
Changed 
Intact_Same 
Intact_Different 
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no difference in saccades between the two upright ice creams during 
“another ice cream”, suggesting both of them were likely to be treated 
as “another” one. 
In sum, data from the second sentence showed that immediatey 
after “but first” or “and then” was mentioned, saccades were not 
influenced by the described temporal shifts. Instead, the pattern of 
saccades was similar to the first sentence with more saccades 
towards the dropped ice creams than other the other two. During “ice 
cream”, when “but first” was mentioned at the beginning of the 
second sentence, there were more saccades towards both upright ice 
creams than the dropped one regardless of the determiners. There 
were also more saccades towards the same-looking one than the 
different-looking one for both ”the/another ice cream”. However, when 
“and then” was mentioned at the beginning of the second sentence, 
during “ice cream”, there were more saccades overall towards the 
same-looking upright ice cream than the different-looking one for 
“the”, but not for “another” 
4.4.3 Discussion  
Experiment 8 intended to further explore whether semantic overlap between 
described object-state representation and the depicted versions drove eye 
movements on the visual display. Similar to previous experiments, participants 
listened to auditory stimuli while their eye movements on the visual stimuli were 
monitored. There were two sentences in the auditory stimuli. The first sentence 
described a change of state event, and the second sentence began with a 
backward temporal shift (“but first”) or a forward temporal shift (“and then”) and 
126 
 
referred to either “the” or “another” target object. On the visual display, three 
versions of the target object were depicted, including a changed one (e.g., the 
dropped ice cream), an intact one (e.g., the upright ice cream that is similar to 
the dropped one), and an intact competitor (e.g., the upright ice cream that is 
different from the dropped one).   
Eye movements in the first sentence replicated previous experiments 
with more looks towards the dropped ice cream than towards the upright ones. 
This pattern suggests that participants were sensitive to the consequences of 
the change of state event. In the second sentence, when “but first/and then” 
was mentioned the eye movement pattern was similar to the first sentence, 
suggesting no immediate influence of temporal shifts. However, when “ice 
cream” was subsequently referred to, there were more eye movements towards 
the upright one that was more similar to the dropped one than towards the 
different-looking upright one after both  “but first, the” and “but first, another”. By 
contrast, if “and then” was mentioned at the beginning of the second sentence, 
there were no difference in eye movements between the two upright ice creams 
after “and then, another”, but more saccades towards the upright one that was 
more similar to the dropped one than towards the less similar one after “and 
then, the” 
Therefore, it seems that participants tended to look at both upright ice 
creams for “another ice cream”. This finding suggests that when “another ice 
cream” was mentioned, participants had an intact version in mind; the canonical 
object-state representation (See Experiment 2). Rather than looking at the 
different-looking upright ice cream, they looked at the same-looking one. This 
result is consistent with Experiment 7 that participants were not binding the 
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dropped and upright ice creams as belonging to the same object identity. 
Instead, “another ice cream” may have inherited the episodic characteristics of 
the dropped ice cream in the previous sentence. Perhaps, participants 
established an object-state representation for “another ice cream” based on 
existing situation models. Similarly, participants preferred the same-looking ice 
cream to the different-looking for both “but first, the” and “and then, the”, 
probably due to the inheritance of semantic features in the episodic memory 
rather than binding the same-looking ice cream and the dropped one as the 
same object identity. 
4.5 General Discussion 
In the three studies reported in this chapter, visual and linguistic contexts were 
manipulated as a target object was mentioned in two sentences. We examined 
whether semantic overlap between the representation in mind and the depicted 
versions of the target object on the visual scene drove the switch in looks from 
one version to the other, or whether it was due to identity binding of them.  
First, the experiments replicated results of Experiment 4 & 5. Initially, 
participants were more interested in the dropped ice cream than the upright one 
at the onset of the verb in the first sentence. This difference was increased by 
the description of a change of state event (e.g., drop the ice cream). 
Subsequently, eye movements switched to the upright ice cream from the 
dropped one due to the introduction of a backward temporal shift (“but first”). 
However, this effect was not manifest immediately, but later when “ice cream” 
was mentioned again. This is consistent with Altmann & Kamide (2009) that eye 
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movements can be directed to a particularly depicted item on the visual display, 
at least in part, by a dynamically modifiable representation of the object.  
Second, we found that semantic overlap alone could not account for the 
effect. In Experiment 6, two tokens of the ice cream were depicted on the visual 
display. One was in the intact state (e.g., an upright ice cream) and the other 
one in the changed state (e.g., a dropped ice cream), but the two versions could 
not be treated as conflicting states of the same object identity due to differences 
in perceptual features. As predicted, there were increasing looks towards the 
upright ice cream at the end of the second sentence. However, the upright ice 
cream did not receive more saccades than the dropped one, suggesting 
reduced preference in the different-looking upright ice cream.  
This lead to Experiment 7, where a new token of the ice cream was 
introduced at the end of the second sentence by saying “another ice cream”. In 
this way, we were able to find out how this new token of ice cream drove eye 
movements on both type of visual displays in Experiment 4 (two ice creams that 
might be bound to a single object identity) and Experiment 6 (two ice creams 
that could not be bound to the same object). We found that eye movements 
were not only driven by the overlap of semantic features between the noun 
phrase and the current visual display, but also inherited features in the previous 
sentence.  For example, after “But first/And then, she will look at another…” was 
mentioned, the same eye movement patterns were found for the visual scenes, 
suggesting participants were treating both the upright ice creams as “another 
ice cream”. Nonetheless, an alternative account may be the visual constraint. 
When there was only one intact version on the visual scene (Experiment 6 & 
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Experiment 7), eye movements could only be directed to the upright ice cream 
that was available on the visual scene. 
This was further explored in Experiment 8, which demonstrated that eye 
movements were directed to the object that matched the new information and 
that was similar to the previous object. When there were two upright ice creams 
on the visual display, eye movements were directed to the one that resembled 
previously constructed object-state representation (i.e. the dropped one) 
(Experiment 8). This finding was consistent with the idea that object-state 
representation was modified on the basis of its previous mental representation, 
as proposed by Zwaan and Radvansky (1998).  
4.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, Experiment 6, Experiment 7, and Experiment 8 revealed eye 
movements on the visual scene were driven by semantic overlap between 
dynamically modifiable object-state representation and the depicted versions of 
the object in the visual scene, which were also influenced by the previous 
object-state representation in mind.  
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Chapter 5 
Event-related brain potentials reflect processing of 
object-state representations in language 
comprehension 
5.1 Overview 
We have so far demonstrated that a single object can be associated with 
different mental representations depending on the linguistic context. With the 
sentence-picture verification paradigm, we found that participants reacted faster 
to a depicted version of the target object when it matched what was described 
in the language than mismatched. For instance, when an ice cream was 
described to experience a substantial change (e.g., “The woman will drop the 
ice cream”), response latencies to a dropped ice cream was shorter than when 
it was described to experience a minimal change (e.g., “The woman will choose 
the ice cream”). Subsequently, with the visual world paradigm, we further 
demonstrated that eye movements towards conflicting versions of a target 
object could be modulated as language unfolded. Participants tended to look 
the version that matched the consequence of the described action. When a 
later sentence refer back to the object introduced in an earlier sentence, 
participants tended to switch look at an item that matched both prior and current 
contexts, suggesting object representations are tracked in real-time language 
processing. 
However, it is not clear what cognitive processes are involved to keep track 
of an object’s representation. In this chapter, we report an experiment using the 
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Event Related Potentials (ERP) to examine the electrophysiological evidence of 
tracking an object’s representations in language comprehension. Specifically, 
we explored whether a change-of-state event (e.g., “The woman will drop the 
ice cream”) would elicit a different ERP relative to a no-change-of-state event 
(e.g., “The woman will choose the ice cream”) in the subsequent sentence (e.g., 
“And then, she will look at the ice cream”), and if so, to what extent this effect 
resembles ERP effects observed in other studies. Extant models of language 
comprehension do not lead to strong predictions about what ERP components 
to expect.  
To further explore whether keeping track of object representation and 
conflict resolution is correlated in neural activity, we additionally administered a 
modified Stroop colour identification task based on Hindy et al. (2012). In this 
task, the response is limited to three colours (yellow, green, and blue). 
Participants were instructed to press a key corresponding to the typeface color 
of the word. There were three types of trials: congruent trials, response-eligible 
incongruent trials, and response-ineligible incongruent trials. For response-
eligible incongruent trials, the word (yellow, green, or blue) matched one of the 
response keys, but mismatched with the typeface colour. For example, the word 
was “YELLOW” in the font colour of blue. For response-ineligible incongruent 
trials, the word (orange, lime, or red) mismatched the response keys and the 
typeface colour. For example, the word was “RED” in the font colour of yellow. 
This manipulation allows for the separation of the source of conflict. In the 
response-eligible condition, participants may push a wrong button because of 
the meaning of the printed word matches one of the response keys. Thus, the 
conflict may come from both response and representational levels. In the 
132 
 
response-ineligible condition, the meaning of the target word is not shown in the 
response keys, but it may still competes with the font colour at a 
representational level. Stroop conflict at the representational level has been 
shown to predict conflict during language processing, e.g., syntactic ambiguity 
resolution (January, Trueswell, & Thompson-Schill, 2009) and object 
representational conflict (Hindy et al., 2012). Correlation analyses between the 
two kinds of Stroop effect and the ERPs in separate time windows were thus 
conducted to explore whether resolution of Stroop conflict was related to ERPs 
in current experiment.  
The goal of the present experiment is to examine the ERPs that may 
associate with keeping track of object-states in language comprehension. In 
order to understand a sentence such as “She will look at the ice cream”, we 
must engage processing not only at semantic and syntactic levels but also at 
discourse level (e.g., what is talked about). Recent fMRI studies (Hindy et al., 
2012) and previous experiments in this thesis further demonstrated that “what is 
talked about” is not limited to different objects, but also related to the state of 
the object itself.  
Figuring out object representation may be an issue of conflict resolution. As 
shown by Hindy et al. (2012) understanding sentences describing a substantial 
change of state activate the same brain region (pVLPFC) involved in Stroop 
conflict. The N400 effect, a negative-going component with a broad centro-
parietal scalp distribution, is the ERP component that was discovered to 
associate with conflict resolution at the semantic level (Brown and Hagoort, 
1993; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000; Kutas, Van Petten & Kluender, 2006). For 
example, the semantically anomalous condition (e.g., He spread his warm 
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bread with socks) elicited a more negative going waveform compared to 
semantically coherent condition (e.g., He spread his warm bread with butter) 
(Kutas and Hillyard, 1980). Moreover, N400 is associated with conflict resolution 
at the discourse level (Nigam, Hoffman, & Simons, 1992). Compared to 
related/matched word or picture, an unrelated/mismatched one elicited the 
N400 (Nigam et al., 1992), regardless whether the picture was presented prior 
to sentence reading (Coppens, Gootjes, & Zwaan, 2012) or afterwards 
(Knoeferle, Urbach, & Kutas, 2011).  
Alternatively, referential ambiguity resolution may be involved in keeping 
track of object representation. As shown in previous eye tracking experiments, 
at least two object representations (the changed state vs. the intact state) can 
be activated when the target object is described to experience a substantial 
change. When the object is encountered in a subsequent sentence, perhaps we 
have to choose beween these two representations. If this is the case, we may 
find the Nref effect of referential ambiguity resolution (Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 
2008; Van Berkum, et al., 1999; Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, and Zwitserlood, 
2003; Yu, Zhang, & Boland, 2015).  
Van Berkum, et al. (1999) asked participants to read short stories, such as 
the following texts (English translation of Dutch stimuli):  
(1a) David had asked the boy and the girl to clean up their room before 
lunchtime. But the boy had stayed in bed all morning, and the girl had been 
on the phone all the time. David told the girl that had been on the phone to 
hang up.  
(1b) David had asked the two girls to clean up their room before lunchtime. 
But one of the girls had stayed in bed all morning, and the other had been 
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on the phone all the time. David told the girl that had been on the phone to 
hang up.  
In (1a), the critical noun “girl” had only one eligible antecedent. In (1b) there 
were two equally possible referents, but only one eligible antecedent is possible 
for the referent under the language context. This manipulation leads to a clear 
and reliable effect of negative ERP waveforms emerging about 300 ms after 
onset of the referentially ambiguous nouns (as shown in 1b) largely at the 
anterior sites. This effect has been replicated when using pronouns and when 
stimuli were presented in auditory format (Van Berkum, et. al, 2003).  
Nonetheless, unlike individual entities, multiple representations of the same 
object may not co-exist. Perhaps, selective retrieval of an object representation 
is required when the object name is encountered, which may evoke the old/new 
parietal effect. Studies of recognition memory have revealed left posterior 
distributions of negative-going ERPs about 400 – 800 ms after critical word 
onset when participants correctly retrieved details or other contextual 
information. In these studies, participants were required to identify whether the 
word/object was presented before (e.g., Curran, 2000; Cycowicz, Friedman, 
Snodgrass, 2001; Johansson, Stenberg, Lindgren, & Rosén, 2002; Johansson 
& Mecklinger, 2003; Senkfor and van Petten, 1998) or they had to complete a 
recognition test of actions (e.g., Leynes, Crawford, & Bink, 2005; Leynes, Grey, 
& Crawform, 2006). As Johansson & Mecklinger (2003) pointed out, this left late 
posterior negativity might reflect “search for and/or retrieval/evaluation of the 
attributes in modality-specific cortical regions”. Importantly, recent studies 
suggested that the old/new effect can also be evoked by old items (Bridger, 
Sprondel, & Mecklinger, 2015; Herron & Rugg, 2003). Bridger et al. (2015) 
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presented items in two different context. Participants were required to accept 
items from a specific context as old (targets) but to reject items from the other 
class (nontargets), the found a larger old/new effect for targets than nontargets. 
The above-mentioned ERP effects are different in time windows and scalp 
distributions. The N400 often begins about 250 ms and peaks about 400 ms at 
the centroparietal site after poststimulus onset. By contrast, Nref is a late effect 
that peaks at anterior sites between 400 -1000 ms. The left parietal old/new 
effect usually appears about 500-800 ms post-stimulus onset, but it peaks at 
the left parietal sites. To summarize the predictions: first, the N400 effect may 
be expected after the target object is described to experience a substantial 
change compared with no change due conflict resolution; second, we shall see 
an Nref effect for the substantial change due to the activation of two competing 
states of the same object, but not for no change; third, perhaps the left parietal 
old/new effect will be found due to selective retrieval of object representations. 
N400 effect is expected to appear 300-500 ms post stimulus onset over 
centralparietal sites, but Nref and the old/new effects are about 400-1000 ms 
over anterior and left posterior, respectively.  
5.2 Method 
Participants 
After giving informed consent, 29 students from the University of York (19 
females, 18-24 years old) participated in this study for 10 pounds of payment or 
2 hours’ course credit. All participants were native speakers of British English. 
None of them had any neurological impairment or any neurological trauma. Two 
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participants were excluded for data analysis due to sleepiness and excessive 
blinks during the experiments. 
Materials 
Sentence comprehension task 
120 sets of stimuli based on Hindy et al (2012) were used in this experiment. 
They were divided into three conditions. Each stimulus is consisted of three 
sentences. The first sentence describes an event that either involved a minimal 
change (labeled as “no change”) or a substantial change (labeled as “change”) 
that will happen on the target object. Verbs in the first sentence were matched 
in ratings of lexical ambiguity and frequency of use. The second sentence refers 
to the object again. The third sentence describes the object, which is not 
relevant to previous events. For each set of stimuli, an implausible stimulus that 
followed the same structure was added. The first sentence of the Implausible 
condition indicated no change by taking the verb from the second sentence of 
the experimental conditions. The verb in the second sentence was not expected 
to appear with the target noun, creating anaolmous meanings (e.g., iron the ice 
cream). The third sentence is the same as the one in experimental conditions. 
Three counterbalanced lists were used. Participants were exposed to all 
conditions, but never saw more than one version of each stimulus. Table 5.1 
shows two sets of example stimuli.     
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Table 5.1 Example stimuli in Experiment 9. 
Condition Examples 
No Change The woman will choose the ice cream. And then, she will look 
at the ice cream. It is a Wall’s. 
Change The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will look at 
the ice cream. It is a Wall’s. 
Implausible  The woman will look at the ice cream. And then, she will iron 
the ice cream. It is transparent. 
No Change The chef will select the onion. And then, he will smell the 
onion. It is fresh. 
Change The chef will chop the onion. And then, he will smell the 
onion. It is fresh. 
Implausible The chef will smell the onion. And then, he will telephone the 
onion. It is odourless.  
Ratings for the degree of change of the first sentence were collected 
through online surveys. As mentioned in Hindy et al. (2012), 85 participants 
from the University of Pennsylvania rated “the degree to which the depicted 
object will be at all different after the action occurs that it had been before the 
action occurred” on a 7-point scale ranging from “just the same” to “completely 
changed”. The Change condition (e.g., The woman will drop the ice cream) 
(M=4.64, SD=0.84) significantly had higher ratings than the No Change 
condition (e.g., The woman will choose the ice cream) (M=1.97, SD=0.57, t (119) 
= 27.63, p < .001, by items). Ratings for imageability and ambiguity of the 
events that were described in the first sentence were also collected. The 
Change condition (M=4.89, SD=0.64) was rated as more imageable than the 
No Change condition (M=5.46, SD=0.41, t (119) = 8.24, p = .001), but no 
difference was found for ambiguity (Mchange=3.20, SD= .55, MNo_change=3.62, 
SD=.60, t (119) = 5.66, p = .179). 
As for the second sentence, a separate pool of 95 participants rated the 
degree of change (Hindy et al., 2012). The results confirmed that the second 
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sentence conveyed a minimal change (M=1.90, SD=4.7). Furthermore, the 
likelihood of the second sentence following the first sentence of each stimulus 
were also collected, on a 7-point scale from a further 93 participants. No 
difference was found between the No Change condition (M=4.06, SD=0.77) and 
the Change condition in the likelihood ratings (M=4.34, SD=0.79, t (119) = 2.82, 
p = .920), suggesting there was no bias on the occurrence of the second 
sentence despite the differences of verbs in the first sentence. 
Stroop task  
There were 216 trials in total, which were composed of three types: congruent 
trials, response-eligible trials, and response-ineligible trials. Participants were 
presented with a single word for each trial and instructed to press the key 
corresponding to the typeface color of the word. Three keys on the keyboard 
attached with yellow, green, and blue stickers were used as response keys. In 
response-eligible trials, the word denoted a colour that was included in the 
response keys (i.e., yellow, green, or blue). In the response-ineligible trials, the 
word denoted a colour that was not a potential answer (i.e., orange, lime, or 
red). Stroop effect was calculated by taking the difference of accuracy rates and 
reaction times between incongruent trials and congruent trials for both 
response-eligible and response- ineligible trials, respectively.  
Procedure  
EEG data of language comprehension and behavioral data of Stroop conflict 
were collected in a single session (the language task before the Stroop task) 
with rest periods. Participants were tested individually. In the language 
comprehension task, participants were informed that they would read short 
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stories and judge whether the situation described in the sentences is plausible 
or not. Sentences were presented word-by-word using a serial visual 
presentation procedure, wherein each word was presented in white font on a 
black background for 300 ms (except the critical words), followed by a 200 ms 
blank screen before the next word appeared. The critical word at the end of the 
second sentence (e.g., ice cream) was presented for 800 ms and there was a 
500 ms gap before it. After all words have been presented, the plausibility 
question “Plausible or Implausible? Y for “yes”, N for “no”” appeared directly on 
the screen. Participants were expected to answer yes” to experimental trials, 
but “no” to implausible trials. The experiment was divided into 3 blocks, 
separated by rest reminders. Each trial was separated from the next by a blank 
screen for 1000 ms followed by a fixation cross for another 1000 ms. 
Participants only saw one version of each stimulus, but were exposed to all 
stimuli and all conditions. Participants were instructed to minimize body 
movement during EEG recording. No additional task demands were imposed. 
After completing the language comprehension task, participants were instructed 
to take a break before performomg the Stroop colour identification task. No 
EEG signals were recorded for this task. We followed the same procedure as 
described in Hindy et al. (2012). Total time-on-task was about 80 minutes in 
total for both tasks. 
EEG recording and ERP data analysis 
The EEG was recorded with 30 electrodes in an EEG cap from 30 scalp 
locations (Fpz, Fp1/2, Fz, F3/4, F7/8, FC1/2, FC5/6, Cz, C3/4, T7/8, CP1/2, 
CP5/6, Pz, P3/4, P7/8, POz, Oz, O1/2). The EEG signals were amplified by 
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using an ANT amplifier, digitized at 500 Hz and re-referenced to the algebraic 
average of the two mastoids. Electrooculographic activity (EOG) was assessed 
using four additional electrodes above and below the right eye (VEOG) and 
over the outer canthi (HEOG). Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. A digital 
band-pass filter (0.1-30 Hz) was applied.  
Epochs were extracted beginning 200 ms prior to and ending 1000 ms after 
the onset of stimulus presentation and re-referenced to a baseline period of 200 
ms pre-stimulus baseline period. Ocular and muscular artifacts were corrected 
using Independent Component Analysis. Any epochs containing artifacts after 
the ICA were removed based on visual inspection. Data from two participants 
were excluded from data analysis due to excessive movement artifacts. 
Statistical analyses on average amplitudes were conducted separately for two 
critical time windows chosen based on the literature (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard, 
1980; van Berkum et al., 1999) and on visual inspection of the data: 300 ms -
500 ms for the N400, and 400 ms -1000 ms for Nref and the old/new effect. 
Separate analyses were conducted for mean amplitudes in each time window. 
Data were averaged across four regions of interest, including left anterior (F3, 
F7, FC5, C3), left posterior (CP5, P3, P7, O1), right anterior (F4, F8, FC4, C4) 
and right posterior (CP6, P4, P8, O2). Central/midline electrodes were not 
included. Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using anteriority (anterior 
vs. posterior) and laterality (left vs. right) as topographic factors.  
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Comprehension questions  
Participants’ plausibility judgments were 93.56% accurate on average. A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was a main effect of condition, 
F (2, 25) = 1446.22, p < .001. Participants reliably rejected the semantically 
anomalous sentences and accepted the experimental sentences (“yes” 
responses were given on only 4.83% of trials in the implausible condition). 
Sentences in the No Change condition (e.g., The woman will choose the ice 
cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. It is a Wall’s) were judged as 
more plausible than the Change conditions, (e.g., The woman will drop the ice 
cream. And then, she will look at the ice cream. It is a Wall’s), t (26) = 4.30, p 
< .001. 
5.3.2 Stroop colour-word interference 
The Stroop effect was measured by the differences of responses between 
congruent trials versus incongruent trials. The Stroop inhibitory ability was 
calculated by taking the differences of response accuracy between congruent 
trials and incongruent trials, while the Stroop inhibitory efficiency was indexed 
by the differences of reaction times. The outcome indicated participants’ ability 
and efficiency of making the right choice by inhibiting inappropriate choice. 
Overall, participants correctly answered 96% of all trials. The average response 
times (excluding errors) were 562 ms for congruent trials and 628 ms for 
incongruent trials. Repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of trial 
type in both accuracy (higher for congruent trials than incongruent ones), F (2, 
26) = 11.32, p < .001 and reaction times (faster for congruent trials than 
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incongruent ones), F (2, 26) = 54.31, p < .001. Moreover, within-subjects t-tests 
showed response-eligible trials elicited greater Stroop effect than response-
ineligible trials, t (28) = 3.91, p = .001, for Stroop inhibitory ability, t (28) = 4.94, 
p < .001, for Stroop inhibitory efficiency.  
5.3.3 Event-related Potentials (ERPs). 
Figure 5.1 displays the grand average ERPs of all subjects (N=27) at all 30 
electrode sites and corresponding scalp distributions time-locked to the onset of 
the noun phrase in the second sentence (e.g., “And then, she will look at the ice 
cream”). Visual inspection of the figure suggested that the Change condition 
elicited a more negative ERP waveform than the No Change condition during 
400 ms after post stimulu onset. On the basis of earlier studies (e.g., van 
Berkum et al., 1999; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980) two time windows were chosen for 
statistical analysis, including: (a) 300-500 ms; (b) 400 – 1000 ms post onset of 
“the ice cream”.  
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The woman will choose/drop the ice cream. And the, she will look at …  
 the ice cream 
Figure 5.1 Experiment 9: Grand average ERPs waves (A) and scalp distribution (B) 
after onset of the critical noun phrase in the second sentence involving No Change 
(blue line) and Change (red line) in the first sentence, and corresponding scalp 
distributions during the time windows (300 ms – 1000 ms). 
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Table 5.2 presents pairwise comparisons of the Change and Implausible 
condition compared to No Change condition, averaged across four electrodes 
sites. Results suggested that the Implausible condition elicited more negative 
ERPs relative to No Change condition at posterior sites in time window 300 – 
500 ms. By contrast, in time window 400 – 1000 ms, the Change condition 
elicited more negative ERP relative to No Change condition at left hemisphere.  
Table 5.2 Experiment 9: F, MSE, and p values for main effect of degree of change, and 
implausibility in two time windows (computed across all electrodes, and for four electrode ROIs,  
separately). All statistical tests in this table involve pairwise comparisons of each condition 
compared to the No Change condition.*p <= .05, ** p <=.01, *** p <=.001. 
Time window 300 ms – 500 ms 
Results of repeated measures ANOVAs with conditions (No Change, Change, 
Implausible), Hemisphere (left, right), Anteriority (anterior, posterior) suggested 
that there was no main effect of conditions, F(2, 25) = 1.22, p =.311, ηp2 = .09, 
 Electrodes 300-500 ms 400-1000 ms 
  F p MSE F p MSE 
Change All .47 .50 .87 2.25 .146 .48 
 Left 1.60 .217 .96 6.31 .019* .52 
 Right .00 .981 .82 .14 .713 .54 
 Anterior .19 .665 1.19 1.49 .234 .60 
 Posterior .83 .370 .76 2.63 .117 .48 
 All .97 .335 1.27 .02 .889 .44 
Implausible Left .20 .659 1.48 .15 .703 .49 
 Right 2.38 .135 1.19 .01 .911 .46 
 Anterior .21 .652 1.57 .39 .54 .66 
 Posterior 5.80 .023* 1.35 .20 .66 .52 
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and anteriority, F(1,26) = 0.69, p=.794, ηp2 = .003, but there was a main effect of 
hemisphere (more negative over right than left), F (1,26) = 9.70, p =.004, ηp2 
= .27, and significant interactions between Condition and Hemisphere, F(1,26) 
= 5.22, p = .013, ηp2 = .30, and between Condition and Anteriority, F(1,26) = 
10.43, p = .001, ηp2 = .46. Planned comparison suggested that implausibility 
trials elicited more negative ERPs over the right posterior sites relative to No 
Change condition, t(26) = 3.15, p =.004, and Change condition, t (26) =2.95, p 
=.007, but no such difference was found between experimental conditions, t 
(26) =.37, p =.717. Thus, the Change condition did not elicit different ERPs 
relative to No Change condition, but the Implausible condition evoked more 
negative N400 relative to experimental conditions, but no difference in N400 
was found between experimental conditions. 
Moreover, correlation analyses using the difference of ERP amplitudes 
(Implausible minus No Change, Implausible minus Change, Change minus No 
Change) over right posterior sites and Stroop effects (inhibitory ability and 
inhibitory efficiency) revealed a marginally significant correlation between the 
Stroop effect (inhibitory ability of response-ineligible trials) the Implausible 
(minus No Change) condition, r = -.38, p=.058. No significant relationship 
between Stroop effects and other conditions. The pattern suggests that for 
participants who were more accurate in the response-ineligible trials tended to 
show a more robust N400 effect over right posterior sites, but this effect was 
revealed only when N400 effect presented.  
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Time window 400 ms – 1000 ms 
Repeated measures ANOVAs yielded no significant main effect of the 
conditions, F(2,25) = 1.48, p = .247, ηp2 = .11, but there were main effects of 
anteriority (more negative over posterior than anterior), F(1,26) = 6.84, p = .015, 
ηp2 = .21, and hemisphere (more negative over left than right), F(1,26) = 4.39, p 
= .046, ηp2 = .14. Besides, there was a significant interaction between 
conditions and hemisphere, F(1,26) = 7.70, p = .002, ηp2 = .38. Planned 
comparisons revealed but the Change condition elicited more negative ERPs 
over the left hemisphere than No Change, t (26) =2.51, p =.019, and 
Implausible conditions, t (26) =2.44, p =.022, but the scalp distribution is more 
negative over posterior sites than anterior sites for both experimental 
conditions, t (26) =2.76, p =.010 (No Change), t (26) =3.12, p =.004 (Change). 
Correlation analyses using the difference of ERP amplitudes revealed no 
significant correlations. 
5.4 Discussion  
In this study, we explored the ERP evidence on updating object representation 
in language comprehension. The temporal resolution of the ERP method 
allowed us to characterize the time course of neural signals. Specifically, we 
recorded neural activity while participants read short stories about a target 
object that was described to experience either a change or no change of its 
original state in the first sentence. In experimental conditions, the second 
sentence was the same regardless of the first sentence, in which he object was 
described to experience no further changes. In the Implausible condition, 
however, the object was described to experience an anomalous action. ERPs at 
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the time windows of 300 ms – 500 ms and 400 ms – 1000 ms after onset of the 
object name in the second sentence were analyzed. Our results revealed that 
there was no difference in ERP amplitudes between experimental condition in 
the time window of 300 – 500 ms, but differences were found in the time 
window of 400 – 1000 ms. After onset of the object name, the Change condition 
induced more negative ERPs than the No Change condition at both the anterior 
and posterior areas of the left hemisphere.  
The ERPs in the time window of 400 – 1000 ms post stimulus onset were 
different in scalp distributions from studies on referential ambiguity resolution by 
Van Berkum and colleagues (e.g., Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006, 2008; 
Nieuwland et al., 2007a; Van Berkum et al., 1999; Van Berkum eta al., 2003), 
but similar to the old/new effect in episodic memory retrieval (e.g., Johansson & 
Mecklinger, 2003; Leynes, Grey, & Crawform, 2006; Senkfor and van Petten, 
1998;). Typically, the old items elicit more positive ERPs than new items, which 
is maximal over the left parietal sites. Anterior old/new effect that onsets at 
approximately 400 ms at right frontal sites has also been observed. These two 
kinds of old/new ERP effects are known to be associated with familiarity and 
recollection, respectively (Curran, 2000). Thus, the similarity of the current ERP 
effect and the left parietal old/new effect suggested that the episodic retrieval 
(recollection) of the target object tended to be different depending on the prior 
context. Compared to no change, the object that is described to experience a 
substantial change seem to resemble a ‘new’ object, suggesting difficult in 
episodic retrieval. This result is consistent with Kalenik (2012) that longer 
reading time is needed to read the repeated target noun phrase in the Change 
condition than No Change.  
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The lack of correlation between the Stroop effect and ERPs amplitudes 
in our experiment may be due to the difference in the time course of activation 
of the neural resources. Studies on the EEG activity of the Stroop task 
suggested that increased fronto-central negativity appeared around 400 ms for 
incongruent trials compared to congruent and neutral items (Hanslmayr, et al., 
2008; Liotti, Woldorff, Prez III, & Mayberg, 2000). Using amplitudes in the time 
window of 300-500 ms may not map to neural activity of the Stroop conflict. 
Also, as only behavioral outcomes of the Stroop effect was collected, this may 
lead to difficult in map Behaviour responses to ERP amplitudes. Studies that 
revealed significant correlation between behavioral and ERP measures often 
involved the same task rather than two separate tasks (e.g., Knoeferle et a., 
2011).  
In sum, our findings provided supportive evidence for the existence of 
difference in neural activity after an object was described to experience a 
change of state compared with no change. It shows that the processing system 
can very rapidly determine whether an object is representationally different in 
one situation from the other. About 400 ms after onset of the object name, the 
readers have determined whether the object had been described differently in in 
earlier linguistic context. This effect may not be attributed to the same neural 
resources as the Nref. Instead, it is more similar to the posterior distribution of 
the old/new effect. 
5.5 Conclusion  
We have shown that when an object was described as undergoing substantial 
change, keeping track of its representations led to differences in 
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electrophysiological responses over the scalp in contrast to a minimal/no 
change when the object name was mentioned in subsequent context. We 
compared the effect that we observed with other effects with similar latencies 
and topography in existing studies. The effect resembled the old/new effect in 
recognition memory, suggesting recognition memory plays an important role in 
updating object-state representations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion: Aligning hands, eyes and the brain 
6.1 Overview  
This thesis set out to explore the keeping track of object-state representations in 
language comprehension. The construction of object-state representations that 
encode different states at different event times is key to serve as an index of 
events in situation model. However, there has been limited evidence on 
whether specific object states, and their change across time, are encoded 
during language comprehension. Drawing on evidence from three experimental 
techniques with different measures – button-press reaction times, eye 
movements, and event-related potentials (ERPs), the data unequivocally tells 
us that a single object can have multiple instantiations in the mental 
representation of the event, and that this representational complexity must be 
resolved during the interpretation of unfolding sentences. Among these 
techniques, the picture verification paradigm has been used for studying the 
relationship between internal representations and external referents (e.g., 
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012), while eye movements and ERPs are excellent for 
capturing temporal dynamics and real-time responses from participants in 
language comprehension (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 2009; Van Berkum, et al., 
1999). By combining the techniques, we intended to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the construction of object-state 
representations. In this chapter, I synthesize the empirical findings reported in 
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previous chapters and discuss theoretical and methodological implications of 
these findings.  
6.2 Synthesis of empirical findings 
6.2.1 Do we establish multiple object-state representations in language 
comprehension?  
The first three experiments in Chapter 2 with the picture verification task 
provided evidence for the activation of object-state representations in language 
comprehension. We found that the intact state was responded to faster than the 
changed state when no contextual information was provided (Experiment 1). 
Nevertheless, when linguistic context was provided, the representation that 
matched the consequences of the described event was activated (Experiment 
2). The time available for comprehension was also shown to be important for 
activating object-state representations (Experiment 3). When there was a short 
delay (250 ms) between sentence reading and picture verification, verification 
response times were not influenced by contextual information but the typicality 
of the intact state. By contrast, when a long delay (1250 ms) was provided, 
picture verification responses to pictures that matched the context were then 
shorter than that mismatches the context after a forward temporal shift. Thus, 
the results suggest that different object-state representations can be 
constructed in language comprehension but sufficient processing time is 
required.  
6.2.2 What is the time course of establishing an appropriate object-state 
representation? 
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Chapter 3 and 4 reported evidence from a series of visual world eye-tracking 
experiments. Participants’ eye movements were recorded while they viewed a 
clipart visual display and listened to description of a target object. Eye 
movements on the display were thus time-locked to the unfolding utterances. 
Experiments 4 and 5 explored when during the time course of comprehension 
listeners establish an object-state representation. The results showed that 
participants switched their eye movements to an intended object-state upon 
hearing the object name but not before. These findings were replicated by 
Experiments 6, 7, and 8, which also revealed that eye movements were 
primarily driven by semantic overlap between the depicted object state and the 
described object-state representation. 
6.2.3 Is there ERP evidence for keeping track of an object’s representations 
when that object is described as changing of state? 
In Chapter 5, Experiment 9 examined the ERP “marker” that may be relevant 
when object-state representation was established. No N400 was revealed 
between the Change condition than the No Change condition at the time 
window of 300 ms – 500 ms after onset of the critical noun phrase in the second 
sentence (“the ice cream”), but greater negativity was found at the time window 
of 400 ms – 1000 ms. This effect was distributed in a similar time window as the 
Nref of referiential ambiguity resolution and old/new effect. However, the Nref is 
typically distributed at the anterior sites, but the negativity in our experiment was 
largely at the posterior sites. In this case, the effect was more similar to the late 
posterior negativity that was found in studies of recognition memory (e.g., Ecker, 
et al., 2007). Therefore, differences in ERPs between the Change and No 
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Change condition suggest that object-state representations may be processed 
differently due to episodic memory retrieval (cf. recognition memory). 
Taken together, the findings suggest that different instantiations of the 
same entity can be constructed, maintained and updated in language 
comprehension. The linguistic context provides criteria for the kind of object-
state representation being established. When a visual display was provided, the 
established instantiation can be mapped onto the appropriate depicted state of 
the object. 
6.3 Methodological Implications 
Each of the techniques has their strengths and weaknesses. Offline picture 
verification measures can capture the established object-state representation in 
an efficient and relatively low-cost manner. However, pictures were presented 
after the sentence was read and thus cannot capture moment-by-moment 
sentence processing.  
In the thesis, this issue has been addressed by using eye tracking that 
provide an excellent way of investigating online language comprehension. As 
pointed out by Tanenhaus & Trueswell (2006), eye-tracking measures reflect 
when and where people fixate on the visual display as the utterance unfolds, 
and then use that information to draw inferences about the underlying 
processes and representations.  
Besides, to explore the construction of object-state representations in 
reading comprehension, ERPs data were also collected by using similar stimuli 
in picture verification and eye-tracking. 
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So far, there has been limited interaction between these paradigms. This is 
probably due to differences in stimuli presentation (e.g., a serial order of words 
in ERPs but paragraph/visual stimuli in eye tracking) and data analysis, it is 
difficult to capitalize on the strengths of both techniques. Nonetheless, data 
from this thesis provide an opportunity to explore the same issue by using 
different paradigms. The use of multiple techniques provides the opportunity to 
obtain a comprehensive view of this issue compared with using a single method 
alone. As each paradigm was intended to address different aspects of the same 
research questions, data in this thesis were comprehensive, covering 
behavioral consequences to neural responses.  
6.4 Theoretical implications   
The experimental data presented in this thesis provided empirical evidence for 
the construction and updating of multiple object-state representations in 
language comprehension, reflecting the changes of state that an object may 
experience as a consequence of, or during, the described event. In respect of 
prior work on event representation, most current models focus on event 
segmentation than on the actual content of the representations. The work 
reported here focuses less on how we segment events and more on what the 
content is of event representation and how that content is dynamically updated 
as sentences unfold. Four main theoretical implications are discussed.  
6.4.1 Object-state representations are included in situation models of language 
comprehension  
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Data in this thesis suggest that contextual information (no change vs. change) 
activates a particular object-state representation, indicating contextual 
information activates candidate object-state representations in a top-down 
manner. Our data are consistent with episodic object recognition (Ecker, et al., 
2007) that reaction times increase when the size, orientation, or colour of a 
target object is changed from study to test. These findings also support the 
situated/grounded view of language comprehension that language 
understanding is grounded in motor and perceptual systems (Barsalou, 1999) 
that reflect real-world experience with the described actions and objects.   
6.4.2 Semantic overlap plays a role in online language comprehension, 
particularly the updating of object-state representation. 
Semantic overlap of perceptual (shape), motoric (action), and abstract (function) 
features between spoken words and objects direct eye movements towards the 
named objects (e.g., hear “piano” and look at a piano) and related ones (e.g., 
hear “piano” but look at a trumpet) in the visual scene However, until the studies 
in Chapter 4, it was not clear whether semantic overlap also influences eye 
movements towards objects overlapping in respect of object state. We 
demonstrated that when an object name (e.g., “ice cream”) was repeated in 
subsequent discourse (“the woman dropped the ice cream. Then she looked at 
another ice cream”), eye movements were directed to the object that matched 
the linguistic context and shared perceptual features with the ice cream held in 
episodic memory (and matching the depicted dropped ice cream in the stimuli 
we used).  
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6.4.3 An object’s changed state activated the action that caused its current 
state. 
In all eye-tracking experiments, we have shown that participants preferred to 
look at the dropped ice cream than the upright ice cream even before the verbs 
were mentioned. Perhaps, perceptual properties of the dropped ice cream 
indicated a “drop” action has happened to the object upon seeing it. This finding 
is consistent with previous studies suggest that actions can be automatically 
activated during object processing (e.g., Campanella & Shallice, 2011; Davey et 
al., 2015; Martin et al., 1995). For example, Martin et al. (1995) asked 
participants to generate an action word related to an object. They found that 
participants often activated the conceptual representation of the object that is 
corresponding to an action verb (e.g., a picture of a pair of scissors and the verb 
cut in response). Campanella & Shallice (2011) have shown that if the target 
object and another object share similar manipulation features, matching an 
object picture to a word is less accurate than when they do not share these 
features.  
6.4.4 Change-of-state may be used to explore cognition and language. 
Understanding change-of-state events also speaks to the theories of cognitive 
representation and conceptual development (Galazka & Ganea, 2014; Ganea, 
et al., 2007; Osina, Saylor, & Ganea, 2013; Ganea & Harris, 2013). Recent 
studies revealed that toddlers as young as 22 months can use verbal 
information to update the representation of an absent toy when the object was 
described as undergoing a change in state, but 19-months-olds failed to 
perform the task (Ganea, et al., 2007). Data in this thesis suggest that 
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representations of the same object token in the discourse may be processed 
differently from multiple tokens. This finding opens the possibility of further 
studies on what cognitive mechanism may be involved in updating object-state 
representations. Such research, coupled with studies on child cognitive 
development (e.g., Ganea, et al., 2007), will provide important implications for 
understanding the interaction between language and cognition.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The studies presented in this thesis explored when and what type of 
object-state representations are constructed and updated as the target object is 
described to experience a change of state event. Our findings suggest that 
linguistic context modulated the activation of object-state representation in 
language processing. Responses to the representation when it matched the 
linguistic description were significantly shorter than when they mismatched. In 
the eye movement studies, the corresponding effect manifested when the 
object name was explicitly mentioned, but not before. These findings 
correspond well theories of situation models of language comprehension and 
go further by outlining the time course of the updating process. Besides, as 
shown by the ERP study, keeping track of object-state representation is similar 
to episodic memory retrieval. Thus, the studies presented in this thesis provided 
detailed information in terms of establishing and updating object-state 
representations in online language comprehension.  
The work reported here has three  important contributions: first, it 
highlights the need for accounts of event representation to incorporate object 
state change; second, and related, it requires theories to take account of the 
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dynamics with which such object representations change as events (and 
sentences describing events) unfold; finally, it highlights the need for models of 
event representation to take account of the interplay between general semantic 
knowledge about objects, and the episodic knowledge introduced by the 
sentential context and on which basis the event representation must be updated. 
The ERP data suggest that research on episodic memory may be particularly 
relevant in respect of understanding the neural signatures associated with event 
processing.   
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APPENDICES  
Appendix I Experimental Stimuli  
(Words and Sentences) 
 
A1.1 Experimental words – Experiment 1 
 
1 gate                                         
2 dustbin 
3 gift 
4 acorn 
5 banana 
6 jump rope 
7 candle  
8 plant 
9 blackboard 
10 sunglasses 
11 ice cream 
12 glasses 
13 gum 
14 onion 
15 vase 
16 rug 
17 pizza 
18 blowtorch 
19 drawing  
20 blueberries 
21 cucumber 
22 bagel 
23 piglet 
24 pumpkin 
25 ball 
26 egg 
27 bed 
28 sleeping bag 
29 tree 
30 umbrella 
31 apple 
32 wall 
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 A1.2 Experimental sentences – Experiment 2 
 
No. Condition A:  No Change Condition B: Change 
1 
The man has jumped over the 
gate. The man has shut the gate. 
2 
The teenager has looked into the 
dustbin. 
The teenager has tipped over the 
dustbin. 
3 The bride has accepted the gift. The bride has unwrapped the gift. 
4 The squirrel has sniffed the acorn. 
The squirrel has cracked the 
acorn. 
5 
The gorilla has inspected the 
banana. 
The gorilla has peeled the 
banana. 
6 
The girl has examined the jump 
rope. The girl has cut the jump rope. 
7 
The young man has smiled at the 
candle. 
The young man has blown out 
the candle. 
8 
The child has crouched behind 
the plant. 
The child has knocked down the 
plant. 
9 
The teacher has inspected the 
blackboard. 
The teacher has wiped clear the 
blackboard. 
10 
The customer has picked out the 
sunglasses. 
The customer has unfolded the 
sunglasses. 
11 
The woman has chosen the ice 
cream. 
The woman has drop the ice 
cream. 
12 
The customer has picked out the 
glasses. 
The customer has broken the 
glasses. 
13 
The girl has inspected the stick of 
gum. 
The girl has chewed the stick of 
gum. 
14 The chef has weighed the onion. The chef has chopped the onion. 
15 
The boy has photographed the 
vase. The boy has broken the vase. 
16 The waiter has praised the rug.  The waiter has unrolled the rug.  
17 The student has sniffed the pizza. The student has cut up the pizza. 
18 
The welder has clutched the 
blowtorch. The welder has lit the blowtorch. 
19 
The child has admired the 
drawing. 
The child has coloured in the 
drawing. 
20 
The grocer has weighed the 
blueberries. 
The grocer has puréed the 
blueberries. 
21 
The woman has squeezed the 
cucumber. 
The woman has squeezed the 
cucumber. 
22 The man has chosen the bagel. The man has sliced the bagel. 
23 The man has fed the piglet.  The man has roasted the piglet.  
24 
The farmer has weighed the 
pumpkin. 
The farmer has carved the 
pumpkin. 
25 The boy has patted the ball. The boy has deflated the ball. 
26 The woman has selected the egg. The woman has broken the egg. 
27 The maid has sat upon the messy The maid has made up the 
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bed. messy bed. 
28 
The traveler has laid on the 
sleeping bag. 
The traveler has rolled up the 
sleeping bag. 
29 
The lumberjack has measured the 
tree. 
The lumberjack has chopped 
down the tree. 
30 
The woman has inspected the 
umbrella. 
The woman has opened the 
umbrella. 
31 
The woman has picked out the 
apple. The woman has halved the apple. 
32 
The construction worker has 
leaned on the wall. 
The construction worker has 
knocked down the wall. 
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A1.3 Experimental sentences –Experiment 3, 4, & 6 
 
No. Stimuli 
 
a = no change, but first; b = no change, and then; c = change, but first; d = change, 
and then 
01a The man will jump over the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
01b The man will jump over the gate. And then, he will lean on the gate. 
01c The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
01d The man will shut the gate. And then, he will lean on the gate. 
02a 
The teenager will look into the dustbin. But first, he will walk around the 
dustbin. 
02b 
The teenager will look into the dustbin. And then, he will walk around 
the dustbin. 
02c 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. But first, he will walk around the 
dustbin. 
02d 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. And then, he will walk around 
the dustbin. 
03a The bride will accept the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03b The bride will accept the gift. And then, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03c The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03d The bride will unwrap the gift. And then, she will give thanks for the gift. 
04a The squirrel will sniff the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
04b The squirrel will sniff the acorn. And then, it will lick the acorn. 
04c The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
04d The squirrel will crack the acorn. And then, it will lick the acorn. 
05a 
The gorilla will inspect the banana. But first, he will grunt at the 
banana. 
05b 
The gorilla will inspect the banana. And then, he will grunt at the 
banana. 
05c The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at the banana. 
05d The gorilla will peel the banana. And then, he will grunt at the banana. 
06a 
The girl will examine the jump rope. But first, she will complain about 
the jump rope. 
06b 
The girl will examine the jump rope. And then, she will complain about 
the jump rope. 
06c 
The girl will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about the 
jump rope. 
06d 
The girl will cut the jump rope. And then, she will complain about the 
jump rope. 
07a 
The young man will smile at the candle. But first, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07b 
The young man will smile at the candle. And then, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07c 
The young man will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07d 
The young man will blow out the candle. And then, he will reach for the 
candle. 
08a 
The child will crouch behind the plant. But first, he will jump over the 
plant. 
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08b 
The child will crouch behind the plant. And then, he will jump over the 
plant. 
08c 
The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over the 
plant. 
08d 
The child will knock down the plant. And then, he will jump over the 
plant. 
09a 
The teacher will inspect the blackboard. But first, she will point at the 
blackboard. 
09b 
The teacher will inspect the blackboard. And then, she will point at the 
blackboard. 
09c 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. But first, she will point at 
the blackboard. 
09d 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. And then, she will point at 
the blackboard. 
10a 
The customer will pick out the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
10b 
The customer will pick out the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
10c 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
10d 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
11a 
The woman will choose the ice cream. But first, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11b 
The woman will choose the ice cream. And then, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11c 
The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11d 
The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
12a 
The customer will pick out the glasses. But first, she will ask about the 
glasses. 
12b 
The customer will pick out the glasses. And then, she will ask about the 
sunglasses. 
12c 
The customer will break the glasses. But first, she will ask about the 
sunglasses. 
12d 
The customer will break the glasses. And then, she will ask about the 
sunglasses. 
13a 
The girl will inspect the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about 
the gum. 
13b 
The girl will inspect the stick of gum. And then, she will complain about 
the gum. 
13c 
The girl will chew the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about the 
gum. 
13d 
The girl will chew the stick of gum. And then, she will complain about 
the gum. 
14a The chef will weigh the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
14b The chef will weigh the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. 
14c The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
14d The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. 
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15a The boy will photograph the vase. But first, he will examine the vase. 
15b The boy will photograph the vase. And then, he will examine the vase. 
15c The boy will break the vase. But first, he will examine the vase. 
15d The boy will break the vase. And then, he will examine the vase. 
16a The waiter will praise the rug.  But first, he will step over the rug. 
16b The waiter will praise the rug.  And then, he will step over the rug. 
16c The waiter will unroll the rug.  But first, he will step over the rug. 
16d The waiter will unroll the rug.  And then, he will step over the rug. 
17a The student will sniff the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
17b The student will sniff the pizza. And then, he will blow on the pizza. 
17c The student will cut up the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
17d The student will cut up the pizza. And then, he will blow on the pizza. 
18a 
The welder will clutch the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18b 
The welder will clutch the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18c 
The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18d 
The welder will light the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
19a The child will admire the drawing. But first, she will display the drawing. 
19b 
The child will admire the drawing. And then, she will display the 
drawing. 
19c 
The child will colour in the drawing. But first, she will display the 
drawing. 
19d 
The child will colour in the drawing. And then, she will display the 
drawing. 
20a 
The grocer will weigh the blueberries. But first, he will smell the 
blueberries. 
20b 
The grocer will weigh the blueberries. And then, he will smell the 
blueberries. 
20c 
The grocer will purée the blueberries. But first, he will smell the 
blueberries. 
20d 
The grocer will purée the blueberries. And then, he will smell the 
blueberries. 
21a 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. But first, she will talk about the 
cucumber. 
21b 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. And then, she will talk about 
the cucumber. 
21c 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. But first, she will talk about the 
cucumber. 
21d 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. And then, she will talk about 
the cucumber. 
22a The man will choose the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
22b The man will choose the bagel. And then, he will smell the bagel. 
22c The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
22d The man will slice the bagel. And then, he will smell the bagel. 
23a The man will feed the piglet.  But first, he will examine the piglet. 
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23b The man will feed the piglet.  And then, he will examine the piglet. 
23c The man will roast the piglet.  But first, he will examine the piglet. 
23d The man will roast the piglet.  And then, he will examine the piglet. 
24a 
The farmer will weigh the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24b 
The farmer will weigh the pumpkin. And then, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24c 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24d 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. And then, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
25a The boy will pat the ball. But first, he will throw the ball. 
25b The boy will pat the ball. And then, he will throw the ball. 
25c The boy will deflate the ball. But first, he will throw the ball. 
25d The boy will deflate the ball. And then, he will throw the ball. 
26a The woman will select the egg. But first, she will examine the egg. 
26b The woman will select the egg. And then, she will examine the egg. 
26c The woman will break the egg. But first, she will examine the egg. 
26d The woman will break the egg. And then, she will examine the egg. 
27a 
The maid will sit upon the messy bed. But first, she will complain about 
the bed. 
27b 
The maid will sit upon the messy bed. And then, she will complain 
about the bed. 
27c 
The maid will make up the messy bed. But first, she will complain 
about the bed. 
27d 
The maid will make up the messy bed. And then, she will complain 
about the bed. 
28a 
The traveller will lay on the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28b 
The traveller will lay on the sleeping bag. And then, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28c 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28d 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. And then, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
29a The lumberjack will measure the tree. But first, he will point at the tree. 
29b 
The lumberjack will measure the tree. And then, he will point at the 
tree. 
29c 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. But first, he will point at the 
tree. 
29d 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. And then, he will point at the 
tree. 
30a 
The woman will inspect the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at 
the umbrella. 
30b 
The woman will inspect the umbrella. And then, she will compliment at 
the umbrella. 
30c 
The woman will open the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at the 
umbrella. 
30d The woman will open the umbrella. And then, she will compliment at 
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the umbrella. 
31a 
The woman will pick out the apple. But first, she will talk about the 
apple. 
31b 
The woman will pick out the apple. And then, she will talk about the 
apple. 
31c The woman will halve the apple. But first, she will talk about the apple. 
31d 
The woman will halve the apple. And then, she will talk about the 
apple. 
32a 
The construction worker will lean on the wall. But first, she will frown at 
the wall.  
32b 
The construction worker will lean on the wall. And then, she will frown 
at the wall.  
32c 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, she will 
frown at the wall.  
32d 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. And then, she will 
frown at the wall.  
33a The man will install the mirror. But first, he will examine the mirror. 
33b The man will install the mirror. And then, he will examine the mirror. 
33c The man will smash the mirror. But first, he will examine the mirror.  
33d The man will smash the mirror. And then, he will examine the mirror. 
34a The man will lick the chocolate. But first, he will smell the chocolate. 
34b The man will lick the chocolate. And then, he will smell the chocolate. 
34c The man will bite the chocolate. But first, he will smell the chocolate. 
34d The man will bite the chocolate. And then, he will smell the chocolate. 
35a The child will ask for the tomato. But first, he will wash the tomato. 
35b The child will ask for the tomato. And then, he will wash the tomato. 
35c The child will squeeze the tomato. But first, he will wash the tomato. 
35d The child will squeeze the tomato. And then, he will wash the tomato. 
36a The secretary will praise the coffee. But first, she will make the coffee. 
36b The secretary will praise the coffee. And then, she will make the coffee. 
36c The secretary will spill the coffee. But first, she will make the coffee. 
36d The secretary will spill the coffee. And then, she will make the coffee.  
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A1.4 Experimental sentences – Experiment 5  
No. Stimuli 
  
 
 a = penny, but first; b = penny, and then; c = egg, but first; d = egg, and then 
01a 
 The girl will stomp on the penny. But first, she will look down at the 
penny. 
01b 
The girl will stomp on the penny. And then, she will look down at the 
penny. 
01c  The girl will stomp on the egg. But first, she will look down at the egg.  
01d 
The girl will stomp on the egg. And then, she will look down at the 
egg.  
02a  The boy will jump on the hay. But first, he will look at the hay.  
02b The boy will jump on the hay. And then, he will look at the hay. 
02c  The boy will jump on the box. But first, he will look at the box.  
02d The boy will jump on the box. And then, he will look at the box.  
03a 
 The boy will pound the beach ball. But first, he will glare at the beach 
ball.  
03b 
The boy will pound the beach ball. And then, he will glare at the 
beach ball.  
03c 
 The boy will pound the sand castle. But first, he will glare at the sand 
castle.  
03d 
The boy will pound the sand castle. And then, he will glare at the sand 
castle.  
04a 
 The teenager will drop the football. But first, he will run away from the 
football. 
04b 
The teenager will drop the football. And then, he will run away from 
the football. 
04c 
 The teenager will drop the piggy bank. But first, he will run away from 
the piggy bank. 
04d 
The teenager will drop the piggy bank. And then, he will run away 
from the piggy bank. 
05a 
 The man will squeeze the tennis ball. But first, he will frown at the 
tennis ball.  
05b 
The man will squeeze the tennis ball. And then, he will frown at the 
tennis ball. 
05c  The man will squeeze the biscuit. But first, he will frown at the biscuit.  
05d 
The man will squeeze the biscuit. And then, he will frown at the 
biscuit. 
06a 
The teenager will tip over the empty mug. But first, she will reach for 
the mug.  
06b 
The teenager will tip over the empty mug. And then, she will reach for 
the mug. 
06c 
The teenager will tip over the coffee. But first, she will reach for the 
coffee.  
06d 
The teenager will tip over the coffee. And then, she will reach for the 
coffee. 
07a  The girl will play with the rattle. But first, she will inspect the rattle.  
07b The girl will play with rattle. And then, she will inspect the rattle.  
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07c 
The girl will play with the play dough. But first, she will inspect the 
play dough.  
07d 
The girl will play with the play dough. And then, she will inspect the 
play dough.  
08a The toddler will squeeze the doll. But first, he will glare at the doll.  
08b The toddler will squeeze the doll. And then, he will glare at the doll.  
08c 
 The toddler will squeeze the toothpaste. But first, he will glare at the 
toothpaste.  
08d 
The toddler will squeeze the toothpaste. And then, he will glare at the 
toothpaste.  
09a The girl will pinch the doll. But first, she will scowl at the doll.  
09b The girl will pinch the doll. And then, she will scowl at the doll. 
09c The girl will pinch the baby. But first, she will scowl at the baby.  
09d The girl will pinch the baby. And then, she will scowl at the baby.  
10a The boy will stand on the card. But first, he will look at the card.  
10b The boy will stand on the card. And then, he will look at the card.  
10c The boy will stand on the glasses. But first, he will look at the glasses.  
10d 
The boy will stand on the glasses. And then, he will look at the 
glasses.  
11a The girl will blow on the dice. But first, she will look at the dice.  
11b The girl will blow on the dice. And then, she will look at the dice.  
11c 
The girl will blow on the dandelion. But first, she will look at the 
dandelion.  
11d 
The girl will blow on the dandelion. And then, she will look at the 
dandelion.  
12a The girl will step on the brick. But first, she will stare at the brick.  
12b The girl will step on the brick. And then, she will stare at the brick. 
12c The girl will step on the fly. But first, she will stare at the fly.  
12d The girl will step on the fly. And then, she will stare at the fly. 
13a  The girl will drop the fork. But first, she will laugh about the fork.  
13b The girl will drop the fork. And then, she will laugh about the fork.  
13c 
 The girl will drop the ice cream. But first, she will laugh about the ice 
cream.  
13d 
The girl will drop the ice cream. And then, she will laugh about the ice 
cream.  
14a 
 The girl will poke the teddy bear. But first, she will laugh about the 
teddy bear.  
14b 
The girl will poke the teddy bear. And then, she will laugh about the 
teddy bear.  
14c 
The girl will poke the card tower. But first, she will laugh about the 
card tower.  
14d 
The girl will poke the card tower. And then, she will laugh about the 
card tower.  
15a 
The racing driver will shake the empty wine glass. But first, he will 
look at the wine glass.  
15b 
The racing driver will shake the empty wine glass. And then, he will 
look at the wine glass.  
15c 
The racing driver will shake the champagne. But first, he will look at 
champagne.  
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15d 
The racing driver will shake the champagne. And then, he will look at 
the champagne.  
16a The child will push the doll. But first, he will run away from the doll.  
16b The child will push the doll. And then, he will run away from the doll.  
16c 
The child will push the dominoes. But first, he will run away from the 
dominoes.  
16d 
The child will push the dominoes. And then, he will run away from the 
dominoes.  
17a  The man will sit on the log. But first, he will frown at the log.  
17b The man will sit on the log. And then, he will frown at the log.  
17c The man will sit on the guitar. But first, he will frown at the guitar.  
17d The man will sit on the guitar. And then, he will frown at the guitar.  
18a 
The child will kick the tree stump. But first, he will stand next to the 
tree stump .  
18b 
The child will kick the tree stump. And then, he will stand next to the 
tree stump.  
18c The child will kick the bin. But first, he will stand next to the bin.  
18d The child will kick the bin. And then, he will stand next to the bin.  
19a 
The teenager will drive over the road. But first, she will look at the 
road.  
19b 
The teenager will drive over the road. And then, she will look at the 
road.  
19c 
The teenager will drive over the skateboard. But first, she will look at 
the skateboard.  
19d 
The teenager will drive over the skateboard. And then, she will look at 
the skateboard.  
20a The toddler will bite the Lego. But first, he will sniff the Lego.  
20b The toddler will bite the Lego. And then, he will sniff the Lego.  
20c The toddler will bite the ice-cream. But first, he will sniff the ice-cream.  
20d 
The toddler will bite the ice-cream. And then, he will sniff the ice-
cream.  
21a The girl will blow on the mirror. But first, she will stand by the mirror.  
21b The girl will blow on the mirror. And then, she will stand by the mirror.  
21c The girl will blow on the candle. But first, she will stand by the candle.  
21d 
The girl will blow on the candle. And then, she will stand by the 
candle.  
22a 
The man will shoot at the tank. But first, he will run away from the 
tank.  
22b 
The man will shoot at the tank. And then, he will run away from the 
tank.  
22c 
The man will shoot at the window. But first, he will run away from the 
window.  
22d 
The man will shoot at the window. And then, he will run away from the 
window.  
23a 
The woman will knock over the book. But first, she will look for the 
book. 
23b 
The woman will knock over the book. And then, she will look for the 
book. 
23c The woman will knock over the wine glass. But first, she will look for 
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the wine glass. 
23d 
The woman will knock over the wine glass. And then, she will look for 
the wine glass. 
24a 
The maid will drop the rugby ball. But first, she will stand over the 
rugby ball.  
24b 
The maid will drop the rugby ball. And then, she will stand over the 
rugby ball.  
24c The maid will drop the vase. But first, she will stand over the vase.  
24d The maid will drop the vase. And then, she will stand over the vase.  
25a The boy will punch the tree. But first, he will stare at the tree.  
25b The boy will punch the tree. And then, he will stare at the tree.  
25c The boy will punch the mirror. But first, he will stare at the mirror.  
25d The boy will punch the mirror. And then, he will stare at the mirror.  
26a 
The woman will heat up the frying pan. But first, she will stand beside 
the frying pan.  
26b 
The woman will heat up the frying pan. And then, she will stand 
beside the frying pan.  
26c 
The woman will heat up the chocolate. But first, she will stand beside 
the chocolate.  
26d 
The woman will heat up the chocolate. And then, she will stand 
beside the chocolate.  
27a The woman will chew the spoon. But first, he will look at the spoon.  
27b The woman will chew the spoon. And then, he will look at the spoon.  
27c 
The woman will chew the chewing gum. But first, he will look at the 
chewing gum.  
27d 
The woman will chew the chewing gum. And then, he will look at the 
chewing gum.  
28a 
The man will step on the doormat. But first, he will look at the 
doormat.  
28b 
The man will step on the doormat. And then, he will look at the 
doormat.  
28c 
The man will step on the beer can. But first, he will look at the beer 
can.  
28d 
The man will step on the beer can. And then, he will look at the beer 
can.  
29a The boy will bite the chopsticks. But first, he will smell the chopstick.  
29b 
The boy will bite the chopsticks. And then, he will smell the 
chopsticks.  
29c The boy will bite the chocolate. But first, he will smell the chocolate.  
29d The boy will bite the chocolate. And then, he will smell the chocolate.  
30a The boy will push the statue. But first, he will look at the statue.  
30b The boy will push the statue. And then, he will look at the statue.  
30c 
The boy will push the flower pot. But first, he will look at the flower 
pot.  
30d 
The boy will push the flower pot. And then, he will look at the flower 
pot.  
31a 
The girl will throw the balloon. But first, she will laugh about the 
balloon.  
31b The girl will throw the balloon. And then, she will laugh about the 
171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
balloon.   
31c The girl will throw the puzzle. But first, she will laugh about the puzzle.  
31d 
The girl will throw the puzzle. And then, she will laugh about the 
puzzle.   
32a 
The cowboy will snap the leather whip. But first, he will examine the 
whip.  
32b 
The cowboy will snap the leather whip. And then, he will examine the 
whip.  
32c The cowboy will snap the ruler. But first, he will examine the ruler.  
32d The cowboy will snap the ruler. And then, he will examine the ruler.  
33a The worker will lean on the wall. But first, he will laugh about the wall. 
33b 
The worker will lean on the wall. And then, he will laugh about the 
wall. 
33c 
The worker will lean on the pile of papers. But first, he will laugh about 
the pile of papers. 
33d 
The worker will lean on the pile of papers. And then, he will laugh 
about the pile of papers. 
34a The toddler will sit on the bed. But first, she will look at the bed. 
34b The toddler will sit on the bed. And then, she will look at the bed. 
34c The toddler will sit on the tomato. But first, she will look at the tomato. 
34d 
The toddler will sit on the tomato. And then, she will look at the 
tomato. 
35a 
The woman will throw the Frisbee. But first, she will pick up the 
Frisbee. 
35b 
The woman will throw the Frisbee. And then, she will pick up the 
Frisbee. 
35c The woman will throw the plate. But first, she will pick up the plate. 
35d The woman will throw the plate. And then, she will pick up the plate. 
36a The man will fan the tent. But first, he will inspect the tent. 
36b The man will fan the tent. And then, he will inspect the tent. 
36c The man will fan the campfire. But first, he will inspect the campfire. 
36d The man will fan the campfire. And then, he will inspect the campfire. 
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A1.5 Experimental sentences – Experiment 7 
 
 
a = but first, the; b = but first, another 
 
01a The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
01b The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on another gate. 
02a 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. But first, he will walk around the 
dustbin. 
02b 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. But first, he will walk around 
another dustbin. 
03a The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03b 
The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for another 
gift. 
04a The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
04b The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick another acorn. 
05a The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at the banana. 
05b 
The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at another 
banana. 
06a 
The girl will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about the 
jump rope. 
06b 
The girl will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about 
another jump rope. 
07a 
The young man will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07b 
The young man will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for 
another candle. 
08a 
The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over the 
plant. 
08b 
The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over 
another plant. 
09a 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. But first, she will point at 
the blackboard. 
09b 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. But first, she will point at 
another blackboard. 
10c 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
10d 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
another sunglasses. 
11a 
The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11b 
The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will grin at another 
ice cream. 
12a 
The customer will break the glasses. But first, she will ask about the 
sunglasses. 
12b 
The customer will break the glasses. But first, she will ask about 
another sunglasses. 
13a 
The girl will chew the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about 
the gum. 
13b 
The girl will chew the stick of gum. But first, she will complain about 
another gum. 
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14a The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
14b The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell another onion. 
15a The boy will break the vase. But first, he will examine the vase. 
15b The boy will break the vase. But first, he will examine another vase. 
16a The waiter will unroll the rug.  But first, he will step over the rug. 
16b The waiter will unroll the rug.  But first, he will step over another rug. 
17a The student will cut up the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
17b 
The student will cut up the pizza. But first, he will blow on another 
pizza. 
18a 
The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18b 
The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with another 
blowtorch. 
19a 
The child will colour in the drawing. But first, she will display the 
drawing. 
19b 
The child will colour in the drawing. But first, she will display another 
drawing. 
20c 
The grocer will purée the blueberries. But first, he will smell the 
blueberries. 
20d 
The grocer will purée the blueberries. But first, he will smell another 
blueberries. 
21a 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. But first, she will talk about 
the cucumber. 
21b 
The woman will squeeze the cucumber. But first, she will talk about 
another cucumber. 
22a The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
22b The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell another bagel. 
23a The man will roast the piglet.  But first, he will examine the piglet. 
23b The man will roast the piglet.  But first, he will examine another piglet. 
24a 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24b 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph 
another pumpkin. 
25a The boy will deflate the ball. But first, he will throw the ball. 
25b The boy will deflate the ball. But first, he will throw another ball. 
26a The woman will break the egg. But first, she will examine the egg. 
26b 
The woman will break the egg. But first, she will examine another 
egg. 
27a 
The maid will make up the messy bed. But first, she will complain 
about the bed. 
27b 
The maid will make up the messy bed. But first, she will complain 
about another bed. 
28a 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28b 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
another sleeping bag. 
29a 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. But first, he will point at the 
tree. 
29b The lumberjack will chop down the tree. But first, he will point at 
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another tree. 
30c 
The woman will open the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at 
the umbrella. 
30d 
The woman will open the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at 
another umbrella. 
31a 
The woman will halve the apple. But first, she will talk about the 
apple. 
31b 
The woman will halve the apple. But first, she will talk about another 
apple. 
32a 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, she will 
frown at the wall.  
32b 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, she will 
frown at another wall.  
 
  
175 
 
A1.6 Experimental sentences – Experiment 8 
 
No. Stimuli 
 
a = but first, the; b = but first, another; c = and then, the; d = and then, another 
01a The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on the gate. 
01b The man will shut the gate. But first, he will lean on another gate. 
01c The man will shut the gate. And then, he will lean on the gate. 
01d The man will shut the gate. And then, he will lean on another gate. 
02a 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. But first, he will walk around the 
dustbin. 
02b 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. But first, he will walk around 
another dustbin. 
02c 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. And then, he will walk around 
the dustbin. 
02d 
The teenager will tip over the dustbin. And then, he will walk around 
another dustbin. 
03a The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03b 
The bride will unwrap the gift. But first, she will give thanks for another 
gift. 
03c The bride will unwrap the gift. And then, she will give thanks for the gift. 
03d 
The bride will unwrap the gift. And then, she will give thanks for 
another gift. 
04a The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick the acorn. 
04b The squirrel will crack the acorn. But first, it will lick another acorn. 
04c The squirrel will crack the acorn. And then, it will lick the acorn. 
04d The squirrel will crack the acorn. And then, it will lick another acorn. 
05a The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at the banana. 
05b 
The gorilla will peel the banana. But first, he will grunt at another 
banana. 
05c The gorilla will peel the banana. And then, he will grunt at the banana. 
05d 
The gorilla will peel the banana. And then, he will grunt at another 
banana. 
06a 
The girl will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about the 
jump rope. 
06b 
The girl will cut the jump rope. But first, she will complain about another 
jump rope. 
06c 
The girl will cut the jump rope. And then, she will complain about the 
jump rope. 
06d 
The girl will cut the jump rope. And then, she will complain about 
another jump rope. 
07a 
The young man will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07b 
The young man will blow out the candle. But first, he will reach for 
another candle. 
07c 
The young man will blow out the candle. And then, he will reach for the 
candle. 
07d 
The young man will blow out the candle. And then, he will reach for 
another candle. 
08a The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over the 
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plant. 
08b 
The child will knock down the plant. But first, he will jump over another 
plant. 
08c 
The child will knock down the plant. And then, he will jump over the 
plant. 
08d 
The child will knock down the plant. And then, he will jump over 
another plant. 
09a 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. But first, she will point at 
the blackboard. 
09b 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. But first, she will point at 
another blackboard. 
09c 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. And then, she will point at 
the blackboard. 
09d 
The teacher will wipe clear the blackboard. And then, she will point at 
another blackboard. 
10a 
The customer will unfold the paper airplane. But first, she will ask about 
the paper airplane. 
10b 
The customer will unfold the paper airplane. But first, she will ask about 
another paper airplane. 
10c 
The customer will unfold the paper airplane. And then, she will ask 
about the paper airplane. 
10d 
The customer will unfold the paper airplane. And then, she will ask 
about another paper airplane. 
11a 
The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11b 
The woman will drop the ice cream. But first, she will grin at another ice 
cream. 
11c 
The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will grin at the ice 
cream. 
11d 
The woman will drop the ice cream. And then, she will grin at another 
ice cream. 
12a 
The customer will break the glasses. But first, she will ask about the 
glasses. 
12b 
The customer will break the glasses. But first, she will ask about 
another pair of glasses. 
12c 
The customer will break the glasses. And then, she will ask about the 
glasses. 
12d 
The customer will break the glasses. And then, she will ask about 
another pair of glasses. 
13a The girl will snap the ruler. But first, she will pick up the ruler. 
13b The girl will snap the ruler. But first, she will pick up another ruler. 
13c The girl will snap the ruler. And then, she will pick up the ruler. 
13d The girl will snap the ruler. And then, she will pick up another ruler. 
14a The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell the onion. 
14b The chef will chop the onion. But first, she will smell another onion. 
14c The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell the onion. 
14d The chef will chop the onion. And then, she will smell another onion. 
15a The boy will break the vase. But first, he will examine the vase. 
15b The boy will break the vase. But first, he will examine another vase. 
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15c The boy will break the vase. And then, he will examine the vase. 
15d The boy will break the vase. And then, he will examine another vase. 
16a The waiter will unroll the rug.  But first, he will step over the rug. 
16b The waiter will unroll the rug.  But first, he will step over another rug. 
16c The waiter will unroll the rug.  And then, he will step over the rug. 
16d The waiter will unroll the rug.  And then, he will step over another rug. 
17a The student will cut up the pizza. But first, he will blow on the pizza. 
17b 
The student will cut up the pizza. But first, he will blow on another 
pizza. 
17c The student will cut up the pizza. And then, he will blow on the pizza. 
17d 
The student will cut up the pizza. And then, he will blow on another 
pizza. 
18a 
The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18b 
The welder will light the blowtorch. But first, he will fiddle with another 
blowtorch. 
18c 
The welder will light the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. 
18d 
The welder will light the blowtorch. And then, he will fiddle with another 
blowtorch. 
19a 
The child will colour in the drawing. But first, she will display the 
drawing. 
19b 
The child will colour in the drawing. But first, she will display another 
drawing. 
19c 
The child will colour in the drawing. And then, she will display the 
drawing. 
19d 
The child will colour in the drawing. And then, she will display another 
drawing. 
20a 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
20b 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. But first, she will ask about 
another pair of sunglasses. 
20c 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. 
20d 
The customer will unfold the sunglasses. And then, she will ask about 
another pair of sunglasses. 
21a The secretary will spill the coffee. But first, she will make the coffee. 
21b 
The secretary will spill the coffee. But first, she will make another 
coffee. 
21c The secretary will spill the coffee. And then, she will make the coffee. 
21d 
The secretary will spill the coffee. And then, she will make another 
coffee. 
22a The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell the bagel. 
22b The man will slice the bagel. But first, he will smell another bagel. 
22c The man will slice the bagel. And then, he will smell the bagel. 
22d The man will slice the bagel. And then, he will smell another bagel. 
23a The man will roast the piglet.  But first, he will examine the piglet. 
23b The man will roast the piglet.  But first, he will examine another piglet. 
23c The man will roast the piglet.  And then, he will examine the piglet. 
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23d The man will roast the piglet.  And then, he will examine another piglet. 
24a 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24b 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. But first, he will photograph another 
pumpkin. 
24c 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. And then, he will photograph the 
pumpkin. 
24d 
The farmer will carve the pumpkin. And then, he will photograph 
another pumpkin. 
25a The boy will deflate the ball. But first, he will throw the ball. 
25b The boy will deflate the ball. But first, he will throw another ball. 
25c The boy will deflate the ball. And then, he will throw the ball. 
25d The boy will deflate the ball. And then, he will throw another ball. 
26a The woman will break the egg. But first, she will examine the egg. 
26b The woman will break the egg. But first, she will examine another egg. 
26c The woman will break the egg. And then, she will examine the egg. 
26d 
The woman will break the egg. And then, she will examine another 
egg. 
27a 
The cleaner will tidy the messy desk. But first, she will complain about 
the desk. 
27b 
The cleaner will tidy the messy desk. But first, she will complain about 
another desk. 
27c 
The cleaner will tidy the messy desk. And then, she will complain about 
the desk. 
27d 
The cleaner will tidy the messy desk. And then, she will complain about 
another desk. 
28a 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28b 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. But first, he will moan about 
another sleeping bag. 
28c 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. And then, he will moan about 
the sleeping bag. 
28d 
The traveller will roll up the sleeping bag. And then, he will moan about 
another sleeping bag. 
29a 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. But first, he will point at the 
tree. 
29b 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. But first, he will point at 
another tree. 
29c 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. And then, he will point at the 
tree. 
29d 
The lumberjack will chop down the tree. And then, he will point at 
another tree. 
30a 
The woman will open the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at the 
umbrella. 
30b 
The woman will open the umbrella. But first, she will compliment at 
another umbrella. 
30c 
The woman will open the umbrella. And then, she will compliment at 
the umbrella. 
30d The woman will open the umbrella. And then, she will compliment at 
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another umbrella. 
31a The woman will halve the apple. But first, she will talk about the apple. 
31b 
The woman will halve the apple. But first, she will talk about another 
apple. 
31c 
The woman will halve the apple. And then, she will talk about the 
apple. 
31d 
The woman will halve the apple. And then, she will talk about another 
apple. 
32a 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, she will 
frown at the wall.  
32b 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. And then, she will 
frown at another wall.  
32c 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. But first, she will 
frown at the wall.  
32d 
The construction worker will knock down the wall. And then, she will 
frown at another wall.  
33a The student will snap the ruler. But first, she will pick up the ruler.  
33b The student will snap the ruler. But first, she will pick up another ruler.  
33c The student will snap the ruler. And then, she will pick up the ruler.  
33d The student will snap the ruler. And then, she will pick up another ruler.  
34a The dog will empty his food bowl. But first, he will smell the food bowl. 
34b 
The dog will empty his food bowl. But first, he will smell another food 
bowl. 
34c The dog will empty his food bowl. And then, he will smell the food bowl. 
34d 
The dog will empty his food bowl. And then, he will smell another food 
bowl. 
35a The man will smash the mirror. But first, she will examine the mirror.  
35b 
The man will smash the mirror. But first, she will examine another 
mirror.  
35c The man will smash the mirror. And then, she will examine the mirror.  
35d 
The man will smash the mirror. And then, she will examine another 
mirror.  
36a The man will bite the chocolate. But first, he will smell the chocolate. 
36b 
The man will bite the chocolate. But first, he will smell another 
chocolate. 
36c The man will bite the chocolate. And then, he will smell the chocolate. 
36d 
The man will bite the chocolate. And then, he will smell another 
chocolate. 
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A1.7 Experimental sentences – Experiment 9 
 
No. A. No Change, And 
then 
B. Change, And then C. Implausible 
1 The man will buy the 
hat. And then, he will 
ask about the hat. It is 
made of wool. 
The man will ruin the 
hat. And then, he will 
ask about the hat. It is 
made of wool.  
The man will buy 
the hat. And then, 
he will punch the 
hat. It is smiling.   
2 The airline pilot will land 
the airplane. And then, 
he will steer the 
airplane. It is a Boeing 
747. 
The airline pilot will 
crash the airplane. 
And then, he will steer 
the airplane. It is a 
Boeing 747. 
The pilot will slow 
down the airplane. 
And then, he will 
bloom the airplane. 
It is rotten.     
3 The boy will chase the 
mouse. And then, he will 
follow the mouse. It is 
very scared. 
The boy will injure the 
mouse. And then, he 
will follow the mouse. 
It is very scared. 
The boy will tease 
the mouse. And 
then, he will justify 
the mouse. It is 
blue.    
4 The music conductor 
will wave the baton. And 
then, he will complain 
about the baton. It is 
made of plastic. 
The music conductor 
will snap the baton. 
And then, he will 
complain about the 
baton. It is made of 
plastic.  
The music 
conductor will 
shake the baton. 
And then, he will 
jail the baton. It is 
happy.    
5 The student will 
purchase the blank 
canvas. And then, he 
will ask for the canvas. It 
is good quality. 
The student will paint 
the blank canvas. And 
then, he will ask for 
the canvas. It is good 
quality.  
The student will 
stare at the blank 
canvas. And then, 
he will facility the 
blank canvas. It is 
stormy.  
6 The woman will study 
the sculpture. And then, 
she will describe the 
sculpture. It was created 
by Rodin. 
The woman will alter 
the sculpture. And 
then, she will describe 
the sculpture. It was 
created by Rodin. 
The woman will 
appreciate the 
sculpture. And 
then, she will upset 
the sculpture. It is 
embarrassed. 
7 The man will sit beside 
the fan. And then, he 
will comment on the fan. 
It was bought 10 years 
ago. 
The man will repair the 
fan. And then, he will 
comment on the fan. It 
was bought 10 years 
ago.  
The man will put 
away the fan. And 
then, he will heal 
the fan. It is silky. 
8 The woman will seek 
the chocolate. And then, 
she will grimace at the 
chocolate. It has an 
orange flavour. 
The woman will melt 
the chocolate And 
then, she will grimace 
at the chocolate. It has 
an orange flavour.  
The woman will 
taste the chocolate. 
And then, she will 
knit the chocolate. 
It is wet. 
9 The babysitter will put 
away the toy truck. And 
then, she will grumble 
about the truck. It is 
The babysitter will 
disintegrate the toy 
truck. And then, she 
will grumble about the 
The babysitter will 
polish the toy truck. 
And then, she will 
smoke the truck. It 
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made of rubber. truck. It is made of 
rubber. 
is warm. 
10 The barista will point to 
the latte. And then, she 
will make the latte. It is 
the most popular coffee. 
The barista will spill 
the latte. And then, 
she will make the latte. 
It is the most popular 
coffee.  
The barista will 
make the latte. And 
then, she will weigh 
the latte. It is solid.   
11 The bartender will hold 
the tequila bottle. And 
then, he will talk about 
the bottle. It has an 
interesting design. 
The bartender will 
break the tequila 
bottle. And then, he 
will talk about the 
bottle. It has an 
interesting design. 
The bartender will 
empty the tequila 
bottle. And then, he 
will welcome the 
bottle. It is terrified.  
12 The lumberjack will 
circle around the tree. 
And then, he will push 
against the tree. It is an 
pine tree. 
The lumberjack will 
chop down the tree. 
And then, he will push 
against the tree. It is 
an pine tree.  
The lumberjack will 
choose the tree. 
And then, he will 
unpack the tree. It 
is sad.   
13 The bicyclist will inspect 
the tire. And then, she 
will complain about the 
tire. It is dirty. 
The bicyclist will 
puncture the tire. And 
then, she will complain 
about the tire. It is 
dirty. 
The bicyclist will 
moan about the 
tire. And then, she 
will warm up the 
tire. It is wooden.  
14 The botanist will collect 
the plant. And then, he 
will document the plant. 
It is rare. 
The botanist will 
dissect the plant. And 
then, he will document 
the plant. It is rare.  
The botanist will 
discover the plant. 
And then, he will 
refuse the plant. It 
has wings.   
15 The boxer will step 
towards the training 
bag. And then, he will 
look at the bag.  It is 
made in Italy. 
The boxer will cut 
apart the training bag. 
And then, he will look 
at the bag. It is made 
in Italy. 
The boxer will 
punch the training 
bag. And then, he 
will injure the bag. 
It is sharp. 
16 The boy will try on the 
shoes. And then, he will 
brag about the shoes. 
They are made in 
China. 
The boy will wear out 
the shoes. And then, 
he will brag about the 
shoes. They are made 
in China.  
The boy will share 
the shoes. And 
then, he will upset 
the shoes. They 
are made of paper.  
17 The boy will smile at the 
candle. And then, he will 
reach for the candle. It 
is red. 
The boy will blow out 
the candle. And then, 
he will reach for the 
candle. It is red. 
The boy will touch 
the candle. And 
then, he will 
motivate the 
candle. It is frantic. 
18 The boy will play with 
the broken zipper. And 
then, he will complain 
about the zipper. It is his 
brothers' 
The boy will fix the 
broken zipper. And 
then, he will complain 
about the zipper It is 
his brothers'  
The boy will 
purchase the 
broken zipper. And 
then, he will spell 
the zipper. It is 
slippery.  
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19 The boy will ask for the 
kite. And then, he will 
complement the kite. It 
is colourful. 
The boy will crease 
the kite. And then, he 
will complement the 
kite. It is colourful. 
The boy will 
present the kite. 
And then, he will 
punish the kite. It is 
juicy.   
20 The boy will admire the 
coin. And then, he will 
grin at the coin. It is a 
penny. 
The boy will spin the 
coin. And then, he will 
grin at the coin. It is a 
penny.  
The boy will collect 
the coin. And then, 
he will rehabilitate 
the coin. It is 
watery.   
21 The toddler will shake 
the empty mug. And 
then, he will giggle 
about the mug. It is 
green. 
The toddler will smash 
the empty mug. And 
then, he will giggle 
about the mug. It is 
green.  
The toddler will 
possess the empty 
mug. And then, he 
will fax the mug. It 
is sleepy.  
22 The boy will show off 
the Easter egg. And 
then, he will guard the 
egg. It has a moat. 
The boy will hammer 
the Easter egg. And 
then, he will guard the 
egg. It has a moat. 
The boy will restore 
the Easter egg. 
And then, he will 
undress the egg. It 
is tired.  
23 The boy will swing at the 
snowman. And then, he 
will laugh at the 
snowman. It has a 
carrot for a nose. 
The boy will destroy 
the snowman. And 
then, he will laugh at 
the snowman. It has a 
carrot for a nose.  
The boy will sketch 
the snowman. And 
then, he will slay 
the snowman. It is 
bewildered.  
24 The boy will ask about 
the Halloween costume. 
And then, he will try on 
the costume. It is cheap. 
The boy will tear the 
Halloween costume. 
And then, he will try on 
the costume. It is 
cheap.  
The boy will ask for 
the Halloween 
costume. And then, 
he will smoke the 
costume. It is slow.  
25 The boy will study the 
advent calendar. And 
then, he will frown at the 
calendar. It is creepy. 
The boy will open the 
advent calendar. And 
then, he will frown at 
the calendar. It is 
creepy.  
The boy will mend 
the advent 
calendar. And then, 
he will rely on the 
calendar. It is 
multiplied.  
26 The bride will accept the 
gift. And then, she will 
give thanks for the gift. It 
looks expensive. 
The bride will unwrap 
the gift. And then, she 
will give thanks for the 
gift. It looks expensive.  
The bride will moan 
about the gift. And 
then, she will 
mentor the gift. It is 
shaking.  
27 The man will present the 
fragile ornament. And 
then, he will uncover the 
ornament. It is an 
antique. 
The man will chip the 
fragile ornament.  And 
then, he will uncover 
the ornament. It is an 
antique.  
The man will 
protect the fragile 
ornament. And 
then, he will 
promise the 
ornament. It is 
melted.  
28 The man will praise the 
rug. And then, he will 
The man will unroll the 
rug. And then, he will 
The man will lie on 
the rug. And then, 
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step over the rug. It is 
from Egypt. 
step over the rug. It is 
from Egypt.  
he will overtake the 
rug. It is delicious.  
29 The camper will go into 
the tent. And then, he 
will chat about the tent. 
It is waterproof. 
The camper will put up 
the tent. And then, he 
will chat about the 
tent. It is waterproof.   
The camper will put 
together the tent. 
And then, he will 
interrupt the tent. It 
is delirious.  
30 The carpenter will wear 
the jacket. And then, he 
will frown at the jacket It 
is dusty. 
The carpenter will 
rumple the jacket. And 
then, he will frown at 
the jacket. It is dusty.  
The carpenter will 
put on the jacket. 
And then, he will 
mentor the jacket. 
It is noisy. 
31 The carpenter will stand 
on the floor. And then, 
he will frown at the floor. 
It is muddy. 
The carpenter will tile 
the floor. And then, he 
will step on the floor. It 
is muddy. 
The carpenter will 
tile the floor. And 
then, he will sew 
the floor. It is 
envious.  
32 The chef will select the 
onion. And then, she will 
smell the onion. It is 
fresh. 
The chef will chop the 
onion. And then, she 
will smell the onion. It 
is fresh. 
The chef will smell 
the onion. And 
then, she will 
telephone the 
onion. It is 
odourless.  
33 The child will hide 
behind the plant. And 
then, he will jump over 
the plant. It is leafy. 
The child will pluck the 
plant. And then, he will 
jump over the plant. It 
is leafy. 
The child will water 
the plant. And then, 
he will transcribe 
the plant. It is tired.   
34 The child will lick the ice 
lolly. And then, she will 
grin at the lolly. It is 
delicious.. 
The child will bite the 
ice lolly. And then, she 
will grin at the lolly It is 
delicious..  
The child will grin 
at the ice lolly. And 
then, she will 
revise the lolly. It is 
boiling.     
35 The teenager will take 
the flyer. And then, he 
will grin at the flyer. It is 
about guitar lessons. 
The teenager will rip 
the flyer. And then, he 
will grin at the flyer.  It 
is about guitar 
lessons. 
The teenager will 
grin at the flyer. 
And then, he will 
rescue the flyer. It 
is amused.  
36 The child will poke the 
gingerbread. And then, 
she will laugh at the 
gingerbread. It is fragile. 
The child will decorate 
the gingerbread. And 
then, she will laugh at 
the gingerbread. It is 
fragile.  
The child will laugh 
at the gingerbread. 
And then, she will 
unplug the 
gingerbread. It is 
shining.  
37 The child will find the 
ketchup bottle. And 
then, he will comment 
on the bottle. It is Heinz. 
The child will open the 
ketchup bottle. And 
then, he will comment 
on the bottle. It is 
Heinz. 
The child will 
comment on the 
ketchup bottle. And 
then, he will forgive 
the bottle. It is 
cautious.  
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38 The clown will rub the 
balloon. And then, he 
will laugh at the balloon. 
It is pink. 
The clown will inflate 
the balloon. And then, 
he will laugh at the 
balloon. It is pink. 
The clown will 
laugh at the 
balloon. And then, 
he will write the 
balloon. It is 
courageous.  
39 The construction worker 
will stand by the wall. 
And then, he will frown 
at the wall. It is old. 
The construction 
worker will knock 
down the wall. And 
then, he will frown at 
the wall. It is old. 
The construction 
worker will frown at 
the wall. And then, 
he will repeat the 
wall. It is cloudy.  
40 The contractor will sit by 
the swimming pool. And 
then, he will walk 
around the pool. It is 
clean. 
The contractor will 
drain the swimming 
pool. And then, he will 
walk around the pool. 
It is clean. 
The contractor will 
walk around the 
swimming pool. 
And then, he will 
write the pool. It is 
jealous.  
41 The customer will try on 
the sunglasses.  And 
then, she will ask about 
the sunglasses. They 
are expensive. 
The customer will 
unfold the sunglasses. 
And then, she will ask 
about the sunglasses. 
They are expensive. 
The customer will 
ask about the 
sunglasses. And 
then, she will spray 
the sunglasses. 
They are hungry. 
42 The dentist will brush 
the tooth. And then, he 
will talk about the tooth. 
It is a wisdom tooth. 
The dentist will drill the 
tooth. And then, he will 
talk about the tooth. It 
is a wisdom tooth. 
The dentist will talk 
about the tooth. 
And then, he will 
tame the tooth. It is 
dangerous.  
43 The boy will pick up the 
homework. And then, he 
will frown at the 
homework. It is difficult. 
The boy will tear up 
the homework. And 
then, he will frown at 
the homework. It is 
difficult. 
The boy will frown 
at the homework. 
And then, he will 
recruit the 
homework. It is 
enthusiastic.  
44 The girl will grab the 
glass. And then, she will 
smell the glass. It is 
stinky. 
The girl will drop the 
glass. And then, she 
will smell the glass. It 
is stinky.  
The girl will smell 
the glass. And 
then, she will comb 
the glass. It is 
faithful.  
45 The employee will stand 
beside the mannequin. 
And then, she will laugh 
at the mannequin. It has 
red hair. 
The employee will 
undress the 
mannequin. And then, 
she will laugh at the 
mannequin. It has red 
hair.  
The employee will 
laugh at the 
mannequin. And 
then, she will 
invent the 
mannequin. It is 
helpless.  
46 The woman will touch 
the blanket. And then, 
she will look at the 
blanket. It is white. 
The woman will bleach 
the blanket. And then, 
she will look at the 
blanket.  It is white.  
The woman will 
look at the blanket. 
And then, she will 
disarm the blanket. 
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It is asleep.   
47 The expert will study the 
oil. And then, he will 
recommend the oil. It is 
from Texas. 
The expert will burn 
the oil. And then, he 
will recommend the oil. 
It is from Texas.  
The expert will 
recommend the oil. 
And then, he will 
wrestle the oil. It is 
selfish.  
48 The exterminator will 
spot the cockroach. And 
then, he will talk about 
the cockroach. It is 
brown. 
The exterminator will 
poison the cockroach. 
And then, he will talk 
about the cockroach. It 
is brown.  
The exterminator 
will talk about the 
cockroach. And 
then, he will 
interview the 
cockroach. It is 
sparkling.  
49 The farmer will 
photograph the 
pumpkin. And then, he 
will chat about the 
pumpkin. It is heavy. 
The farmer will carve 
the pumpkin. And 
then, he will chat 
about the pumpkin. It 
is heavy. 
The farmer will 
chat about the 
pumpkin. And then, 
he will command 
the pumpkin. It is 
thoughtful.  
50 The fireman will search 
for the fire hose. And 
then, he will ask about 
the hose. It is not 
working. 
The fireman will 
unravel the fire hose. 
And then, he will ask 
about the hose. It is 
not working.  
The fireman will 
ask about the fire 
hose. And then, he 
will interpret the 
hose. It is busy. 
51 The chef will gaze at the 
duck. And then, he will 
ask for the duck.  It is 
big. 
The chef will defrost 
the duck. And then, he 
will ask for the duck.  It 
is big.  
The chef will ask 
for the duck. And 
then, he will 
forecast the duck. 
It is cautious.   
52 The food critic will taste 
the coffee. And then, he 
will ask about the 
coffee. It smells nice. 
The food critic will 
finish the coffee. And 
then, he will ask about 
the coffee. It smells 
nice.  
The food critic will 
ask about the 
coffee. And then, 
he will excite the 
coffee. It is 
adventurous. 
53 The girl will admire the 
flower. And then, she 
will sniff the flower. It is 
pretty. 
The girl will pluck the 
flower. And then, she 
will sniff the flower. It 
is pretty. 
The girl will sniff 
the flower. And 
then, she will 
compete with the 
flower. It is 
aggressive.    
54 The girl will get the stick 
of gum. And then, she 
will complain about the 
gum. It is cinnamon 
flavour. 
The girl will chew the 
stick of gum. And then, 
she will complain 
about the gum. It is 
cinnamon flavour.  
The girl will 
complain about the 
stick of gum. And 
then, she will marry 
the gum. It is alert. 
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55 The man will carry the 
bomb. And then, he will 
find the bomb. It is well 
hidden. 
The man will detonate 
the bomb. And then, 
he will find the bomb. 
It is well hidden.  
The man will find 
the bomb. And 
then, he will boil 
the bomb. It is 
alive. 
56 The girl will lie beside 
the diary. And then, she 
will read the diary. It is 
written by her mother. 
The girl will rip apart 
the diary. And then, 
she will read the diary. 
It is written by her 
mother.  
The girl will read 
the diary. And then, 
she will catch the 
diary. It is amused. 
57 The girl will pose behind 
the shirt. And then, she 
will ask about the shirt. 
It is for tomorrow's party. 
The girl will crumple 
the shirt. And then, 
she will ask about the 
shirt. It is for 
tomorrow's party. 
The girl will ask 
about the shirt. And 
then, she will begin 
the shirt. It is 
arrogant.  
58 The gorilla will grab the 
banana. And then, he 
will grunt at the banana. 
It smells nice. 
The gorilla will peel the 
banana. And then, he 
will grunt at the 
banana. It smells nice. 
The gorilla will 
grunt at the 
banana. And then, 
he will justify the 
banana. It is 
ashamed.   
59 The grandfather will 
photograph the turkey. 
And then, he will pick up 
the turkey. It is huge. 
The grandfather will 
cut up the turkey. And 
then, he will pick up 
the turkey. It is huge.  
The grandfather 
will pick up the 
turkey. And then, 
he will install the 
turkey. It is 
bewildered. 
60 The grandmother will 
look toward the lamp. 
And then, she will ask 
about the lamp. It is 
cute. 
The grandmother will 
turn on the lamp. And 
then, she will ask 
about the lamp. It is 
cute. 
The grandmother 
will ask about the 
lamp. And then, 
she will drink the 
lamp. It is fluid.  
61 The grocer will weigh 
the blueberries. And 
then, he will smell the 
blueberries. They are 
from New Zealand. 
The grocer will blend 
the blueberries. And 
then, he will smell the 
blueberries. They are 
from New Zealand. 
The grocer will 
smell the 
blueberries. And 
then, he will melt 
the blueberries. 
They are 
transparent. 
62 The groomer will pet the 
dog. And then, he will 
feed the dog. It is a 
Labrador. 
The groomer will 
shave the dog. And 
then he will feed the 
dog. It is a Labrador.  
The groomer will 
feed the dog. And 
then he will convert 
the dog. It is 
talkative.  
63 The grouch will curse at 
the alarm clock. And 
then, he will hit the 
clock. It is loud. 
The grouch will turn off 
the alarm clock. And 
then, he will hit the 
clock. It is loud. 
The grouch will hit 
the alarm clock. 
And then, he will 
mentor the clock. It 
is bulbous. 
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64 The gym teacher will 
show the basketball. 
And then, he will 
comment on the 
basketball. It is still new. 
The gym teacher will 
deflate the basketball. 
And then, he will 
comment on the 
basketball. It is still 
new. 
The gym teacher 
will comment on 
the basketball. And 
then, he will invent 
the basketball. It is 
brave.   
65 The gymnast will adjust 
the jump rope. And 
then, she will complain 
about the rope. It made 
of plastic. 
The gymnast will cut 
the jump rope. And 
then, she will complain 
about the rope. It 
made of plastic. 
The gymnast will 
complain about the 
jump rope. And 
then, she will 
forgive the rope. It 
is cautious.  
66 The hairdresser will 
caress the wig. And 
then, she will 
compliment the wig. It is 
made of real hair. 
The hairdresser will 
loosen the wig. And 
then, she will 
compliment the wig. It 
is made of real hair. 
The hairdresser will 
compliment the 
wig. And then, she 
will freeze the wig. 
It is cloudy.  
67 The housepainter will 
climb the ladder. And 
then, he will walk 
around the ladder. It is 
tall. 
The housepainter will 
extend the ladder. And 
then, he will walk 
around the ladder. It is 
tall. 
The housepainter 
will walk around 
the ladder. And 
then, he will 
dramatize the 
ladder. It is clumsy. 
68 The hunter will examine 
the rifle. And then, he 
will frown at the rifle. It is 
old. 
The hunter will 
dismantle the rifle. And 
then, he will frown at 
the rifle. It is old. 
The hunter will 
frown at the rifle. 
And then, he will 
rescue the rifle. It is 
equal.  
69 The hunter will stalk the 
wildebeest. And then, 
he will follow the 
wildebeest. It is a male. 
The hunter will kill the 
wildebeest. And then, 
he will follow the 
wildebeest. It is a 
male. 
The hunter will 
follow the 
wildebeest. And 
then, he will 
hypothesize the 
wildebeest. It is 
fragile.  
70 The illustrator will copy 
the cartoon. And then, 
he will display the 
cartoon. It is interesting. 
The illustrator will 
colour in the cartoon. 
And then, he will 
display the cartoon. It 
is interesting. 
The illustrator will 
display the cartoon. 
And then, he will 
ride the cartoon. It 
is frosty.   
71 The librarian will stand 
behind the bookshelf. 
And then, she will check 
the bookshelf. It is made 
of oak. 
The librarian will tidy 
up the bookshelf. And 
then, she will check 
the bookshelf. It is 
made of oak.  
The librarian will 
check the 
bookshelf. And 
then, she will 
interrupt the 
bookshelf. It is 
dizzy. 
72 The little girl will kiss the 
teddy bear. And then, 
she will talk to the teddy 
The little girl will dress 
the teddy bear. And 
then, she will talk to 
The little girl will 
talk to the teddy 
bear. And then, 
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bear. It is her favourite. the teddy bear. It is 
her favourite. 
she will spill the 
teddy bear. It is 
hungry.  
73 The lumberjack will 
point at the tree branch. 
And then, he will reach 
for the branch.  It is 
long. 
The lumberjack will 
saw off the tree 
branch. And then, he 
will reach for the 
branch. It is long.  
The lumberjack will 
reach for the tree 
branch. And then, 
he will stretch the 
branch. It is faithful. 
74 The maid will sit on the 
messy bed. And then, 
she will complain about 
the bed. It has a velvet 
sheet. 
The maid will make up 
the messy bed. And 
then, she will complain 
about the bed. It has a 
velvet sheet.  
The maid will 
complain about the 
messy bed. And 
then, she will 
excuse the bed. It 
is healthy.  
75 The man will look at the 
wristwatch. And then, he 
will brag about the 
wristwatch. It is a 
counterfeit. 
The man will reset the 
wristwatch. And then, 
he will brag about the 
wristwatch. It is a 
counterfeit. 
The man will brag 
about the 
wristwatch. And 
then, he will 
proofread the 
wristwatch. It is 
homeless.  
76 The man will criticize the 
brochure. And then, he 
will read the brochure. It 
is informative. 
The man will fold the 
brochure. And then, he 
will read the brochure. 
It is informative. 
The man will 
publicize the 
brochure. And 
then, he will sow 
the brochure. It is 
made of metal.   
77 The man will choose the 
bagel. And then, he will 
smell the bagel. It is 
freshly baked. 
The man will eat the 
bagel. And then, he 
will smell the bagel. It 
is freshly baked. 
The man will smell 
the bagel. And 
then, he will punch 
the bagel. It is red. 
78 The man will sketch the 
label. And then, he will 
read the label. It is in the 
wrong font. 
The man will remove 
the label. And then, he 
will read the label. It is 
in the wrong font. 
The man will read 
the label. And then, 
he will squeeze the 
label. It is joyous. 
79 The man will kick the 
gate. And then, he will 
lean on the gate. It is 
made of iron. 
The man will shut the 
gate. And then, he will 
lean on the gate. It is 
made of iron. 
The man will lean 
on the gate. And 
then, he will 
summarize the 
gate. It is lazy.  
80 The man will lean on the 
dishwasher. And then, 
he will comment on the 
dishwasher. It is a 
Bosch. 
The man will take 
apart the dishwasher. 
And then, he will 
comment on the 
dishwasher. It is a 
Bosch. 
The man will 
comment on the 
dishwasher. And 
then, he will obey 
the dishwasher. It 
is windproof.  
81 The man will look for the 
mobile phone. And then, 
he will gripe about the 
phone. It is a Nokia. 
The man will smash 
the mobile phone. And 
then, he will gripe 
about the phone. It is a 
The man will gripe 
about the mobile 
phone. And then, 
he will hunt the 
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Nokia. phone. It is mushy.  
82 The mechanic will 
examine the car engine. 
And then, he will ask 
about the engine. It is a 
diesel. 
The mechanic will 
disassemble the car 
engine. And then, he 
will ask about the 
engine. It is a diesel.  
The mechanic will 
ask about the car 
engine. And then, 
he will boil the 
engine. It is 
obedient. 
83 The mother will select 
the egg. And then, she 
will talk about the egg. It 
is medium sized. 
The mother will poach 
the egg. And then, she 
will talk about the egg. 
It is medium sized. 
The mother will talk 
about the egg. And 
then, she will 
confront the egg. It 
is pleasant.  
84 The child will try the 
saxophone. And then, 
she will ask about the 
saxophone. It is a 
birthday present. 
The child will strap on 
the saxophone. And 
then, she will ask 
about the saxophone. 
It is a birthday present. 
The child will ask 
about the 
saxophone. And 
then, she will drink 
the saxophone. It is 
prickly. 
85 The musician will play 
the piano. And then, he 
will rave about the 
piano. It is black. 
The musician will tune 
the piano. And then, 
he will rave about the 
piano. It is black. 
The musician will 
rave about the 
piano. And then, he 
will drive the piano. 
It is puzzled.  
86 The new employee will 
stare at the safe. And 
then, he will ask about 
the safe. It looks 
complicated. 
The new employee will 
open up the safe. And 
then, he will ask about 
the safe. It looks 
complicated. 
The new employee 
will ask about the 
safe. And then, he 
will convert the 
safe. It is shy.  
87 The ninja will grip the 
sword. And then, he will 
grin at the sword. It is a 
gift from his father. 
The ninja will 
unsheathe the sword. 
And then, he will grin 
at the sword. It is a gift 
from his father. 
The ninja will grin 
at the sword. And 
then, he will load 
the sword. It is 
repulsive.  
88 The office worker will 
type on the keyboard. 
And then, he will 
complain about the 
keyboard. It is dirty. 
The office worker will 
plug in the keyboard. 
And then, he will 
complain about the 
keyboard. It is dirty. 
The office worker 
will complain about 
the keyboard. And 
then, he will irritate 
the keyboard. It is 
talented.  
89 The man will aim at the 
field mouse. And then, 
he will follow the mouse. 
It is small. 
The man will shoot the 
field mouse. And then, 
he will follow the 
mouse. It is small. 
The man will follow 
the field mouse. 
And then, he will 
exhibit the mouse. 
It is chatty.  
90 The palaeontologist will 
dig around the fossil. 
And then, he will talk 
about the fossil. It looks 
The palaeontologist 
will dig up the fossil. 
And then, he will talk 
about the fossil. It 
The 
palaeontologist will 
talk about the 
fossil. And then, he 
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like a skull. looks like a skull. will motivate the 
fossil. It is smoggy.  
91 The parking attendant 
will check the parking 
meter. And then, she 
will rest against the 
meter. It is broken. 
The parking attendant 
will empty the parking 
meter. And then, she 
will rest against the 
meter. It is broken. 
The parking 
attendant will rest 
against the parking 
meter. And then, 
she will determine 
the meter. It is 
witty. 
92 The police woman will 
investigate the violent 
crime. And then, she will 
receive reports about 
the crime. It is a serious 
case. 
The police woman will 
solve the violent crime. 
And then, she will 
receive reports about 
the crime. It is a 
serious case. 
The police woman 
will receive reports 
about the violent 
crime. And then, 
she will print the 
crime. It is 
splendid.  
93 The passer-by will 
watch the bird. And 
then, she will call to the 
bird. It has red feathers. 
The passer-by will 
frighten the bird. And 
then, she will call to 
the bird. It has red 
feathers. 
The passer-by will 
call to the bird. And 
then, she will 
bleach the bird. It is 
vast. 
94 The plumber will leave 
behind the pipe. And 
then, he will frown at the 
pipe. It is leaking. 
The plumber will bend 
the pipe. And then, he 
will frown at the pipe. It 
is leaking. 
The plumber will 
frown at the pipe. 
And then, he will 
fry the pipe. It is 
wicked. 
95 The sailor will hold onto 
the sail. And then, he 
will scowl at the sail. It is 
ragged. 
The sailor will take 
down the sail. And 
then, he will scowl at 
the sail. It is ragged. 
The sailor will 
scowl at the sail. 
And then, he will 
salt the sail. It is 
woolly.   
96 The scuba diver will 
peer through the diving 
mask. And then, he will 
tug at the mask. It is his 
brother's. 
The scuba diver will 
wipe clear the diving 
mask. And then, he 
will tug at the mask. It 
is his brother's. 
The scuba diver 
will tug at the 
diving mask. And 
then, he will 
compute the mask. 
It is stormy. 
97 The secretary will 
search for the file. And 
then, she will gripe 
about the file. It is top 
secret. 
The secretary will 
shred the file. And 
then, she will gripe 
about the file. It is top 
secret.  
The secretary will 
gripe about the file. 
And then, she will 
mourn the file. it is 
thoughtful. 
98 The squirrel will sniff the 
acorn. And then, it will 
lick the acorn. It is tiny. 
The squirrel will crack 
the acorn. And then, it 
will lick the acorn. It is 
tiny.  
The squirrel will lick 
the acorn. And 
then, it will fold the 
acorn. It is worried. 
99 The student will smell 
the pizza. And then, he 
will blow on the pizza. It 
The student will slice 
the pizza. And then, 
he will blow on the 
The student will 
blow on the pizza. 
And then, he will 
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is pepperoni. pizza. It is pepperoni. forgive the pizza. It 
is nervous.  
100 The student will 
measure the iron beam. 
And then, he will stare 
at the beam.  It is for his 
project. 
The student will 
engrave the iron 
beam. And then, he 
will stare at the beam.  
It is for his project. 
The student will 
stare at the iron 
beam. And then, 
he will frighten the 
beam. It is tired.  
101 The tailor will measure 
the dress. And then, he 
will ask about the dress. 
It is glamorous. 
The tailor will shorten 
the dress. And then, 
he will ask about the 
dress. It is glamorous.  
The tailor will ask 
about the dress. 
And then, he will 
rhyme the dress. It 
is weary.   
102 The politician will 
support the welfare 
program. And then, he 
will praise the program.    
It is for working mothers. 
The politician will 
expand the welfare 
program. And then, he 
will praise the 
program.    It is for 
working mothers. 
The politician will 
praise the welfare 
program. And then, 
he will itch the 
program. It is 
quaint.  
103 The teacher will point at 
the blackboard. And 
then, she will read from 
the blackboard. It is 
huge. 
The teacher will wipe 
clear the blackboard. 
And then, she will read 
from the black board.  
It is huge. 
The teacher will 
read from the 
blackboard. And 
then, she will divert 
the black board. It 
is yellow. 
104 The teenager will bang 
on the dustbin. And 
then, he will walk 
around the dustbin. It 
smells bad. 
The teenager will tip 
over the dustbin. And 
then, he will walk 
around the dustbin. It 
smells bad. 
The teenager will 
walk around the 
dustbin. And then, 
he will offend the 
dustbin. It is misty. 
105 The teenager will 
interpret the tarot cards. 
And then, she will chat 
about the cards. They 
are mysterious. 
The teenager will 
shuffle the tarot cards. 
And then, she will chat 
about the cards. They 
are mysterious. 
The teenager will 
chat about the tarot 
cards. And then, 
she will chop the 
cards. They are 
round. 
106 The toddler will look 
over the puzzle. And 
then, he will marvel at 
the puzzle. It is about 
jungle animals. 
The toddler will break 
apart the puzzle. And 
then, he will marvel at 
the puzzle. It is about 
jungle animals. 
The toddler will 
marvel at the 
puzzle. And then, 
he will float the 
puzzle. It is 
obedient. 
107 The man will join the 
political commune. And 
then, he will study the 
commune.  It is not well 
known. 
The man will split the 
political commune. 
And then, he will find 
the commune.  It is not 
well known. 
The man will join 
the political 
commune. And 
then, he will warm 
up the commune. It 
is tasty. 
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108 The traffic cop will 
observe the CCTV 
camera. And then, he 
will photograph the 
camera.  It is facing the 
wrong direction. 
The traffic cop will stop 
the CCTV camera. 
And then, he will 
photograph the 
camera.  It is facing 
the wrong direction. 
The traffic cop will 
recognize the 
CCTV camera. And 
then, he will sew 
the camera. It is 
lonely. 
109 The trainer will pat the 
horse. And then, he will 
feed the horse. It is a 
black stallion. 
The trainer will saddle 
the horse. And then, 
he will feed the horse. 
It is a black stallion. 
The trainer will 
feed the horse. 
And then, he will 
extract the horse. It 
is barking.  
110 The traveller will lay on 
the blanket. And then, 
he will complain about 
the blanket. It is a bit 
wet. 
The traveller will roll 
up the blanket. And 
then, he will complain 
about the blanket. It is 
a bit wet. 
The traveller will 
complain about the 
blanket. And then, 
he will frame the 
blanket. It is proud.  
111 The ventriloquist will 
address the dummy. 
And then, he will make 
fun of the dummy. It 
looks freaky. 
The ventriloquist will 
seat the dummy.  And 
then, he will make fun 
of the dummy. It looks 
freaky.  
The ventriloquist 
will make fun of the 
dummy.  And then, 
he will persuade 
the dummy. It is 
fluorescent. 
112 The welder will clutch 
the blowtorch. And then, 
he will fiddle with the 
blowtorch. It is his 
friend's. 
The welder will light 
the blowtorch. And 
then, he will fiddle with 
the blowtorch. It is his 
friend's. 
The welder will 
fiddle with the 
blowtorch. And 
then, he will 
misspell the 
blowtorch. It is 
depressed. 
113 The woman will pick up 
the potato. And then, 
she will talk about the 
potato. It is a Maris 
Piper. 
The woman will mash 
the potato. And then, 
she will talk about the 
potato. It is a Maris 
Piper. 
The woman will 
talk about the 
potato. And then, 
she will evacuate 
the potato. It is 
modern.  
114 The woman will pick out 
the apple. And then, she 
will talk about the apple. 
It is sweet. 
The woman will halve 
the apple. And then, 
she will talk about the 
apple. It is sweet. 
The woman will 
talk about the 
apple. And then, 
she will interfere 
the apple. It is 
flying.   
115 The woman will look into 
the pram. And then, she 
will kneel beside the 
pram. It is from 
Mothercare. 
The woman will fold up 
the pram. And then, 
she will kneel beside 
the pram. It is from 
Mothercare. 
The woman will 
kneel beside the 
pram. And then, 
she will flash the 
pram. It is leafy.  
116 The woman will peer 
behind the curtain. And 
then, she will frown at 
the curtain. It has a 
The woman will wash 
the curtain. And then, 
she will frown at the 
curtain. It has a floral 
The woman will frown 
at the curtain. And 
then, she will land the 
curtain. It is stringy.  
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floral pattern. pattern. 
117 The woman will inspect 
the cello. And then, she 
will kneel beside the 
cello. It is a gift. 
The woman will 
restring the cello. And 
then, she will kneel 
beside the cello. It is a 
gift. 
The woman will 
kneel beside the 
cello. And then, 
she will pour the 
cello. It is smiling.  
118 The woman will tap the 
table. And then, she will 
walk around the table. It 
is from IKEA. 
The woman will set the 
table. And then, she 
will walk around the 
table. It is from IKEA. 
The woman will 
walk around the 
table. And then, 
she will fail the 
table. It is hairy.   
119 The architect will rate 
the room. And then, she 
will comment on the 
room. It is for a client's 
daughter. 
The architect will 
redecorate the room. 
And then, she will 
comment on the 
room.. It is for a 
client's daughter. 
The architect will 
comment on the 
room. And then, 
she will diagnose 
the room. It is 
dripping. 
120 The zookeeper will pat 
the animal. And then, he 
will chat about the 
animal. It is furry.  
The zookeeper will 
rescue the animal. 
And then, he will chat 
about the animal. It is 
furry.  
The zookeeper will 
chat about the 
animal. And then, 
he will hover the 
animal. It is sugary. 
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Appendix II 
Supplement Tables  
Table a2.1  
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target objects on the visual display in Experiment 4 
 
DEPICTED 
STATE 
(PICTURE) 
CHANGE 
OF STATE 
(VERB) 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage 
of trials %) 
The 
woman 
will 
choose 
/drop 
the ice 
cream. 
But first/ But 
first, 
she will look at the ice cream. 
FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN 
INTACT 
STATE 
CHOOSE Saccades 40 (14) 21 (9) 38 (11) 26 (12) 22 (18) 9 (11) 9 (13) 18 (13) 16 (12) 32 (18) 29 (17) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 22 (10) 26 (11) 50 (19) 53 (20) 43 (23) 47 (22) 44 (23) 45 (20) 39 (21) 36 (18) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 26 (10) 42 (12) 47 (20) 48 (20) 44 (23) 45 (20) 39 (21) 36 (18) 45 (20) 39 (21) 
DROP Saccades 43 (15) 21 (9) 28 (12) 22 (16) 19 (14) 9 (12) 7 (9) 17 (14) 16 (15) 39 (18) 30 (17) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 24 (10) 28 (10) 31 (15) 32 (18) 26 (16) 26 (17) 26 (17) 24 (17) 28 (17) 23 (16) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 26 (10) 30 (13) 26 (15) 27 (17) 26 (17) 24 (16) 28 (17) 23 (16) 46 (19) 34 (16) 
CHANGED 
STATE 
CHOOSE Saccades 43 (17) 21 (9) 34 (11) 27 (16) 24 (17) 11 (13) 10 (11) 19 (14) 22 (16) 31 (18) 26 (18) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 29 (11) 30 (9) 33 (16) 32 (16) 31 (18) 33 (17) 32 (20) 34 (16) 34 (16) 37 (19) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 29 (9) 35 (10) 33 (16) 33 (18) 32 (20) 34 (16) 34 (16) 37 (19) 35 (14) 37 (17) 
DROP Saccades 45 (15) 24 (12) 36 (11) 28 (16) 22 (15) 9 (9) 9 (11) 18 (13) 21 (15) 24 (18) 31 (18) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 30 (11) 41 (14) 54 (17) 55 (23) 49 (24) 52 (22) 46 (21) 50 (23) 41 (18) 45 (20) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 35 (12) 53 (15) 53 (23) 52 (22) 47 (22) 50 (23) 41 (18) 45 (20) 35 (18) 47 (19) 
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Table a2.2   
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target objects on the visual display in Experiment 5 
 
DEPICTED 
STATE 
OBJECT 
TYPE 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage of 
trials %) 
The 
girl will 
stomp 
on 
the 
penny/egg. 
But first/ And 
then, 
she will look at the 
penny/egg. 
FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN 
INTACT 
VERSION 
PENNY Saccades 26 (12) 14 (8) 29 (11) 28 (15) 26 (15) 15(12) 14(11) 19(14) 19(14) 18(13) 22(14) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 16 (10) 18 (12) 31 (14) 31 (14) 28(16) 29(14) 30 (17) 27 
(12) 
28(16) 29(14) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 18 (12) 27 (10) 28 (16) 29 (14) 30(17) 27(12) 22(20) 22(16) 27(16) 32(15) 
EGG Saccades 29 (11) 15 (10) 29 (12) 24 (15) 24 (14) 10(10) 12(10) 22(13) 18(15) 25(13) 19(11) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 21 (11) 20 (12) 26 (16) 24 (15) 25(14) 22(14) 23 (14) 22 
(13) 
29(14) 26(15) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 20 (12) 24 (11) 25 (14) 22(14) 23(14) 22(13) 22(16) 19(16) 35(17) 26(12) 
CHANGED 
VERSION 
PENNY Saccades 29 (11) 14 (9) 29 (12) 27 (13) 26 (15) 12(12) 15(12) 21(13) 20(12) 22(13) 21(14) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 19 (9) 18 (9) 32 (15 32 (16) 30 (16) 28(17) 24 (15) 29(16) 30(18) 28(15) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 18 (9) 27 (9) 30 (16) 28 (17) 24(15) 29(16) 21 (18) 22(15) 34(15) 30(15) 
EGG Saccades 31(10) 18 (8) 37 (12) 41 (14) 40 (16) 15(12) 13(10) 16(12) 17(11) 18(12) 22(14) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 28 (9) 30 (11) 42 (15 43 (17) 40 (17) 42 
(16) 
41(17) 40(16) 35(17) 36(17) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 30 (11) 41 (11) 40 (17) 42 (16) 41(17) 40(16) 28(20) 30(18) 29(16) 39(16) 
Note: The two versions of objects that were not expected to experience any change, such as the penny, were the identical on the visual display. Thus, 
“intact/changed version” of the “penny” refer to the corresponding locations of the “egg” rather than change of state.  
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Table a2.3 
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target object on the visual display in Experiment 6.  
 
DEPICTED 
STATE 
(PICTURE) 
DESCRIBED 
CHANGE 
(VERB) 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage of 
trials %) 
The 
woman 
will 
choose 
/drop 
the ice 
cream. 
But first/ And 
then, 
she will look at the ice cream. 
FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN FIRST THEN 
INTACT 
VERSION 
CHOOSE Saccades 40(15) 23(13) 37(14) 27(14) 25(15) 8(10) 11(10) 17(12) 19(18) 33(19) 28(14) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 25(12) 28(11) 50(17) 45(17) 45(19) 48(18) 42(20) 46(19) 41(18) 41(17) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 28(10) 37(14) 49(21) 47(20) 42(20) 46(19) 41(18) 41(17) 49(17) 48(17) 
DROP Saccades 40(14) 21(9) 34(14) 19(14) 22(15) 9(10) 8(11) 18(14) 17(12) 31(13) 26(15) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 25(11) 28(10) 35(17) 31(14) 30(17) 28(15) 30(15) 27(13) 33(19) 27(16) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 28 (9) 35(12) 27(15) 31(16) 30(15) 26(13) 33(19) 27(16) 42(19) 31(16) 
CHANGED 
VERSION 
CHOOSE Saccades 41(14) 20(11) 40(15) 25(18) 22(16) 9(11) 11(10) 18(14) 19(14) 28(15) 23(15) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 31(12) 31(12) 36(15) 37(15) 36(16) 33(16) 36(19) 36(16) 33(16) 34(15) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 31 (13) 39(12) 33(19) 36(19) 36(19) 35(16) 33(16) 34(15) 34(15) 34(17) 
DROP Saccades 43(13) 22(12) 44(13) 31(17) 26(14) 9(10) 11(12) 18(13) 19(16) 27(15) 28(16) 
Fixations at the 
onset  
0 (0) 29(10) 33(11) 49(19) 53(17) 48(18) 51(20) 45(18) 51(21) 39(19) 45(20) 
Fixations at the 
offset  
N/A 32 (12) 48(12) 53(17) 51(20) 45(18) 51(21) 39(19) 45(20) 40(19) 47(17) 
Note: The two versions are not expected to be associated with the same object - being the intact state and the changed state respectively. 
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Table a2.4 
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target objects on the visual displays in Experiment 7 
 
VISUAL 
DISPLAY 
(PICTURE) 
DESCRIBED 
STATE 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage 
of trials %) 
The 
woman 
will 
drop the ice 
cream. 
But 
first,  
she 
will 
look 
at 
the/another ice cream 
THE ANOTHER THE ANOTHER 
SIMILAR 
VERSIONS 
INTACT 
STATE 
Saccades 42(15) 39(13) 31(11) 21(12) 13(10) 17(11) 6(8) 17(15) 41(19) 46(20) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 22(11) 23(10) 23(14) 21(12) 24(15) 27(16) 25(19) 29(18) 32(20) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 23(13) 25(11) 21(12) 24(15) 26(14) 29(18) 32(20) 47(20) 57(22) 
CHANGED 
STATE 
Saccades 44(14) 54(14) 47(13) 24(12) 11(9) 13(9) 4(8) 9(8) 23(16) 22(19) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 31(9) 38(11) 58(18) 56(22) 51(22) 42(24) 40(25) 41(24) 30(21) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 38(17) 58(14) 56(22) 51(22) 41(22) 41(24) 30(21) 32(17) 24(17) 
DIFFERENT 
VERSIONS 
INTACT 
VERSION 
Saccades 39(16) 41(11) 37(13) 23(11) 12(9) 16(10) 7(9) 18(13) 38(18) 42(19) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 24(12) 26(9) 28(11) 27(10) 27(11) 24(16) 30(19) 28(17) 36(18) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 26(14) 31(12) 27(17) 27(11) 27(14) 27(17) 35(18) 47(19) 54(16) 
CHANGED 
STATE 
Saccades 42(14) 51(12) 47(14) 26(10) 13(8) 14(9) 4(7) 12(10) 23(17) 26(15) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 29(11) 35(11) 55(13) 51(19) 50(18) 45(23) 39(21) 44(211) 32(17) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 35(14) 52(13) 51(19) 50(18) 42(19) 44(21) 32(17) 34(17) 28(14) 
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Table a2.5a 
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target objects on the visual displays in Experiment 8 when a backward 
temporal shift “but first” was indicated at the beginning of the second sentence. 
 
VISUAL 
DISPLAY 
(PICTURE) 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage 
of trials %) 
The 
woman 
will 
drop the ice 
cream. 
But first, she will look at the/another ice cream 
THE ANOTHER THE ANOTHER 
INTACT 
STATE 
 
Saccades 34(8) 15(7) 29(9) 20(11) 12(8) 13(8) 7(9) 11(9) 38(22) 41(19) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 16(6) 14(5) 15(10) 12(8) 13(8) 13(10) 13(13) 19(14) 13(9) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 14(6) 17(6) 12(8) 13(8) 
 
13(8) 18(14) 13(10) 33(19) 35(18) 
INTACT 
COMPETITOR 
 
Saccades 32(9) 15(5) 25(8) 18(10) 12(9) 14(7) 1(4) 16(11) 27(15) 30(20) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 15(6) 15(7) 14(10) 13(9) 15(10) 15(11) 16(11) 14(11) 23(14) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 15(7) 15(6) 13(9) 15(10) 15(7) 14(11) 22(14) 19(14) 30(18) 
CHANGED 
STATE 
 
Saccades 34(9) 17(8) 44(11) 33(13) 17(9) 19(8) 2(5) 10(11) 25(18) 13(11) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 19(6) 24(8) 48(19) 48(18) 45(20) 33(19) 41(24) 30(17) 24(19) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 24(8) 42(11) 48(18) 45(20) 37(18) 30(18) 25(20) 26(18) 12(10) 
CHANGED 
COMPETITOR 
 
Saccades 25(12) 12(8) 19(8) 12(8) 8(6) 13(8) 1(3) 11(13) 13(12) 10(12) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 11(6) 13(8) 7(5) 9(8) 9(8) 13(11) 10(12) 11(10) 10(12) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 13(8) 9(4) 9(8) 9(8) 11(8) 11(11) 10(12) 8(10) 7(9) 
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Table a2.5b 
Mean fixations and saccades towards the depicted versions of the target objects on the visual displays in Experiment 8 when a forward 
temporal shift “and then” was indicated at the beginning of the second sentence. 
 
VISUAL 
DISPLAY 
(PICTURE) 
Mean (SD) 
(Percentage 
of trials %) 
The 
woman 
will 
drop the ice 
cream. 
And then she will look at the/another ice cream 
THE ANOTHER THE ANOTHER 
INTACT 
STATE 
 
Saccades 34(8) 15(7) 29(9) 21(12) 11(9) 15(9) 3(5) 15(15) 29(14) 40(15) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 16(6) 14(5) 17(10) 13(9) 13(10) 14(12) 14(11) 13(11) 17(12) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 14(6) 17(6) 13(9) 13(10) 14(8) 13(11) 17(12) 23(16) 35(14) 
INTACT 
COMPETITOR 
 
Saccades 32(9) 15(5) 25(8) 18(10) 9(7) 14(11) 3(6) 13(11) 20(15) 33(17) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 15(6) 15(7) 14(7) 13(9) 12(9) 15(14) 12(12) 15(13) 16(13) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 15(7) 15(6) 13(9) 12(9) 13(10) 15(14) 16(13) 18(14) 33(18) 
CHANGED 
STATE 
 
Saccades 34(9) 17(8) 44(11) 312(15) 18(10) 19(12) 5(8) 10(12) 27(18) 16(14) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 19(6) 24(8) 47(18) 48(18) 46(20) 37(25) 42(25) 36(24) 28(20) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 24(8) 42(11) 48(18) 46(20) 
 
39(23) 36(24) 28(20) 30(18) 14(14) 
CHANGED 
COMPETITOR 
 
Saccades 25(12) 12(8) 19(8) 12(9) 8(7) 13(10) 4(6) 9(9) 13(10) 10(9) 
Fixations at 
the onset  
0 (0) 11(6) 13(8) 8(6) 9(6) 10(8) 13(11) 12(11) 11(10) 10(10) 
Fixations at 
the offset  
N/A 13(8) 9(4) 9(6) 10(8) 12(8) 11(10) 11(10) 8(10) 6(7) 
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Appendix III 
Supplement Experiments  
 
Experiment A1  
In this experiment, 211 participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk. They read a sentence such as “The woman will choose the ice cream” or 
“The woman will drop the ice cream” and judged whether an object in the probe 
picture was mentioned in the sentence. The probe picture was presented 500 
ms after they finished reading the sentence. For experimental items, the probe 
picture showed a matched object in either an intact state or a changed state, 
thus required “yes” answers. There were also foil items with mismatched 
sentences and objects, thus “no” answers were required. A within-subjects 
design was used and 4 counterbalanced lists were included. In each list, there 
were 32 experimental items and 32 foil items. After excluding non-native 
speakers and participants with low-accuracy rates (less than 3 standard 
deviation from the mean), 176 participants (44 per list) were included in data 
analysis. Figure a1.1 illustrates mean verification accuracy rates and latencies. 
Note: * p< .05; ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Figure a1.1 Mean accuracy rates (left) and response times (right) of correct 
responses in Experiment A1. 
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A two-way repeated measures  ANOVA revealed a main effect of event, F1(1, 
175) = 37.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .18 (by subjects), F2(1, 31) = 2.62, p = .116, ηp2 
= .08 (by items), and a main effect of picture probe, F1(1, 175) = 34.31, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .16 (by subjects), F2(1, 31) = 1.82, p = .188, ηp2 = .06 (by items). However, 
there was a significant interaction, F1(1, 175) = 102.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .37 (by 
subjects), F2(1, 31) = 8.91, p = .006, ηp2 = .22 (by items), replicating the finding 
in Experiment 2. As shown in Figure a1.1, the intact state was verified more 
accurately and faster when no change was described. By contrast, the changed 
state was verified more accurately and faster when a change of state was 
described. Therefore, the results suggest that responses to the probe pictures 
were influenced by the linguistic context. Participants responded more 
accurately and faster to probe pictures that matched the linguistic context 
compared to ones that mismatched the linguistic context.  
Experiment A2  
In this experiment, we have investigated whether an event in between would 
influence the keeping track of of object representations. Participants were 64 
native speakers of British English. According to event boundary theory (e.g., 
Radvansky & Copeland, 2006), once a model has been updated due to 
changes (e.g., location shifts), what was in the previous model would not be as 
accessible compared to the case when no updating has happened. Here, we 
aimed to test whether similar effect would be shown when another object was 
mentioned. Thus, we predicted that the difference of eye movements between 
(a) and (b) would not be found between (c) and (d). The results confirmed our 
predictions. When an additional event was mentioned participants’ overall looks 
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towards target regions were reduced, and difference of looks between “penny” 
and “egg” disappeared. The data thus suggest that adding a new event not only 
reduces the accessibility of target objects, but also interferes the memory 
retrieval process of the intended object representation.  
a) The girl will stomp on the penny. But first, she will look down at the 
penny.  
b) The girl will stomp on the egg. But first, she will look down at the egg. 
c) The girl will stomp on the penny. But first, she will put on her gloves and 
look down at the penny;  
d) The girl will stomp on the egg. But first, she will put on her gloves and 
look down at the egg. 
         
Figure A2 Example visual stimuli 
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Experiment A3 
To control for the visual difference between the two types of target objects (e.g., 
penny vs. egg ), they were not shown in the visual scene (see Figure A3). 
Instead, the same visual scene was used for both conditions. Half of the 
linguistic stimuli were the same as in Experiment A2, and the other half were in 
“and then” condition, as shown in examples below. We expected to see more 
eye movements towards the plant when the linguistic stimuli were in “egg” 
condition than “penny” condition,   
 
a) The girl discovered a penny behind the plant. She will stomp on the penny. 
But first, she will look down at the penny. 
b) The girl discovered a penny behind the plant. She will stomp on the penny. 
And then, she will look down at the penny. 
c) The girl discovered an egg behind the plant. She will stomp on the egg. But 
first, she will look down at the egg. 
d)  The girl discovered an egg behind the plant. She will stomp on the egg. And 
then, she will look down at the egg. 
 
 
Figure A3 Example of a visual scene for Experiment A3 
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96 students from the University of York participated in this study. During the 
final reference to the target objects (e.g., penny/egg). A two-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on saccades towards the “plant” when the 
“egg” or “penny” was mentioned at the end of the third sentence. The results 
showed that there was neither significant main effect of the type of objects, F (1, 
95) = .14, p=.71, temporal shifts, F (1, 95) = .94, p=.34. Nevertheless, there was 
a marginal interaction between the change of state and the temporal shifts by 
subjects, F (1, 95) = 3.61, p=.06. The results indicate that it’s easier to retrieve 
an object’s initial state when change was described to happen on it, but it’s 
easier to maintain an object’s current state when no change was associated 
with it. Thus, the data suggest that keeping track of an intact state (regardless 
due to the properties of the object itself or as the initial state before changes 
happen) was not as difficult as keeping tracking of a changed state. 
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